Spatial Asset Pricing: A First Step*

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Abstract
Our goal is to develop an asset pricing model where both location decisions and investment decisions are endogenous. There are four classes of assets: a risk free bond, houses (in various locations), stocks, and human capital (with different productivity in different locations). The dividend paid by houses in certain location, the local rent, is determined endogenously. Agents choose where they live and can invest in the financial market and in all real estate markets. Our equilibrium construction relies on the notion of the marginal resident – an agent who receives the same expected utility from all the possible locations. The model yields a closed-form representation of: (i) The portfolio decisions of agents as a combination of an investment in a financial and real estate mutual fund and demand in local housing to hedge the endogenous rent risk; and (ii) The returns of financial and real estate assets in terms of the covariance matrix of dividend shocks and local productivity shocks. The main lesson we draw is that the properties of real estate asset prices depend on the underlying geographic assignment model. The present paper makes a first step toward the analysis of spatial asset pricing by providing a tractable example.

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1 Introduction

Great progress has been made in recent years in understanding the role of real estate in portfolio allocation and asset pricing. Yet, we still lack a canonical model of dynamic asset pricing with real estate in multiple locations.

There are a number of real estate asset pricing models with one location (Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel, 2007). Several authors have explored asset pricing in multiple locations starting from an exogenously given rent process (Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008, Grossman and Laroque, 1991). There are also dynamic real estate models with multiple locations and endogenous rents, but real estate prices are determined by a perfectly elastic supply function (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2008) or by a perfectly elastic demand function (Davis and Ortalo-Magné, 2007, Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weil, 2007).

The goal of the present paper is to make a first step in the direction of developing a dynamic asset pricing model with uncertainty, endogenous real estate rents, and endogenous pricing of a multiplicity of real estate and financial assets.

Constructing a model of “spatial asset pricing” represents a challenge because the dividend paid by real estate assets – the rent – is endogenous. That represents an important difference with standard asset pricing models, where the dividend generating process is exogenously given. Since Rosen (1989) and Roback (1992), we understand that in order to price real estate in a spatial context, we need to model the location choices of agents. In equilibrium, the real estate market is driven by “marginal residents” who are indifferent between one location and another. Hence, our set-up will include a simple location model, where heterogeneous agents choose in which of many locations they wish to live.1

Our objective here is not to obtain a general theory but rather a simple, tractable setting, to get a feeling for the properties of this class of asset pricing model. Despite its restrictiveness, our example highlights what we believe are three important features of a much larger class of “spatial asset pricing” models.

First, the location decisions of agents can be represented as part of their portfolio allocation decision. Namely, an agent who moves to a certain place acquires a combination of two asset for a net price of zero: (1) a unit of location-specific human capital, which pays a stream of stochastic positive payments, understood as wages or enjoyment of local

1Any asset pricing theory with real estate must include a location model. However, one could assume an extreme one, where there is only one location or where agents must live where they are born. Such an approach is unlikely to be fruitful if one wants to study regional price differences in a country with sizeable long-term mobility, such as the United States.
amenities, and (2) a unit of local real estate due to the need for a home in that location, which requires a stream of stochastic rent payments. With this observation in mind the location decision and the portfolio allocation problem of an agent must be examined within the same dynamic optimization framework.

Second, the details of the location model matter enormously for housing prices. Our model leads to a CAPM-like asset pricing model, but we view this as a negative result. As it will become apparent, small changes in the underlying location model would destroy the pricing formula. This is why “spatial asset pricing” is an appropriate description: housing rents and prices depend crucially on the spatial model that one has in mind. While this observation makes the search for general real estate asset pricing theories harder, it also opens the door to a wealth of testable implications linking spatial and financial variables.

Third, there is also an important feedback channel in the opposite direction. The properties of the dynamic asset pricing model matter for location decisions. As we shall see, the equilibrium allocation of agents to places does not maximize productive efficiency. When an agent moves to a city, he must also consider the amount of systemic risk that he takes up when he acquires location specific human capital and he commits to securing the use of local real estate. In turn, systemic risk depends on the location decisions of agents. The key advantage of our simple set-up is that it leads to a close-form solution of this potentially complex fixed-point problem.

