Research Seminars

X-HEC Seminar in Economic Theory "Optimal Platform Design "

Speaker: Jason Hartline
NorthWestern

19 May 2011 - HEC Paris, Jouy-en-Josas, Room H027 - From 2:30 pm to 4:00 pm

An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead they provide one (or several) auction technology, and clients select the most appropriate (e.g., eBay provides ascending auctions or "buy-it-now" pricing). For each client the offered technology may not be optimal, but it would be too costly for clients to create their own. We call these mechanisms, which emphasize generality rather than optimality, platform mechanisms. A platform mechanism will be adopted by a client if it performance exceeds that of the client's outside option, e.g., hiring (at an exogenous cost) a consultant to design the optimal mechanism. We ask two related questions. First, for what costs of the outside option will the platform be universally adopted? Second, what is the structure of good (optimal) platform mechanisms? To answer these questions we will take a prior-free viewpoint on optimal mechanism design and look at mechanisms that are approximately optimal independent of any prior.

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Speaker: Jessica Jeffers

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Speaker: Ramona Dagostino

14 March 2019 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


title : TBA

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: Harry Di Pei
Northwestern

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title : TBA

Economics & Decision Sciences

Speaker: François Geerolf
UCLA

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title : TBA

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Speaker: Marko Tervio
Aalto

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Speaker: Julien Cujean

6 December 2018 - T104 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Andres Liberman

29 November 2018 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm



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