Working Papers

  • Title
  • Author(s)
  • Department

  • 983
  • Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity: A Reappraisal
  • Brian HILL
  • Economics - Sciences of Decision

  • 982
  • Overconfidence and Entrepreneurial Choice under Ambiguity
  • Anisa SHYTI
  • Strategy and Business Policy

  • 981
  • Nudging Healthy Lifestyles – Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research
  • Alberto ALEMANNO, L. BOVENS, A. BURGESS, O. LOBEL, K. POWYS WHYTE, E. SELINGER
  • Business Law and Taxation

  • 980
  • Networked Narratives: Understanding Word-of-Mouth Marketing in Online Communities
  • K. DE VALCK, R. KOZINETS, A. WOJNICKI, S.J.S. WILNER
  • Marketing

  • 978
  • Shining in the center : Contral Gaze Cascade Effect on Product Choice
  • Selin ATALAY, H. Onur BODUR, Dina RASOLOFOARISON
  • Marketing

  • 966
  • Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games
  • Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Jérôme Renault
  • Economics - Sciences of Decision
  • Download

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

  • 964
  • Social Responsibility and Market Karma
  • Afshin Mehrpouya, Imran Chowdhury
  • Accouting and Management Control

  • 963
  • Sovereign Wealth Funds, the IMF and Transparency
  • Afshin Mehrpouya
  • Accouting and Management Control
  • Download

  • 962
  • From God to Markets
  • Afshin Mehrpouya
  • Accouting and Management Control
  • Download

  • 961
  • Transparency in transnational governance
  • Afshin Mehrpouya, Marie-Laure Djelic
  • Accouting and Management Control