Articles

Achieving High Growth in Policy-Dependent Industries: Differences between Startups and Corporate-Backed Ventures

R. DURAND, G. PANAYIOTIS (PANIKOS)

Long Range Planning

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2794262


This research examines which firms achieve high growth in policy-dependent industries. Using the European solar photovoltaic industry as our empirical setting, we investigate the impact of policy support on the growth of independent startups and corporate-backed ventures operating across countries with diverse policy conditions. We find that producers' growth is positively linked to policy generosity, and negatively linked to policy discontinuity. Moreover, corporate-backed ventures are less affected by policy generosity compared to entrepreneurial startups, and less impacted by policy discontinuity as well. Our results underline the importance of country- and firm-level differences in analyzing firms' response to regulatory policies, and point to the need for a better understanding of the unintended consequences of policies designed to support new industries.

Alleviating Managerial Dilemmas In Human-Capital-Intensive Firms Through Incentives: Evidence From M&A Legal Advisors

O. CHATAIN, P. MEYER-DOYLE

Strategic Management Journal

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Human-Capital-Intensive Firms, Human Capital, Managerial Dilemmas, Incentives, Capabilities, Micro-foundations, Mergers and Acquisitions, Law firms

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693097


We examine how human-capital-intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm-specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro-data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains while ‘stretching’ lawyers with high firm-specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm-specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority-based rent-sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment

Better Safe than Sorry: Subsidiary Performance Feedback and Internal Governance in Multiunit Firms

T. OBLOJ, m SENGUL

Journal of Management

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This paper explores the link between subsidiary performance feedback and internal governance mechanisms in multiunit firms. A central premise of performance feedback models is that performance below aspirations is associated with increased risk tolerance and thereby with a higher likelihood of taking excessive risks in resource allocation decisions. Building on this observation, we contend that the headquarters of multiunit firms take this association into account in the design of internal (i.e., headquarters-subsidiary) governance mechanisms. Accordingly, a subsidiary’s performance-aspiration gap (below aspirations) is positively associated with the headquarters’ oversight of its resource allocation decisions and negatively associated with the provision of incentive schemes that promote risk taking. Regression results, using data on subsidiaries in France between 1998 and 2004, support our hypotheses and show that subsidiaries performing below historical and social aspirations are less likely to be given discretion in investment decisions and incentivized by cash bonuses. In the supplementary analyses we also provide suggestive evidence that subsidiary performance problems in multiunit firms trigger structural adaptation in the internal governance mechanisms in pursuit of regaining fit

Estimating Value Creation from Revealed Preferences: Application to Value-Based Strategies

O. CHATAIN, D. MINDRUTA

Strategic Management Journal

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We develop and apply a new set of empirical tools consistent with the tenets of value-based business strategies, leveraging the principle that “no good deal comes undone” and the methods of revealed preferences to empirically estimate drivers of value creation. We demonstrate how to use these tools in an analysis of value creation in buyer–supplier relationships in the UK corporate legal market. We show how the method can uncover evidence of subtle mechanisms that traditional methods cannot easily distinguish from each other. Furthermore, we show how these estimates can be used as parameters of biform games for out-of-sample analyses of strategic decisions. With readily available data on relationships between firms, this approach can be applied to many other contexts of interest to strategy researchers

How Do Firm Political Connections Impact Foreign Acquisitions? The Effects of Decision Makers’ Political and Firm Embeddedness

P. DUSSAUGE, R. ANAND, J ALBINO PIMENTEL

Global Strategy Journal

Forthcoming

Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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