The set-up we propose can be sketched as follows. Agents choose where to live. There are four classes of assets: a risk-free bond, stocks, residential properties, and non-transferrable human capital. As in standard asset pricing models, agents may lend and borrow at the risk-free bond rate without any constraint. Agents may also invest in stocks defined as claims over exogenous stochastic streams of dividends. The dividend stream of residential properties, however, is determined endogenously. Residential properties provide access to a stochastic production technology that is specific to the city where they are located. An agent’s human capital determines the expected level of his earnings in the city and the covariance of his earnings with the city-specific production technology.

Properties differ only in their location. They can be rented at the local equilibrium market rate. They can be purchased or sold (even fractionally) at the local equilibrium price without any transaction cost. Obviously, agents may buy a home in their city, in

\footnote{For most of the paper, we interpret local productivity as labor-related and hence translating into labor earnings, but the model has an equivalent interpretation in terms of leisure, where productivity is understood as the ability of the agent to enjoy local amenities. See page 13 for a more detailed discussion of the consumption interpretation.}
which case they are homeowners. Agents may buy residential properties, not only in the city where they live but also in the other cities.

We want to obtain closed-form solutions and expressions that are comparable to standard mean-variance asset pricing models. To this end, we assume that agents have constant-absolute risk-aversion preferences with infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution and that both city-productivity and stock-dividends stochastic shocks are normally distributed. While all investment decisions can be re-visited in every period, the location choice is irreversible. The distribution of individual characteristics across the population is left in a general form. We also do not impose any restrictions on the covariances between the stochastic processes driving stock dividends and city-specific technology shocks.\(^3\)

To study the equilibrium of the model, we introduce the notion of marginal resident (citations...). As we saw above, our agents are distributed (continuously) on a multi-dimensional space of local productivity parameters. Conjecture that in every cohort there exists an agent with a specific vector of personal characteristics that in equilibrium is indifferent between living in any of the locations. Namely, given all the price/rent processes in all locations, this agent—the marginal resident—receives the same expected utility from choosing to live in any of them.

The marginal resident is the channel through which productivity shocks are transmitted to rents. The indifference condition of the marginal resident pins down the relative level of rents in different locations. The fact that one location (the countryside) has unlimited supply of land determines the absolute level of rents. A productivity shock in a certain location affects the expected utility that the marginal resident receives if he moves to that location and hence the local rent.

The location decision of any agent can be determined by comparing his productivity parameter vector with that of the marginal resident. By aggregating the demand functions of all agents we obtain the asset pricing formulas for real estate in different locations and for stocks of different companies. With all this elements in place, one can verify that the initial conjecture about the marginal agent was correct and that this is indeed an equilibrium of the game. Indeed, we prove that this is the unique equilibrium where prices can be expressed as linear functions of the underlying parameters.

The equilibrium that we find leads to a characterization of location decisions, portfolio allocations, and asset prices. Let us consider these three elements one by one.

\(^3\)For most of the paper, we assume that there are no spillover effects across agents, namely the productivity of an agent depends on his location but not by who else lives in that location. In Section 4.5, we show that our characterization extends to a model with generic economies of agglomeration.
The location decision can be understood as an investment problem. An agent who moves to a city acquires a combination of two assets at net price zero. One – human capital – pays a dividend that depends on the interaction of the agent’s individual productivity parameters with the productivity process in that city. The other – the need for a home – pays a negative dividend equal to the market rent in that city. Both dividend streams last for the rest of the agent’s life. The agent will move to the city where the expected benefit of acquiring these two assets is highest. Obviously, he will be attracted to locations where his productivity level is high and the rent is low. More interestingly from an asset pricing perspective, the agent will seek cities where his net stream of dividends from human capital and housing is negatively correlated with dividends from other assets, namely, places where his labor income is not correlated with systemic risk but the market rent is. In such locations, the agent can kill two birds with a stone: by buying local real estate, he eliminates his own rent risk and he enjoys the extra return associated with an asset that carries systemic risk (the asset pricing implications of this tendency will be examined shortly).

The optimal portfolio of every agent is characterized as a combination of two components: (a) An investment in local real estate that depends on the agent’s exposure to local productivity shocks, (b) A portfolio of stocks and residential properties, with identical weights across agents. One can view point (a) as a manifestation of home bias. An agent who does not own property in the city where he lives is vulnerable to a combination of local productivity shocks and rent fluctuations (determined endogenously). This risk can be hedged away by an appropriate holding of local real estate. This hedging demand depends on the covariance between the agent’s earnings and local equilibrium rents. Point (b) amounts to an extension of the two-fund theorem. Consider the portfolio made up of all stocks and residential properties in the economy minus the homes held for hedging purposes. Let us call this portfolio the adjusted market portfolio. The optimal portfolio characterization we obtain says that besides their local hedging investment, all agents hold a portfolio of risky assets with the same weights as the adjusted market portfolio. Note that as long as the local hedging demand is smaller than the local supply of properties, every household holds some local properties in the adjusted market portfolio.

