Articles

A Configural Approach to Coordinating Expertise in Software Development Teams

S. KUDARAVALLI, S. FARAJ, S. L. JOHNSON

MIS Quarterly

Forthcoming

Departments: Informations Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Software development, software teams, expertise coordination, configuration, centralization, knowledge tacitness, team conflict, coordination success

http://misq.org/a-configural-approach-to-coordinating-expertise-in-software-development-teams.html


Despite the recognition of how important expertise coordination is to the performance of software development teams, understanding of how expertise is coordinated in practice is limited. We adopt a configural approach to develop a theoretical model of expertise coordination that differentiates between design collaboration and technical collaboration. We propose that neither a strictly centralized, top-down model nor a largely decentralized approach is superior. Our model is tested in a field study of 71 software development teams. We conclude that because design work addresses ill-structured problems with diverse potential solutions, decentralization of design collaboration can lead to greater coordination success and reduced team conflict. Conversely, technical work benefits from centralized collaboration. We find that task knowledge tacitness strengthens these relationships between collaboration configuration and coordination outcomes and that team conflict mediates the relationships. Our findings underline the need to differentiate between technical and design collaboration and point to the importance of certain configurations in reducing team conflict and increasing coordination success in software development teams. This paper opens up new research avenues to explore the collaborative mechanisms underlying knowledge team performance.

A Legal Analysis of Packaging Standardisation Requirements Under EU Law - The Case of ‘Plain Packaging’ in the United Kingdom

A. ALEMANNO

Journal of Business Law

Forthcoming

Departments: Tax & Law, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Achieving High Growth in Policy-Dependent Industries: Differences between Startups and Corporate-Backed Ventures

R. DURAND, G. PANAYIOTIS (PANIKOS)

Long Range Planning

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2794262


This research examines which firms achieve high growth in policy-dependent industries. Using the European solar photovoltaic industry as our empirical setting, we investigate the impact of policy support on the growth of independent startups and corporate-backed ventures operating across countries with diverse policy conditions. We find that producers' growth is positively linked to policy generosity, and negatively linked to policy discontinuity. Moreover, corporate-backed ventures are less affected by policy generosity compared to entrepreneurial startups, and less impacted by policy discontinuity as well. Our results underline the importance of country- and firm-level differences in analyzing firms' response to regulatory policies, and point to the need for a better understanding of the unintended consequences of policies designed to support new industries.

Alleviating Managerial Dilemmas In Human-Capital-Intensive Firms Through Incentives: Evidence From M&A Legal Advisors

O. CHATAIN, P. MEYER-DOYLE

Strategic Management Journal

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Human-Capital-Intensive Firms, Human Capital, Managerial Dilemmas, Incentives, Capabilities, Micro-foundations, Mergers and Acquisitions, Law firms

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693097


We examine how human-capital-intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm-specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro-data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains while ‘stretching’ lawyers with high firm-specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm-specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority-based rent-sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment

Ambiguity and the Bayesian Approach

I. GILBOA, M. MARINACCI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications

Forthcoming

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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