Research Seminars


Speaker: Fred Malherbe
London Business School

7 December 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Speaker: Andrea Vedolin

23 November 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Speaker: Francesca Cornelli
London Business School

16 November 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Speaker: Sabrina Howell
NYU Stern School of Business

9 November 2017 - T017 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm

When Two Heads Are Worse than One: Understanding the Costs of Co-Leadership

Management & Human Resources

Speaker: Frederic Godart

7 November 2017 - Bernard Ramanantsoa room - From 10:45 am to 12:15 pm

The present research examined the effectiveness of co-leadership, a situation where two individuals jointly occupy the same formally assigned role at the top of a hierarchy. We integrate insights from the social hierarchy and leadership literatures to present the Social Hierarchy Model of Co-Leadership. This model proposes that co-leadership generally hurts team performance because co-led teams are more likely than solo-led teams to suffer from coordination and conflict problems. However, our model also proposes that when the co-leaders have a strong relationship, this underperformance will disappear. Four studies using qualitative, experimental, and archival data support this model. Our qualitative study established the prevalence of co-leadership configurations and how co-leaders affect team processes and performance. Our experiment established causality: teams randomly assigned to have co-leaders were less creative than solo-lead teams. Archival analyses of mountaineering expeditions replicated the negative effects of co-leadership: co-led teams were more likely to experience a fatality than solo-led teams. Additional archival analyses of high-end fashion design teams replicated the negative effects of co-leadership and found that co-leadership no longer hurt creativity when the co-leaders were co-founders of their firm. The current data and the Social Hierarchy Model of Co-Leadership offer numerous theoretical and practical implications.


Speaker: Raman Uppal
EDHEC Business School

2 November 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm

Are policymakers ambiguity averse?

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: Professor Loïc Berger

26 October 2017 - HEC Campus - T Building - Room T017 - From 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm

We investigate the ambiguity preferences of a unique sample of real-life policymakers at the Paris UN climate conference (COP21). We find that policymakers are generally ambiguity averse. Using a simple design which explicitly makes the distinction between objective and subjective probabilities presented in different layers, we are moreover able to detect a strong association between preferences towards model uncertainty and those towards ambiguity. These results suggest that the preferences policymakers exhibit towards ambiguity are not necessarily due to an irrational behavior (such as the inability to reduce compound lotteries), but rather to intrinsic preferences over unknown probabilities, thus shedding new light on the role that ambiguity models can play in informing policymaking. Results are confirmed in a laboratory experiment with university students.

Financialization and the institutional foundations of the new capitalism

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Bruce Carruthers
Northwestern University

20 October 2017 - HEC Paris - Room T004 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

One of key features of capitalism as a form of economic organization concerns its ability to change. Innovation often occurs by using old things in new ways, or by taking pre-existing elements and rearranging them into novel configurations [termed ‘conversion’ by Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 26)]. Change can also happen when old activities are simply discontinued, or when new activities are added [what Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 16) call ‘layering’]. Capitalist innovation does not arise ex nihilo, nor does it involve wholesale rejection of the past. As even casual students of contemporary capitalism realize, much of today’s capitalism resembles the old-fashioned kind studied by nineteenth-century social theorists like Marx, Durkheim andWeber. Heavy industry still exists, tangible goods are still manufactured in factories using assembly line methods, commodities are sent around the world via rail or ship, people still make steel and dig coal and iron ore out of the ground, and so on. Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars have identified ‘financialization’ as a significant change: the growth in importance of financial markets and financial institutions, and the increasing involvement of economic actors in financial transactions (Krippner, 2011; Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Philippon and Reshef, 2013). Such transactions consist of traditional activities like lending (e.g. bank loans and bonds) and investment (e.g. equities), but also newer ones involving derivatives and securitization. What is the significance of this change, and what undergirds it?
The markets that organize capitalism are based on a set of underlying institutional preconditions. What do such foundations consist of? Since markets are venues for economic exchange, the first precondition concerns the objects of exchange. What do buyers buy from sellers, and how are these objects constituted? This is not a matter of physical reality since market exchange involves rights over things or services, not necessarily the things or services themselves. But by virtue of private property rights, tangible and intangible objects are commodified and ownership rights over them can be freely transferred from one owner to another.
Second, markets depend on information to suppose an interdependent role structure: buyers and sellers. Markets cannot function without actors willing to act in both of these roles. If everyone wants to sell and no-one wants to buy, then market exchange will not occur. The same is true with only buyers, but no sellers. As Akerlof (1970) showed, asymmetries of information can cause markets to unravel. In his analysis, sellers possessed information that they could not credibly convey to buyers, but the more general problem is that both buyers and sellers seek information about the objects they transact. Too much uncertainty will curtail market exchange. Third, markets depend on regulation that is sufficient to suppose binding agreements. Many bilateral transactions unfold over time, they are not completed ‘on the spot’. For example, one party might receive goods and pay for them later, or someone might pay for goods, and receive them later. In modern markets, contracts are the vehicle typically used to make an agreement formally binding.1 Finally, market economies contain the possibility of failure by firms, who then face bankruptcy. Firms that are unprofitable will eventually close down and cease their activities: their assets will be distributed to their creditors and employees lose their jobs. Corporate bankruptcy or insolvency law provides the means to identify and extinguish failing firms.
Financialization, as I discuss below, involves the modification and rearticulation of these preconditions. Krippner (2011) emphasized the political origins of financialization, but here I explore its institutional basis, an aspect she does not treat. I have listed these preconditions as analytically separable, but in historical fact they were usually linked together. For example, the development of corporate lawenabled fictive individuals to become both owners of property and objects of property rights, where financial instruments functioned as the unit of ownership. A corporation was owned (by shareholders), and their ownership interests could be freely exchanged, but the corporation itself could also own property (for instance, other corporations). With the passage of general laws of incorporation and their modification at the end of the nineteenth century, corporations could own, buy, sell and enter into binding agreements. They could also fail, although limited liability protected the personal wealth of shareholders. In addition, these preconditions are often shaped through public regulation. Regulations may set restrictions on market entry (i.e. on who may act as a buyer or seller in a particular market), set prices or quality standards, standardize the contracts that govern exchange, mandate the provision of certain types of information by market actors or set the terms of market exit. The dynamism of contemporary capitalism stems, in part, from the emergence of new ways to satisfy these preconditions. Through institutional change, capitalism was able to financialize within an overarching framework of private property, information, regulation and failure, maintaining its identity as a distinct economic system. This complex combination of change and continuity unfolded as small variations were amplified into large and often unintended transformations. The outcomes were variably intended.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Elisa OPERTI

19 October 2017 - HEC Room T017 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm

This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Star Analyst Voting and Recommendation Bias

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Qiang Cheng
Singapore Management University

18 October 2017 - HEC Paris - Room T004 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

Being voted as a star analyst increases an analyst’ compensation, reputation, and mobility. In this
paper, we examine financial analysts’ economic incentives arising from currying favor from
mutual funds in star analyst voting. Using the proprietary, detailed voting data from China, we
find that analysts issue more optimistically biased recommendations to the firms owned by the
voting funds. The extent of the recommendation bias increases with the relative weight of the
firm in the voting funds’ portfolios and the weight of the funds’ vote in the calculation of final
voting outcome, and decreases with the reputation of the brokerage houses that employ the
analysts. In addition, we find that the capital markets do not seem to recognize and discount
analysts’ recommendation bias arising from such voting connections. Collectively these findings
indicate that analysts issue biased recommendations to secure favourable votes from, or return
favour to mutual funds that vote for them.