Research Seminars

Researc Seminar : Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information

Speaker: Juuso VALIMAKI
Aalto University

9 October 2012 - HEC Paris, Room S126 - From 11:30am to 1:30pm

We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with informational externalities. A number of players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. The players learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop methodology for analyzing such games in continuous time, and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria. We show that in large games, the asymptotic statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model. Although the beliefs converge to truth, learning takes place too late.

Finance

Speaker: Xavier Gabaix

13 June 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Adriano Rampini

23 May 2019 - T105 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Luke Taylor

16 May 2019 - T105 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Jessica Jeffers

18 April 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Emil Verner

4 April 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Niels Gormsen

28 March 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Ramona Dagostino

14 March 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


title : TBA

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: Harry Di Pei
Northwestern

12 February 2019


title : TBA

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: François Geerolf
UCLA

18 December 2018


title : TBA

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: Marko Tervio
Aalto

13 December 2018



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