Research Seminars

Strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Speaker: Jean-François LASLIER
Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique

14 November 2006 - From 14:30 to 16:00

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The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters.
It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly and according to a simple behavioral rule. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

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