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Specialized in education and research in management, HEC Paris offers a complete and unique range of educational programs for the leaders of tomorrow: Masters Programs, MBA, PhD, Executive MBA, TRIUM Global Executive MBA and Executive Education open-enrolment and custom programs.
Founded in 1881 by the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry and founding member of Université Paris-Saclay, HEC Paris has a permanent faculty of 106 professors, more than 4,000 students and over 8,500 managers and executives in training every year.
The Master in Management - Grande Ecole Program is designed for students who hold a Bachelor’s degree in any field. The 1st academic year is comprised of general business courses; the 2nd academic year is devoted to the student’s area of specialization.
The school selects students that show the highest potential and then guides them towards the top careers in management. The vocation of the Grande Ecole program is therefore to train its students to become leaders, capable of anticipating changes in the world and of playing a responsible role within it.
HEC successfully meets this exciting challenge by:
- systematically registering all of the knowledge transmitted at HEC at the forefront of research, in all fields of management science;
- being up to date with the on-the-field practices and expectations of the businesses that the school has maintained extremely close relations with since its creation and developing leadership and entrepreneurial skills amongst the students;
- giving all its students the opportunity to have a more international outlook from the beginning and throughout their school life, whether this is through exchanges or double degrees or even on the campus itself, where more than 95 nationalities are brought together.
The Specialized Masters and MSc provide students with a specialization in a sector or a function. Lasting 8 to 12 months and taught full-time, they are aimed at candidates, with little or no professional experience, who have graduated from higher education in France or abroad, and wish to acquire an expertise in a specific field of management.
6 programs are offered in English: MSc in International Finance (with one option in Real Estate conferring a double degree with the University of Wisconsin), MSc in Strategic Management, MSc in Managerial & Financial Economics, MSc in Marketing, MSc in Sustainable Development.
4 programs are offered in French: Specialized Masters in International Law and Management, Specialized Masters for Entrepreneurs, Specialized Masters in Projects Management, Specialized Masters in Media Arts and Creation.
One program, two options: 16-month full-time MBA and 24-month part-time MBA.
The HEC MBA is divided into 2 phases. During the fundamental phase participants gain a solid foundation in 11 core business subjects. In the customized phase participants tailor the MBA to suit their individual career paths in selecting from a range of business concentrations, corporate experience and international exchanges.
Participants gain hands-on, practical experience through seminars integrated into the curriculum, such as the MBA Tournament and the off-campus leadership seminar at St-Cyr Military Academy.
The program offers participants a unique and valuable experience of being immersed in a student body of highly diverse nationalities, academic and professional backgrounds. Teamed with exceptionally talented peers, participants motivate each other to achieve, to realize their full potential and ultimately develop and sharpen their leadership skills.
A unique program: 8 majors • 5 locations • 1 unique degree
Specifically built to provide to the managers and to the executives around the world the opportunity to choose from eight majors, but also to follow their courses in five several international locations. The HEC Executive MBA is a program aimed toward senior executives around the world willing to accelerate and boost their career at the mid-term of their professional lives. The main values of our education program are based on strategy, change management, leadership and entrepreneurship.
The Executive MBA is conducted in Paris, Beijing, Shanghai and Doha, and allows you to remain either in your home track throughout the program, or to take classes within different environments.
In order to fulfill the needs of the executives in today's world, we offer eight different majors: Luxury, Aerospace & Aviation, Energy, Differentiation & Innovation through Services, Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Innovation and Social Business, Entrepreneurship - Project Accelerator. These majors allow participants to specialize themselves in a specific field and increase their knowledge in various sectors.
TRIUM Global Executive MBA enables executives to understand the world, as it is today and will be tomorrow.
Ranked #3 Executive MBA worldwide by the Financial Times, it is a unique degree jointly awarded by 3 world-renowned universities: HEC Paris, London School of Economics & Political Science, New York University Stern School of Business.
Speed up your career!
Ranked #1 worldwide for Executive Education by the Financial Times, we offer training programs for business leaders and host over 8,500 executives and managers from the whole world. Our mission is to assist companies in training managers, future managers and leaders.
Our desire is to offer executive education programs specifically built for managers and executives. They allow you to gain perspective by revisiting your convictions, learn from the diversity of participants in the class and offer proximity and access to corporate issues. HEC Executive Education relies on the excellence of the faculty of HEC Paris, the expertise of its external speakers and the international reputation of its research in order to offer its customers a unique and unforgettable experience.
HEC Paris offers:
- a 4-year full-time doctoral program fully taught in English that meets the highest international standards
- a program which fosters originality, innovation and the ability to advance the frontier of management knowledge
- a first year dedicated to courses to give you a grasp of research skills and advanced conceptual frameworks in your field
- supervision by a world-class Faculty engaged in cutting-edge research
- placement at top-level academic institutions around the world.