Equilibrium asset prices depend on the contribution of each asset to systemic risk evaluated in the adjusted market portfolio. Our expressions for expected returns on
stocks and houses are similar to CAPM with two important modifications: (a) The covariance matrix that determines prices now also includes local productivity shocks; namely the price of a stock is determined not only by how its dividend co-varies with other financial assets but also by how it relates to the earnings risk in different cities; (b) The quantity of real estate in each location that enters the systemic risk is the total supply of residential properties minus the quantity held by local residents for hedging purposes. Point (b) implies that the price of real estate in a location depends on the identity of people who live there to the extent that it determines the quantity of local homes that are left in the adjusted market portfolio. As we saw above, agents demand more local real estate in cities where their income is more insulated from local productivity shocks. Hence, in those places (e.g. areas with a diversified production base), prices will be relatively high compared to rents.

Our characterization yields an array of implications:

- Differences in real estate returns across locations depend on differences in the within-location covariance of the income of each resident with the income of the current and future marginal residents. This is because rents are determined by the current marginal resident and all local agents invest in housing to protect themselves against fluctuations in income minus rent.

- Housing demand for hedging purposes is first increasing and then decreasing in age. As agents get older, we assume their income displays decreasing covariance with the income of young marginal newcomers to their city. This implies agents purchase an increasing amount of local housing for hedging purposes. Counter to this effect is the fact that as agents get older, the number of periods to live decreases and thus their demand for insurance.

- Talent allocation across cities does not maximize aggregate expected production. When choosing a location, agents trade off expected net earnings opportunities (expected wage minus expected rents) against risk exposure (volatility of income minus rent). Agents therefore do not necessarily choose the location that maximizes their output. In particular, agents prefer a location with lower expected earnings minus rents if their income in that location displays a lower correlation with rents. In such a location, the purchase of a home provides them with insurance benefits. Nevertheless, they earn a risk premium on the home since the home is priced by outsiders to whom the volatility of returns is a risk, not an insurance.
It is possible to quantify the error that we make if we price stocks according to a classical beta (taking into account only the covariance with other stocks), rather than the correct beta. The covariance of stocks with human capital returns and rents in each location matters for the pricing of financial assets.

The model can be extended to encompass economies of agglomeration and other forms of externalities among residents. The equilibrium characterization above is valid as stated; the only – unsurprising – difference is that equilibrium uniqueness is no longer guaranteed.

The model can also be adapted to allow for frictions in the real estate market: as an illustration, we assume that ownership is the only option because the transaction costs associated with renting are prohibitively high. In this case, household cannot hedge the risk in income minus rent completely with the ownership of local housing because they are not free to choose home much local housing to own. As a consequence, they resort to exploiting the covariance between local risk and each of the financial assets. Agents in different location therefore purchases a different portfolio of financial stocks. The home bias effect shows up in portfolio choices and the two-fund theorem mentioned earlier breaks down.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 presents the main equilibrium characterization result, through three propositions corresponding to: portfolio allocation (Proposition 1), asset pricing (Proposition 2), and location choice (Proposition 4). Section 4 uses the main result to discuss a number of related issues. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.

Related Literature

This is – to the best of our knowledge – the first asset pricing model where both location choices and investment choices are endogenous.

Our paper is perhaps closest in spirit to DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004). They consider an economy with multiple communities and local goods as well as a global good. In this dynamic setting, some agents (the laborers) are endowed with human capital which will be used to produce local goods in future periods, but they are currently subject to borrowing constraints. Other agents (the investors) own shares in firms that produce the global good. This simple set-up yields a number of powerful results. Investors care about their relative wealth in the community because they bid for scarce local goods. This generates an externality in portfolio choice, which leads to the potential presence of multiple equilibria (in the stable equilibria, investors display a strong home bias). Moreover, if there
is a behavioral bias, the presence of this externality amplifies the bias through the portfolio decisions of rational investors. Clearly, our model differs from DeMarzo et al. (2004) in a number of important dimensions: (i) Our local good does not produce utility directly but it enables agents to realize their human capital potential; (ii) Our spatial allocation is endogenous; (iii) There are no credit constraints. However, we share their goal of studying the properties of portfolio choice and asset pricing under uncertainty in the presence of community effects. As in their model, a home bias arises in equilibrium due to a hedging motive.4

