Research Seminars

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Irem TUNA
LBS

12 December 2014 - Room T017 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm


Finance

Speaker: Bruno Biais
Toulouse School of Economics

11 December 2014


Finance

Speaker: Nikolaï Roussanov
Wharton

4 December 2014


Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Woo-Jin CHANG
INSEAD

21 November 2014 - Room T017 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm


Finance

Speaker: Francesco Franzoni
Swiss Finance Institute

20 November 2014


Finance

Speaker: Philip Bond
Washington University in St.Louis

13 November 2014


Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Bjorn Jordensen
LSE

7 November 2014 - Room T004 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm


Finance

Speaker: Rui Silva
London Business School

6 November 2014


Retail Short Selling and Stock Prices

Finance

Speaker: Paul Tetlock
Columbia Unviversity

9 October 2014

Download

This study tests asset pricing theories that feature short selling using a large

database of retail trading. We find that retail short selling negatively predicts

firms’ monthly stock returns and news tone, even controlling for overall short

selling. Predictability from retail shorting is strongest in stocks with low analyst

and media coverage, high idiosyncratic volatility, and high turnover; it does not

depend on short sales constraints. Retail buying positively predicts returns in

similar types of stocks. These results are consistent with the theory that retail

short selling informs market prices, but are inconsistent with alternative theories

in which retail short selling is a proxy for sentiment or attention.

The Impact of Manufacturer SPIFFs on a Supply Chain with Retailer-hired Sales Agent

Operations Management & Information Technology

Speaker: Neda Ebrahim Khanjari
Assistant Professor in Management , The School of Business, Rutgers University

3 October 2014 - HEC Paris - Jouy en Josas Campus - Building S - Room S119 - From 10:30 am to 12:00 pm


In many industries, manufacturers pay commissions to retailer-hired sales agents to boost the demand for the manufacturers' products, and this type of payments are often called sales incentive fund (spiff). In this paper, we study the implications on the supply chain performance when a retailer hires sales agents but a manufacturer may obtain the capability to directly pay commissions to the retailer's sales agents. We show that when a manufacturer obtains the capability to pay spiffs directly to retailer-hired sales agents, the exact value of the wholesale price charged by the manufacturer to the retailer does not affect the equilibrium profits of the supply chain members, the effort level of retailer-hired sales agents, and the retail price of the retailer. In addition, when the manufacturer's wholesale price is exogenous, the retailer always benefits when the manufacturer obtains the capability to pay spiffs to retailer-hired sales agents, but the manufacturer benefits only if the manufacturer's wholesale price is large enough. Furthermore, we show that while spiff payments may not be necessary to help improve the supply chain performance when the manufacturer's wholesale price is exogenous, when the manufacturer's wholesale price is endogenous, having the capability of paying spiffs directly to retailer-hired sales agents by the manufacturer can increase the the supply chain's profit but decreases the manufacturer's profit. Consequently, if the manufacturer and the retailer can work out a transfer payment plan when the manufacturer builds its capability to directly reward retailer-hired sales agents, the manufacturer can invest in its capability of rewarding retailer-hired sales agents directly to coordinate the supply chain. In this case, the retail price charged by the retailer would become the same as the price charged by an integrated channel.