Articles

Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments

T. TOMALA, L. RENOU

Journal of Economic Theory

September 2015, vol. 159, Part A, pp.401-442

Departments: Economics & Decision Sciences, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Implementation, Approximation, Undetectability, Efficiency, Dynamic, Mechanism Design, Markov Processes

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2267373


This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable


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