Articles

Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

R. CALCAGNO, Y. KAMADA, S. LOVO, T. SUGAYA

Theoretical Economics

May 2014, vol. 9, n°2, pp.409-434

Departments: Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords: Revision games, Pre-opening, finite horizon, Equilibrium selection, Asynchronous moves


We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players repare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the ?nally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player “common interest” games, where there exists a best action pro?le for all players, this best action pro?le is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In “opposing interest” games, which are 2 × 2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payo? structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.


JavaScriptSettings