Grossman and Laroque (1991) characterize optimal consumption and portfolio selection when households derive utility from a single durable good only and trading the durable require payment of a transaction cost. They show that CAPM holds in this environment, but CCAPM fails because consumption of housing is not a smooth function of wealth due to the transaction costs. Flavin and Nakagawa (forthcoming) expand on the Grossman and Laroque framework by assuming that households derive utility not only from housing but also from numeraire consumption. They show that when housing asset returns do not co-vary with stock returns, the CCAPM holds. In equilibrium, all households hold a single optimal portfolio of risky financial assets. Depending on their holding of housing, households vary how much of their wealth is invested in this portfolio but not its composition.

We obtain somewhat similar results with regards to portfolio choice (e.g., separation) and asset pricing (CAPM) although we build our model focusing on a completely different dimension of housing. In the existing literature, housing differs from stocks in the fact that the quantity owned or rented enters directly into the utility function. Housing in our model does not enter the utility function directly. Rather, the choice of a home determines the characteristics of the labor income process households enjoys and the stream of rents they will face. Choosing a home amounts to shorting an asset (commitment to pay the future stream of rents) and going long in another asset (the households stream of income) with the added feature that the returns to this last asset are specific to each agent, they depend on his human capital. Another key difference between our paper and the literature cited above is that the stream of rents in each location in our model is determined endogenously, by the allocation of the households over space. The papers cited above assume that housing rents follow exogenous stochastic processes.

An extensive literature has explored the effect of housing consumption on households’

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4Our results on home bias are also related to the international finance literature on the home bias puzzle (Stockman and Dellas, 1989). However, we differ in our focus on real estate and in that location choice is endogenous.
life-cycle overall consumption and investment behavior. One of the early papers by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) considers an optimal consumption and saving problem when the household chooses whether to own or rent and a wedge arises endogenously between the cost of renting and owning. Henderson and Ioannides show that the consumption demand for homeownership distorts households' investment decisions. Goetzman (1993) and Brueckner (1997) explain how this distortion affects households' portfolio choice. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) compute mean-variance optimal portfolios for homeowners using U.S. data on housing and financial asset returns. Cocco (2004) also computes optimal portfolios but in a calibrated dynamic model of households consumption and portfolio choice. Housing consumption is constrained to equal housing investment in both papers. Yao and Zhang (2004) introduce discrete tenure choice (rent or own total housing consumption) in a similar environment. They show the sensitivity of households' portfolio choice to tenure mode: owning a house leads households to reduce the proportion of equity investment in their net worth (a substitution effect). However, households give a greater weight to stocks relative to bonds in their portfolio because homeownership provides insurance against stocks and labor-income fluctuations (a diversification benefit). Altogether, these papers demonstrate that incorporating housing consumption in portfolio choice models helps reconcile theoretical predictions with cross-sectional observations. In particular, home investment seems a key factor in explaining the very limited participation of the young in equity markets. Credit constraints play a critical role in explaining the observed hump-shape in home ownership over the life-cycle.

Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) study a consumption-based asset pricing model where housing rents and prices are determined endogenously; the quantity of housing follows an exogenous stochastic process. Agents can invest in both housing and stocks. The focus of the analysis is on the composition risk related to fluctuations in the share of housing in the households’ consumption baskets. The authors show that the housing share can be used to forecast excess returns of stocks – a prediction that appears to be borne out by the data. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) propose a mechanism whereby the amount of housing wealth in the economy affect the ability of households to insure idiosyncratic income risk and thus shifts the market price of risky assets, housing included. In Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) the authors present empirical evidence of the relevance of the

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5Englund, Hwang and Quigley (2002) report similar computations for Sweden, Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) for the UK, and LeBlanc and Lagarenne (2004) for France. Note that every one of these papers considers the stock market as a whole and so ignores the covariance between housing and specific stocks.
ratio of housing wealth to human wealth for returns of stocks. We share with Piazzesi et al. (2005) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2007) the same focus on the equilibrium properties of housing rents and the risk premia. In Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008), the authors extend their framework to consider risk sharing across regions. Empirical evidence indicates that the amount of housing wealth in each region affects the sensitivity of local consumption to local income. This paper is particularly close to ours because there are several locations. However, they assume exogenous location choice and houses are priced by risk neutral competitive deep pockets.

