Articles

Ambiguity and the Bayesian Approach

I. GILBOA, M. MARINACCI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences, GREGHEC (CNRS)


An analytic calculus for the intuitionistic logic of proofs

B. HILL, F. POGGIOLESI

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Confidence in belief and rational decision making

B. HILL

Economics and Philosophy

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Confidence, Decision Under Uncertainty, Belief, Rationality

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144309


The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature

Explore first, exploite next: the true shape of regret in bandit problems

A. GARIVIER, P. MENARD, G. STOLTZ

Mathematics of Operations Research

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences


We revisit lower bounds on the regret in the case of multi-armed bandit problems. We obtain non-asymptotic, distribution-dependent bounds and provide straightforward proofs based only on well-known properties of Kullback-Leibler divergences. These bounds show in particular that in an initial phase the regret grows almost linearly, and that the well-known logarithmic growth of the regret only holds in a final phase. The proof techniques come to the essence of the information-theoretic arguments used and they are deprived of all unnecessary complications

Forward Guidance and Heterogenous Beliefs

G. GABALLO, E. MENGUS

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences



JavaScriptSettings