Research Seminars

The Effect of Exogenous Information on Voluntary Disclosure and Market Quality

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Ilan Guttman
New York University

9 March 2018 - HEC Paris - Room T004 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

We analyze a game in which a firm chooses whether to disclose information, knowing this information may be published by a third party, such as an analyst. We analyze how the firm's disclosure strategy is affected by probability of disclosure by the third party; we refer to this probability as analyst coverage. Under plausible assumptions, analyst coverage crowds out disclosure. Despite the crowding out effect, we argue that an increase in analyst coverage increases aggregate information. We base this claim on
two measures of information in prices. The first is statistical in nature while the second relies on liquidity in a model in which following information disclosure there is trade. We show how an increase in analyst coverage increases liquidity as measured by the bid ask spread.

Subnational Debt of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus


Speaker: Dragon Tang
School of Economics and Finance, HKU

8 March 2018 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Using comprehensive proprietary loan-level data, we analyze debt borrowing and default of local governments in China. Contrary to conventional wisdom, policy bank loans to local governments have significantly lower default rates than commercial bank loans with similar characteristics.
Due to the importance of policy bank loans for the advancement of local politicians’ careers, distressed local governments often strategically choose to default on loans from commercial banks. This selection became more pronounced after the abrupt ending of the “4-trillion” stimulus, when China started tightening local government borrowing. Our findings shed light on a potential approach to hardening budget constraints for local governments.

Real Externalities of Mandatory Disclosures: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry

Accounting & Management Control

Speaker: Bjorn Jorgensen
London School of Economics

26 January 2018 - HEC Paris - Room T020 - From 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

This paper documents real externalities of firms’ mandatory disclosures. We focus our analysis on the regulatory disclosure of oil and gas (O&G) reserves, a setting in which mandatory information is particularly important to understand industry competition. Using a comprehensive sample of Canadian and US O&G producers, we hypothesize and find that larger increases in reserves are accompanied by lower stock returns and increases in investment for competing firms. These findings are consistent with O&G disclosures containing competition-sensitive information. To sharpen identification, we exploit three sources of institutional variation. First, the North-American pipeline infrastructure constrains the supply of natural gas, and thus competition in the gas market, but not the supply of oil. Second, the introduction of the fracking technology substantially altered the competition dynamics in the natural gas market. Third, mandatory O&G disclosure rules were modified in Canada and the US in a similar fashion, albeit at different points in time. Consistent with mandatory disclosure of O&G reserves imposing proprietary costs, we also find that, under the new rules, disclosing firms appear to be less able to exploit their competitive advantage. Overall, our evidence highlights important trade-offs in the market-wide effects of disclosure regulation.

Physical Attractiveness in the Workplace

Management & Human Resources

Speaker: Margaret Lee
London Business School

11 December 2017 - Bernard Ramanantsoa room - From 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm

Work in psychology and economics documents a robust attractiveness bias: People tend to attribute positive qualities and give better outcomes to attractive individuals. Research shows this bias exists in workplace-relevant decisions such as selection decisions, performance evaluations, and wages. However, much of this research is surprisingly lacking consideration for the organizational context. I present two projects that each examine a contextual factor that improves our understanding of how the attractiveness bias affects workplace behavior and outcomes. In the first, I present studies that show that when hiring for jobs that are considered to be relatively less desirable, the attractiveness bias is reversed such that selectors are more likely to hire a less attractive candidate. In the second project, I present evidence that shows that an additional path to advantage in organizations for attractive individuals is through their better interactions with coworkers. I propose that attractive individuals receive more help from their coworkers, which in turn positively affects their performance and outcomes. In all, this research highlights that well-established general conclusions from social psychology might change when we take organizational contexts into account.


Speaker: Fred Malherbe
London Business School

7 December 2017 - T015 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm

Financial Innovation and Asset Prices


Speaker: Raman Uppal
EDHEC Business School

30 November 2017 - T025 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm



Speaker: Andrea Vedolin

23 November 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm

Team Stability and Performance: Evidence from Private Equity


Speaker: Francesca Cornelli
London Business School

16 November 2017 - T004 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


We examine the relation between team turnover and firm performance
studying the private equity industry. Using a unique data set that tracks over
time teams in 138 PE managers and their performance, we uncover a positive
relation between turnover and fund performance. We propose and confirm in
the data two channels that explain our findings: i) in the short-run, performance
improves when bad performers are fired, ii) in the long-run, turnover
helps teams to adapt and replenish their skills in response to shifting external
demand. Our findings suggest that frictions coming from informational
asymmetries may deter optimal turnover. These findings are surprising given
the common belief among PE investors that team stability is key to long-term


Speaker: Sabrina Howell
NYU Stern School of Business

9 November 2017 - T017 - From 11:00 am to 12:15 pm

When Two Heads Are Worse than One: Understanding the Costs of Co-Leadership

Management & Human Resources

Speaker: Frederic Godart

7 November 2017 - Bernard Ramanantsoa room - From 10:45 am to 12:15 pm

The present research examined the effectiveness of co-leadership, a situation where two individuals jointly occupy the same formally assigned role at the top of a hierarchy. We integrate insights from the social hierarchy and leadership literatures to present the Social Hierarchy Model of Co-Leadership. This model proposes that co-leadership generally hurts team performance because co-led teams are more likely than solo-led teams to suffer from coordination and conflict problems. However, our model also proposes that when the co-leaders have a strong relationship, this underperformance will disappear. Four studies using qualitative, experimental, and archival data support this model. Our qualitative study established the prevalence of co-leadership configurations and how co-leaders affect team processes and performance. Our experiment established causality: teams randomly assigned to have co-leaders were less creative than solo-lead teams. Archival analyses of mountaineering expeditions replicated the negative effects of co-leadership: co-led teams were more likely to experience a fatality than solo-led teams. Additional archival analyses of high-end fashion design teams replicated the negative effects of co-leadership and found that co-leadership no longer hurt creativity when the co-leaders were co-founders of their firm. The current data and the Social Hierarchy Model of Co-Leadership offer numerous theoretical and practical implications.