Our approach to the modeling of housing as an enabling asset follows from the tradition of urban economics. Our location choice model follows the standard multi-cities framework of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) where residential properties provide access to the local labor market and locations are differentiated by potential surplus. As in Rosen and Roback and the many more recent papers that build on this framework (e.g., Gyourko and Tracy, 1991, Kahn, 1995, Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), we assume households face a unit housing consumption requirement and derive utility from consumption of numeraire only.

Because we are concerned with portfolio choice in a dynamic environment, we assume households are risk averse. Risk aversion in the face of stochastic streams of income and rent provides a motivation for ownership of local residential properties – homeownership – in our model. This approach builds on the work of Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Hilber (2005), Davidoff (2006) and others who provide evidence of the relevance of such motivation for housing investment.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the vast literature concerned with the determinants of housing prices. Typically in this literature, the equilibrium discount factor for housing is the risk free rate due to assumptions of risk neutrality of consumers or producers (e.g., Davis and Heathcote, 2003, Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill, 2007, Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov, 2007).

2 Model

2.1 Geography and population

Consider an overlapping generation economy where a mass 1 of agents is born in every period. Each agent in the $t$-cohort is born at the beginning of period $t$, lives for $S$ periods, and dies at the beginning of period $t+S$. Hence, at every time $t$, there is a mass $S$ of agents alive in the economy.
There are $L$ cities, denoted with index $l = 1, \ldots, L$ and a countryside denoted with index $l = 0$. City $l$ has an exogenously given mass of houses. For convenience let $n^l$ be the mass of houses per cohort that will be active on the housing market so that total supply of housing in city $l$ equals $S \times n^l$. We assume that housing supply is scarce in cities:
\[
\sum_{l=1}^{L} n^l < 1;
\]
but it is abundant once the countryside is included:
\[
\sum_{l=0}^{L} n^l > 1.
\]
Each house accommodates exactly one agent.

2.2 Production

The income of a person who lives in the countryside is (normalized to) zero. Productivity in city $l$ follows the process
\[
y^l_t = y^l_{t-1} + \tau^l_t
\]
where $\tau^l_t$ is a random variable, independently and identically distributed across time. We discuss the covariance of these shocks below in the Random Shock Structure section.

At birth, each agent draws:

- a vector of city-specific endowment surplus, $\varepsilon = [\varepsilon^l]_{l=1}^{L}$, with $\varepsilon^l \in (-\infty, \infty)$.
- a matrix of city and age specific insulation parameters: $\rho = [\rho^l_{s,m}]_{l=1}^{L} \times \{0, \ldots, S\}$, with $\rho^l_s \in [0, 1]$. Assume $\rho^l_0 = 0$ for all $l$.

The parameters $(\varepsilon, \rho)$ are i.i.d across generations. Their joint distribution within a generation is left in a general form $\phi(\varepsilon, \rho)$, with the only requirement that it should be continuous and have full support.

An agent’s income equals his product. At time $t + s$, the income of an agent living in city $l$, born at time $t$, with parameters $(\varepsilon, \rho)$ is
\[
y^l_{t,t+s}(\varepsilon^l, \rho^l) = y^l_{t-1} + \varepsilon^l + \sum_{m=0}^{s} (1 - \rho^l_m) \tau^l_{t+m},
\]
for $s = 0, \ldots, S - 1$ (note the difference between $y^l_t$, a city-wide variable, and $y^l_{t,t+s}(\varepsilon^l, \rho^l)$ an individual specific variable). Hence, the income of each agent can be decomposed into a
permanent part, which captures the initial productivity of the agent in his location and a
time-dependent part, which is determined by the local productivity shocks in the city and
that agent’s sensitivity to his city’s shocks. We call \( \varepsilon \) the city-agent effect and \( \rho_s \) the shock
insulation effect. We represent below the income earned by an agent born at time \( t \), living
in city \( l \), for each of the first three years of his life.

\[
y_{t,t}^l(\varepsilon^l, \rho^l) = \varepsilon^l + y_t^l;
\]

\[
y_{t,t+1}^l(\varepsilon^l, \rho^l) = \varepsilon^l + y_t^l + (1 - \rho_1^l) \tau_{t+1}^l;
\]

\[
y_{t,t+2}^l(\varepsilon^l, \rho^l) = \varepsilon^l + y_t^l + (1 - \rho_1^l) \tau_{t+1}^l + (1 - \rho_2^l) \tau_{t+2}^l.
\]

Similar formulations determine the agent’s earnings until he reaches age \( S - 1 \). At age \( S \),
we assume the agent does not earn anything. It is mathematically convenient to set \( \rho_S = 0 \)
for all agents even if it is irrelevant to the agents’ earnings.

