Research Seminars

"The Introduction of Pioneering Products : Effects of Issue Interpretation and Strategy"

Speaker: Nils Plambeck

24 November 2004 - From 16H00 to 17H30


"This study examines the factors that encourage firms to introduce products with different levels of

innovativeness to the market and therefore accept different levels of risk. I investigate the influence of the cognitive

process of interpretation and of a firm's strategy on product interpretation. Drawing from data supplied by 102 firms in the

German automobile supplier industry I analyse the perception of situations triggering product innovations and the way in

which the outcomes of this cognitive process affect the new product's degree of innovativeness. Consistent with the

threat-rigidity hypothesis, the results suggest that a more negative interpretation of the trigger leads to a more

incremental product innovation. Moreover, I have found that both, the strategy and the size of an organization influenced the

cognitive process of interpretation as well as the product's degree of innovativeness. Thus, strategy and firm size both

affect innovation directly and indirectly."

“Rewards and Firm Performance - A look into the Motivation Black-Box“

Speaker: Oliver Gottschalg

18 November 2004 - From 14H00 to 16H00


"Collaborative versus Autonomous New Product Development in the WorldWide Aircraft Industry, 1949-2000"

Speaker: Bernard Garrette, Xavier Castañer and Pierre Dussauge

20 October 2004 - From 16H00 to 17H30


1. Problem with product complexity: do we

measure the complexity of the prototype or of the final aircraft? In any event, it's difficult to imagine that managers know

the exact characteristics of the product to be developed at the time of the decision to start the project.
2. Size of the

constant coefficient
3. Do we get the same results if we use 1-50 for years (like Gulati, 1999) rather than 1949-2000?

Ownership Structure, Managerial Incentives and the Intensity of Rivalry

Speaker: Govert Vroom and Javier Gimeno

6 October 2004 - From 16H00 to 17H30


This study investigates how ownership forms affect managerial incentives and pricing in different competitive

contexts. We explore how the difference in ownership form between franchised and company-owned units influences the

incentives of the managers who take the day-to-day decisions that constitute interfirm rivalry. We argue that chains with

company-owned units may restrict decision-making of local units as a credible commitment device to maintain high prices.

Furthermore, we argue that the payment of royalty fees reduces the net available revenues of franchisees, which provides an

incentive to increase the price they charge to customers. Using a proprietary dataset of the Texas hotel industry, our

findings confirm these hypotheses and form one of the first empirical confirmations of what is called strategic incentives

theory. By elucidating the competitive consequences of ownership forms, this study allows managers to take these consequences

into consideration when determining the ownership structure of local units.

Entrepreneurial Alliances as Contractual Forms

Speaker: Africa Ariño
IESE Business School

22 September 2004 - From 16h00 to 17h30



upon taxonomical research on interfirm alliances, we investigate the design of entrepreneurial firms' alliances in more

fine-grained terms by focusing on the specific contractual provisions that firms negotiate into their alliance contracts.

Drawing upon transaction cost arguments, we examine the determinants of the contractual complexity of collaborative

agreements in the German telecommunications industry. The findings reveal that alliance contracts vary greatly in their

complexity, yet contracts for non-equity alliances tend to be no more or less complex than those for equity alliances on

average, which challenges the view that the latter unambiguously afford firms greater control than the former. Furthermore,

multivariate findings on the roles of transaction-specific investment, relational capital, search costs, and so forth

demonstrate that firms' contractual and governance choices have distinct antecedents".