Research Seminars

Article TBD

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Jeffrey Cohen

10 June 2016 - HEC Paris - From 2:00 am to 4:00 am


Article TBD

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Bertrand Malsch
Queens School of Business

3 June 2016 - From 2:00 am to 4:00 am


Does Advertising Serve as a Signal? Evidence from Field Experiments in Mobile Search

Marketing

Speaker: Harikesh Nair
Professor of Marketing , Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

4 March 2016 - Building T, Room T027 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


In a large-scale field experiment, we demonstrate that advertising can serve as a signal that enhances consumers' evaluations of advertised goods. We implement the experiment on a mobile search platform that provides listings and reviews for an archetypal experience good, restaurants. In collaboration with the platform, we randomize more than 200,000 consumers into exposure or no exposure of ads for about 600+ local restaurants. In conditions in which consumers are exposed to advertising, we also randomly vary the disclosure to the consumer of whether a restaurant's listing is an ad. This enables us to isolate the eect on outcomes of a consumer knowing that a listing is sponsored - a pure signaling effect. We find that this disclosure alone increases calls to the restaurant by 77%, holding fixed all other attributes of the ad. This effect is higher when the consumer uses the platform away from his typical city of search, when the uncertainly about restaurant quality is larger, and for restaurants that have received fewer ratings in the past. Further, on the supply side, newer, higher rated and more popular restaurants advertise more on the platform. Taken together, we interpret these results as consistent with a signaling equilibrium in which ads serve as implicit signals that enhance the appeal of the advertised restaurants. Our results also imply that advertisers and search-platforms would gain by making the ads discernible, and thus holds implications for platform design.

HEC/ESSEC - Private Information and the Granting of Stock Options

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Mary Ellen Carter
Boston College

12 February 2016 - HEC Champerret - Room 677 - From 2:00 am to 4:00 am


We examine the relation between firms’ grants of executive stock options and the presence of positive private information about the firm. Firms privately receive notices of forthcoming patents and have a period of time before that information is made public. We examine whether firms’ option-granting behavior during this period of time, relative to a benchmark period, is consistent with CEOs receiving more option grants based on that private information. Our tests suggest that firms use that information to provide more valuable option grants to CEOs and, further, that firms’ option-granting behavior during the private-information period is related to their reliance on innovation and the value of the patent received. We also find that the increase in option granting is concentrated in periods when the US Patent and Technology Office does not publish information about patent applications prior to issuing patents, and that CEOs appear to benefit more broadly from patent-related private information than outside directors do. Overall, we provide support for our expectation that firms with private information about a forthcoming patent use that information to provide more valuable option grants to their CEO.

Robust Dynamic Estimation

Marketing

Speaker: Olivier Rubel
Assistant Professor of Marketing , UC Davis Graduate School of Management

21 January 2016 - Building T, Room T201 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


Managing marketing resources over time requires dynamic model estimation, which necessitates specifying some parametric or nonparametric probability distribution. When the data generating process differs from the assumed distribution, the resulting model is misspecified. To hedge against such a misspecification risk, the extant theory recommends using White’s (1980) sandwich estimator. This approach, however, only corrects the variance of estimated parameters, but not their values. Consequently, the sandwich estimator does not affect any managerial outcomes such as marketing budgeting and allocation decisions. To overcome this drawback, we present the minimax framework that does not necessitate any distributional assumptions to estimate dynamic models. Applying minimax control theory, we derive an optimal robust filter, illustrate its application to a unique advertising data set from the Canadian Blood Services, and contribute several novel findings. We discover the compensatory effect: advertising effectiveness increases and the carryover effect decreases as robustness increases. We also find that the robust filter uniformly outperforms the Kalman filter on the out-of-sample predictions. Furthermore, we uncover the existence of a profit-volatility tradeoff, similar to the returns-risk tradeoff in finance, whereby the volatility of profit stream decreases at the expense of reduced total profit as robustness increases. Finally we prove that, unlike for-profit companies, managers of non-profit organizations should optimally allocate budgets opposite of the advertising-to-sales ratio heuristic; that is, advertise more (less) when sales are low (high).

The End of History Illusion

Marketing

Speaker: Jordi Quoidbach
Assistant Professor , University Pompeu Fraba, Barcelona

20 January 2016 - Building T, Room T201 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


We measured the personalities, values, and preferences of more than 19,000 people who ranged in age from 18 to 68 and asked them to report how much they had changed in the past decade and/or to predict how much they would change in the next decade. Young people, middle-aged people, and older people all believed they had changed a lot in the past but would change relatively little in the future. People, it seems, regard the present as a watershed moment at which they have finally become the person they will be for the rest of their lives. This “end of history illusion” had practical consequences, leading people to overpay for future opportunities to indulge their current preferences.

​Size Discovery

Finance

Speaker: Darrell Duffie
Stanford

10 December 2015


A Tough Act to Follow: Contrast Effects in Financial Markets

Finance

Speaker: Kelly Shue
Chicago Booth

3 December 2015


Status Rebellion: When Lower Status Firms Differentiate Pro Bono Reward Strategy

Management & Human Resources

Speaker: Wooseok Jung
Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University

2 December 2015 - T008 - From 10:45 am to 12:15 pm


Model Use in Sustainability Negotiations and Decisions

Operations Management & Information Technology

Speaker: Ellen Czaika
Post Doctoral Researcher , Institute for Data, Systems and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

1 December 2015 - HEC Paris - Jouy en Josas Campus - Bulding V - Room Bernard Ramanantsoa - From 11:30 am to 12:30 pm


Sustainability negotiations and decisions require the integration of scientific information with stakeholder interests. Mathematical models help elucidate the physical world and therefore may orient the negotiators in a shared understanding of the physical world. Many researchers suggest collaborative modeling to facilitate integrating scientific information and stakeholder interests. In this thesis, I use methods that enable repeated instances of the same decision; the exploration of alternatives to model use (e.g. learning of a model’s logic, relevant information, or irrelevant information); and the exploration of alternatives to collaborative modeling (e.g. using an expert model or not using a model). This thesis comprises two studies that use serious game role-play simulations. The first study is a computer-driven role-play simulation of governmental policy creation and the second is a five-party role-play simulation to negotiate a more sustainable end-of-life for used paper coffee cups. In the first study, model users reached the Pareto Frontier—the set of non-dominated points—more readily (13%) than non-model-users (2.5%) and model users discovered the win-win nature of electricity access with higher frequency (63%) than non-model users (9%). Participants who learned of the model’s logic through presentation performed nearly as well as model users. In the second study, model use shortened the (mean) duration of the negotiation from 55 minutes to 45 minutes. Negotiating tables that co-created a model had a higher likelihood of reaching favorable agreements (44% compared to 25%). Model use did not significantly alter the value distribution among parties. Tables of negotiators used the model in two predominant manners: to test alternatives as they generated potential agreements and to verify a tentative agreement. The former resulted in higher mean table values than the latter. Together, these studies demonstrate: that mathematical models can be used in sustainability negotiations and decisions with good effect; that learning about the insights of a model is beneficial in decision making—but using a model is more beneficial; and that collaborative model building can provide better negotiation outcomes than using an expert model and can be faster than not using a model.