The city-agent effect is a standard object in multi-city models with heterogeneous agents.
Depending on their human capital, agents face different earning opportunities in different
locations.

The shock-insulation effect captures two economic phenomena. First, agents may be
exposed to a technological cohort-specific effect (documented by Goldin and Katz, 1998).
The human capital of certain people, especially the young, may be more flexible. When a
technological innovation appears, the income of certain agents will be more affected than
the income of others. Second, certain agents – like senior workers and public sector workers
– may be part of an implicit labor insurance agreement. Their wage is more insulated from
productivity shocks.

It is reasonable – but not strictly necessary for the analysis – to assume that the insula-
tion parameter, for a shock that occurs at a given age, is increasing in the age of the agent:
\( \rho_{s+1}^l > \rho_s^l \). Of course the two extreme cases are full insulation \( (\rho_s^l = 1) \) and full exposure
\( (\rho_s^l = 0) \).

\(^6\)The structure of \( \varepsilon \) and \( \rho \) could be much more complex than the one we have here and still be amenable
to analysis in the present mean-variance set-up. For instance, we could imagine that the city-agent effect is
not constant over the life of the agent but it follows a random walk. Also, we could assume that the extent
to which a shock that occurs at age \( s \) affect future incomes depends on the age of the agent.

\(^7\)We find it natural to restrict \( \rho_s^l \) to be between zero and one, but our mathematical analysis is valid
even if \( \rho_s^l > 1 \) (the agent’s productivity is negatively correlated to local shocks) and \( \rho_s^l < 0 \) (the agent is
over-exposed to local shocks).
For concreteness, we interpret $y^l_{t,t+s}$ as monetary income, but there exists an alternative interpretation in terms of non-monetary benefits that is equivalent from a mathematical standpoint. The term $y^l_{t,t+s}$ is now viewed as a money-equivalent of the utility afforded by the amenities present in location $l$. In turn the utility can be decomposed into an agent-city effect (taste for that particular location) and a shock component (perhaps an environmental or a social risk) multiplied by the agent’s sensitivity to that type of shock. Of course, the model can also be interpreted as a mix of monetary and non-monetary benefits.

At birth, every agent chooses in what city (or the countryside) to live. He cannot move afterwards. If an agent lives and thus produces in city $l$, he must rent exactly one unit of housing.\textsuperscript{8}

### 2.3 Housing market

The market rent in city $l$ at time $t$ is denoted with $r^l_t$ and will be determined in equilibrium. The housing market is frictionless. There are no transaction costs associated with renting, buying or selling property. In particular there is no difference between living in a owned or a rented house.

Agents may invest in divisible shares of any city’s housing stock and revise their decision at every period. Let $a^l_{t,t+s}$ denote the amount of housing of city $l$ owned by an agent born at time $t$ of age $s$.

The market price of a unit of housing in city $l$ at time $t$ is $p^l_t$. The agent revises his housing investment at the beginning of every period. For accounting purposes, imagine that the agent liquidates all his housing assets and then buys the desired amount in each period. At the beginning of period $t+s$, the agent acquires $a^l_{t,t+s}$ units in city $l$ at total cost $a^l_{t,t+s}p^l_{t+s}$. During period $t$, the agent collects rent on his housing investment for a total of $a^l_{t,t+s}r^l_{t+s}$. At the beginning of the next period, the agent liquidates the housing investment and receives $a^l_{t,t+s}p^l_{t+s+1}$. We denote $a_{t,t+s}$ the vector of the agent’s housing investments, $a_{t,t+s} = [a^l_{t,t+s}]_{l=1,...,L}$.

Given the frictionless nature of the housing market, the creation of derivative securities would be superfluous. In particular, Case-Shiller home price indices for our cities (a security bought at time $t$ which pays a price $p^l_{t+1}$ at time $t+1$) would be equivalent to purchasing housing for one period, net of the “rent coupon”.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{8}The assumption that people cannot move is essential for tractability. Without it, the model cannot be analyzed within the normal-CARA framework. However, the assumption is not necessary for qualitative results about the role of housing as a hedge. Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2006) develop a (much simpler) model where people can move freely.

