Research Seminars

Responding to the Threat of Reputation Loss: Inaccurate Self-Reporting in the Nursing Home Industry

Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Amandine Ody-Brasier
Yale

9 February 2017 - T036 - From 12:00 pm to 1:30 pm

Download

Because third-party evaluation systems, such as ratings and rankings, increasingly serve as a basis for firms’ reputations, organizations pay a great deal of attention to ensuring that they perform well according to such evaluation systems. However, while such systems are intended to incentivize firms to improve in a variety of substantive areas, firms may instead opt to bolster their standing by engaging in various forms of “gaming the system.” In cases where third-party evaluators rely on the organizations being assessed to self-report the data that form the basis for their rating/ranking, “gaming” may include providing false or misleading information. Relatively little work has investigated the conditions under which this is likely to occur. In this paper, we theorize factors that cause rated firms to vary in the reputational incentives they face, leading to differences in the likelihood of reporting false or misleading data. We test our predictions in the context of the U.S. nursing home industry, finding that not-for-profit firms, those with better previous reputations and those facing greater localized competition are more likely to report misleading data. We discuss implications for both consumers and designers of ratings.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Elisa OPERTI
ESSEC

19 October 2017 - HEC Room T017 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Sendhil Ethiraj
LBS

8 June 2017


Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 June 2017 - T004 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 May 2017 - T015 - From 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm


Strategy & Business Policy

Speaker: Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 May 2017


Contact Us  

Strategy & Business Policy Department

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Featured Faculty  

Rodolphe DURAND

Strategy and Business Policy (GREGHEC)

Consult résumé

JavaScriptSettings