If you are a university-level student or recent graduate (from any discipline) seeking an academic challenge and multi-cultural learning experience, our summer school experience is for you.
At the HEC PARIS Summer School, we will sharpen your mind, develop your analytical and decision-making skills, help you grasp complex challenges and strategic opportunities in today’s global economy.
The faculty is central to knowledge creation and dissemination at HEC. Our 115 permanent faculty (over half are from outside France) work on internationally acclaimed research in most of the major disciplines of management, reflecting the diversity of thought and cultures, the open-mindedness and the exacting intellectual standards promoted at HEC.
The permanent faculty is reinforced by 94 affiliate professors bringing their academic and professional skills to HEC's students and program participants, and 40 visiting professors each year who come to teach and carry out research alongside HEC's own professors.
All these professors enhance HEC's courses and programs through their research work, original teaching materials, and personal interaction with the business world; they contribute to corporate reflection on management issues and are involved in national and international scientific community debates.
At HEC Paris, companies find what they are looking for: interns, young graduates, MBA graduates, executive education programs, professors to work with on research or teaching projects. Drawing from this positive experience, some of them decide to support HEC's development and become HEC corporate partners.
- 2,450 internships
- 262 companies attending recruitment events on campus
- 18 Chairs and Centers
- 45 HEC Foundation corporate partners
- 66 Club Campus partners
- 8,500 Executive Education participants
In the 'News Room', find everything you need to know about HEC Paris, our programs, faculty, international relationships, corporate partnerships and life on campus. In the blink of an eye, discover what the press says about HEC with our latest news postings.
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Departments: Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)
Banks heavily rely on wholesale funding – a source of funds characterized as unstable. We explore the actual fragility of wholesale funding using transaction-level data on short-term, unsecured certificates of deposits in the European market. We do not observe any freeze during a period that includes both the subprime crisis and the European sovereign crisis. Yet, many banks suddenly experience funding dry-ups. Banks with low future quality are more likely to face funding dry-ups, whereas banks with a high future quality tend to increase their reliance on wholesale funding in periods of stress. The reallocation of funds from low- to high-quality banks is inconsistent with theories based on adverse selection, and in line with theories of informed runs
Keywords: bank run, wholesale funding, market freeze, certificates of deposits
Departments: Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)
This research studies the possibility that managers attribute firm performance to price and quality decisions in a self-serving manner: they tend to credit success in the market to the product characteristic that matches the commercial orientation of the business, but blame failure on the other. The problem with this reasoning is that managers then carry out adjustments based on biased information, which is suboptimal. The paper first models the phenomenon to clarify the cost of self-serving attributions to a firm. It then reports experiments that provide empirical support for the theory
Keywords: Causal inference, self-serving bias, managerial decision-making
Departments: GREGHEC (CNRS)
This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. We show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.
Keywords: Communication, Incentives, Principal Agent, Information Transmission, Communication Networks, Organizational Behaviour, Correlated Equilibrium, Communication Equilibrium, Secure Communication
Departments: Accounting & Management Control, GREGHEC (CNRS)
The observed smoothing of earnings (i.e. negative contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flows) is the joint product of the role of accruals in smoothing out transitory fluctuations in operating cash flows (noise reduction role) and the role of accruals in providing timely gain and loss recognition (contracting role). These two roles of accruals have opposite effects on earnings smoothing properties. We demonstrate that failing to control for changes in timely gain and loss recognition as firms shift to IFRS can lead to erroneous inferences regarding the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings smoothing, and consequently on researcher’ conclusions about how IFRS adoption has affected accounting quality. Our results are consistent with IFRS adoption resulting in a change in the contracting role rather than the noise reduction role of accruals. A decrease in timely loss recognition, an increase in timely gain recognition, and a net decrease in asymmetric timely loss recognition are what drives the change in observed smoothing of earnings.
Keywords: Earnings smoothing, IFRS, Timely gain and loss recognition
Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)
What role does distributive injustice play in joint venture (JV) termination? We define distributive injustice as a deviation from the contractual allocation of JV-related benefits caused by private benefits. Drawing on social exchange theory, we argue that perceptions of distributive injustice severely damage relationship quality and lead to eventual JV termination. We also suggest that, while both economic and justice considerations influence joint venture termination, they have different implications for JV termination mode. Based on a sample of 284 joint ventures formed between 1996 and 2010, we find evidence that distributive injustice increases the likelihood of JV termination in general, and the likelihood of acquisition of the JV by one of the partners, in particular.