\textsuperscript{9}Given the random-walk nature of all our shocks, long-term securities are also redundant because they
2.4 Stock Market

Besides housing, there is another class of securities, which we call stocks. These are claims on productive assets, which – as in regular asset pricing models – produce an exogenous (but stochastic) stream of income. There are $SZ^k$ units of type-$k$ asset, with $k \in \{1, ..., K\}$ and $z^k > 0$. A unit of stock $k$ produces dividend $d_t^k$ at time $t$. The dividend follows the stochastic process:

$$d_t^k = d_{t-1}^k + \nu_t^k$$

where $\nu$ is i.i.d. across time (and the probability distribution will be discussed below).

As for housing, every agent can buy units of every stock and revise his portfolio allocation in every period. The market price of stock $k$ at a given point in time is $q_t^k$. At the beginning of period $t + s$, the agent acquires $b_{t,t+s}^k$ units of stock $k$ at total cost $b_{t,t+s}^k q_{t+s}^k$. During period $t + s$, the agent receives dividend on his investment in $k$ for a total of $b_{t,t+s}^k d_{t+s}^k$. At the beginning of the next period, the agent liquidates the stock investment and receives $b_{t,t+s}^k q_{t+s+1}^k$. We denote $b_{t,t+s}$ the vector of the agent’s stock investments,

$$b_{t,t+s} = [b_{t,t+s}^k]_{k=1,...,K}.$$  

2.5 Distribution of Random Shocks

There are two sources of exogenous shocks in our economy: a vector $\tau$ of local productivity shocks and a vector $\nu$ of capital productivity shocks. The shocks are independently and identically distributed over time, according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix $\Sigma$: $(\tau_t, \nu_t) \sim N(0, \Sigma)$.

It is important that we allow for correlation between local shocks and dividends. A certain industry may be more affected by shocks in a certain market and vice versa. We also allow for correlation of shocks across cities.

2.6 Consumption and Savings

As the goal of this paper is to arrive at a mean-variance closed-form expression for asset prices, we assume that agents derive CARA utility $-\exp(-\gamma w)$ from wealth at the end of their life, $w$, where $\gamma$ is the standard risk-aversion parameter.

Agents face no credit constraints and can borrow and lend freely at discount rate $\beta \in (0, 1)$. For simplicity, we assume that agents are born with no wealth (this does not affect their decisions, given that they have CARA preferences).

\(\text{can be replicated by sequences of short-term investments. This includes long-term rentals or futures on real estate.}\)
2.7 Non-Negativity Constraints

Asset pricing models with normally distributed shocks suffer from a well-known technical problem. As the value of the dividends can become negative, agents may find themselves in situations where they would want to dispose of assets they own. If they could, the distribution of asset values would no longer be normal and the model would not be tractable. Hence, all models in this class assume, implicitly or explicitly, that agents cannot dispose of assets. Typically, this assumption is unrealistic because in practice both agents and firms are protected by limited liability. Instead, in the model stocks can have negative prices, and their owners must pay to get rid of them.

Our CARA-normal set-up inherits this non-negativity problem. In particular, the productivity in a city could become negative and house prices there may be negative.\textsuperscript{10}

The usual response to this criticism, which applies here as well, is that the unconstrained model should be viewed as an approximation of the model with non-negativity constraints, as long as the starting values are sufficiently far from zero.

2.8 Timing

To recapitulate, the order of moves, for an agent born at time $t$ is as follows:

1. At birth, the agent chooses in which location $l$ he will spend the rest of his life.
2. At the beginning of each period $t + 0, \ldots, t + S$, the agent learns the values of the random shocks for that period, $\nu_{t+s}$ and $\tau_{t+s}$.
3. For $s = 0, \ldots, S - 1$, at the beginning of period $t + s$ the agent revises his housing and stock investments ($a_{t,t+s}$ and $b_{t,t+s}$).
4. At $t + s$, the agent also pays rent $r_{l+1}^t$ for one unit of housing in the location where he lives. He collects dividends and rents on the assets that he owns.
5. At the end of his life, at time $t + S$, the agent liquidates his investments ($a_{t,t+S-1}$ and $b_{t,t+S-1}$) and consumes the wealth that he has accumulated.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}We assume that homeowners have an obligation to rent their property (they pay a large fine if it IS vacant).
\textsuperscript{11}The agent does not work or pay rent in the last period of his life ($t+S$). He consumes his wealth in the beginning of the period and he dies.
3 Analysis

An equilibrium is an allocation of households across cities, a vector of optimal portfolio holdings of housing and stocks for each agent, housing rents and prices for each city and stock prices such that: (i) The location choice and portfolio holdings solve the agents’ problem; (ii) The housing markets in each city clear; (iii) The stock markets clear.