Keywords: Joint ventures, joint venture termination, distributive justice, social exchange theory, private benefits
Departments: Tax & Law, GREGHEC (CNRS)
Beyond Networks critically dissects and systematizes an insightful, well-researched and elegantly written account of the democratic potential carried out by coalitions of civil society actors. Once established a case for studying coalitions of civil society organization through the lens of Global Administrative Law, the book eventually unveils its underlying research question. This volume specifically attempts to explain how civil society networks – which are studied within the broader notion of Global Civil Society (GSC) – drive the development of principles of democratic value at the supranational level. It does so within the broader debate about new modes of global governance and in particular that of experimentalist governance. It proceeds to theorize an autonomous organization network model within GSC: the so-called 'interlocutory coalitions'. Those coalitions are typically made of diverse category of entities whose major – sometimes solely – common feature is the cross-border pursuit of a common cause. In order to build an original and valuable taxonomy of civil society networks, interlocutory coalitions must be contrasted to other forms of networks, including social networks, trans-governmental committees, think tanks, Parallel Summits and QUANGOs. After reconstructing their respective composition, membership, rules of governance and legal status, the book delves into interlocutory coalitions' decision-making. How do coalitions presenting high degree of variation when it comes to their mission, governance, funding and membership coalesce around one common cause? How do they come to existence and get along? How can such coalitions speak with one voice when representing and advocating their common position in front of the relevant international organizations? What kind of techniques and deliberative mechanisms are used to attain a common position and then convey it to the outside world? This book provides a rigorous, constructive and promising stepping stone to embark on such a challenging journey. Yet the case for a global participatory democracy remains to be made.
Keywords: Open government, Transparency, Participation, Civic empowerment, Coalitions, Legitimacy, Accountability, Civil society, European Union, Good governance
Departments: Strategy & Business Policy, GREGHEC (CNRS)
We debate the motivation for and effectiveness of public policies to encourage individuals to become entrepreneurs. Reviewing established evidence we find that most western world policies do not greatly reduce or solve any market failures but instead waste taxpayers’ money, encourage those already intent on becoming entrepreneurs, and mostly generate one-employee businesses with low growth intentions and a lack of interest in innovating. Most policy initiatives that would have the effect of promoting valuable entrepreneurship would not be recognizable as such, because they would primarily address other market failures: a central-payer healthcare would remove health-care related distortions affecting employment choices; greater STEM education would produce more engineers of which some start valuable new firms; and labor market reform to encourage hiring immigrants in jobs they have been educated for would reduce inefficient allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.
Keywords: entrepreneurship; public policy
Departments: Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)
We propose a simple model in which investors price a stock using a persistent signal and sticky belief dynamics à la Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). In this model, returns can be forecasted using (1) past profits, (2) past change in profits, and (3) past returns. The model thus provides a joint theory of two of the most economically significant anomalies, i.e. quality and momentum. According to the model, these anomalies should be correlated, and be stronger when signal persistence is higher, or when earnings expectations are stickier. Using I/B/E/S data, we measure expectation stickiness at the analyst level. We find that analysts are on average sticky and, consistent with a limited attention hypothesis, more so when they cover more industries. We then find strong support for the model's prediction in the data: both the momentum and the quality anomaly are stronger for stocks with more persistent profits, and for stocks which are followed by stickier analysts. Consistently with the model, both strategies also comove significantly.
Keywords: Stock market anomalies, Sticky expectations
Departments: Informations Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)
It is by now almost accepted as a stylized fact that offering deal promotion (such as via Groupon or LivingSocial) deteriorates local merchants’ online reputations (e.g., the average of Yelp review ratings). However, in this paper we show that the stylized fact is not true in certain circumstances. We theorize that the valence and volume of prior reviews can play an important moderating role in the effect of deal promotion. Empirically, we show that restaurants with a relatively low prior average rating and a relatively small review volume have improved their online reputations by offering Groupon promotion. The proportion of such restaurants is substantial. The findings are robust to multiple identification strategies and econometric specifications. The results underscore the substantial heterogeneity in the effect of deal promotion on local merchants’ online reputations. Merchants need understand the moderating role of prior reviews (e.g., the valence and volume of prior reviews) and design appropriate strategies to maximize the returns from offering deal promotion.
Keywords: Online reviews, Deal promotion, Moderating role, Difference-in-differences, Propensity score matching
Departments: Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)
This note investigates the causes of the quality anomaly, which is one of the strongest and most scalable anomalies in equity markets. We explore two potential explanations. The "risk view", whereby investing in high quality firms is somehow riskier, so that the higher returns of a quality portfolio are a compensation for risk exposure. This view is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The other view is the "behavioral view", which states that some investors persistently underestimate the true value of high quality firms. We find no evidence in favor of the "risk view": The returns from investing in quality firms are abnormally high on a risk-adjusted basis, and are not prone to crashes. We provide novel evidence in favor of the "behavioral view": In their forecasts of future prices, and while being overall overoptimistic, analysts systematically underestimate the future return of high quality firms, compared to low quality firms.
Keywords: Quality anomaly, financial analysts misplaced focus, behavioral biases
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