A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium where the mass of agents of a generation $t$ who live in a given city $l$ is the same across generations.\(^\text{12}\)

Define a linear equilibrium as an equilibrium where stock prices, rents, and house prices can be expressed respectively as:

$$q^k_t = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} d^k_t - \bar{q}^k;$$

$$r^l_t = y^l_t + \bar{r}^l;$$

$$p^l_t = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} r^l_t - \bar{p}^l;$$  \hspace{1cm} (1) \hspace{1cm} (2) \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $\bar{q} = [q^k]_{k=1}^{K}, \bar{p} = [p^l]_{l=1}^{L}$ are price discounts and $\bar{r} = [r^l]_{l=1}^{L}$ is a rent premium to be determined in equilibrium. The rent is equal to local productivity plus a local constant. House and stock prices are equal to the discounted value of a perpetuity that pays the current rent or dividend minus an asset-specific discount.

Price discounts can also be interpreted as expected returns of zero-cost portfolios.\(^\text{13}\)

Throughout the analysis we describe $\bar{p}^l$ and $\bar{q}^k$ as price discounts or expected returns, depending on the context.

Our strategy for finding equilibria is as follows. We start by conjecturing that we are in a stationary linear equilibrium. We postulate a feasible allocation of agents to cities and we solve the portfolio problem of a generic agent living in a given city. As it turns out, solving this agent problem is enough to characterize analytically stock prices and house prices up to a vector of city-specific constants. With this information, we compute the expected utility of every agent conditional on city choice. We determine aggregate location demand

\(^{12}\)A non-stationary equilibrium would have the following structure. As agents cannot move after they locate to city $l$, the stock of rented accommodation used by the $t$-cohort will not become available until members of the $t$-cohort die at then end of $t + S$. Hence, if the $t$-cohort is, say, over-represented, then the $t + S + 1$-cohort will be equally over-represented. The non-stationary equilibria are characterized by cycles of length $S + 1$.

\(^{13}\)For instance, the expected return of a zero-cost one-unit portfolio invested in housing in city $l$ (evaluated in today’s dollars) is

$$E \left[ \beta p^l_{t+1} - (p^l_t - r^l_t) \right] = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r^l_t - \beta \bar{p}^l - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r^l_t + \bar{p}^l = (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^l.$$
given any price vector by comparing expected utilities across cities. Finally, we turn to the marginal resident. We show that for every vector of city-specific constants there exists an agent who is indifferent among all locations, while all others have strict preferences. The characteristics of the marginal resident are monotonic in the vector of city-specific constants, and we can identify the marginal agent such that the mass of agents who move to each city equals the local housing supply. This proves that that our initial conjecture on linear prices was correct.\footnote{It is tempting to consider the two first parts of the analysis, portfolio choice and asset pricing, in isolation. But they are only valid if the third part is present too. If one assumed a different location model or an exogenous allocation of agents to cities, the three price processes in (1), (2), and (3) would be different and Propositions 1 and 2 would no longer hold. For instance, if agents could move between cities during their lifetime, it is not clear that the rent the price in city $l$ would depend only on productivity in city $l$. We see this as both a weakness and a strength of spatial asset pricing. On the one hand, one cannot have a meaningful discussion about real estate prices in multiple locations without a spatial model in the background. On the other hand, this opens the door to a wealth of testable implications encompassing spatial and financial variables.}

As agents have CARA preferences, their lifetime utility can be decomposed into:

$$E [u_t^l] = E [u_t^l] - \gamma V [u_t^l].$$

The following proposition rewrites the two components of the agents utility and uses them to compute his optimal portfolio choice and his expected utility (in what follows we focus on one agent and we drop the argument representing the agent-specific characteristics: $(\varepsilon, \rho)$).

**Proposition 1 (Portfolio Allocation)** Suppose that prices and rents are given by equations (1), (2), and (3), with given $r$’s, $q$’s and $p$’s. Consider any allocation of agents to cities. Consider an agent born at period $t$ characterized by a vector $\varepsilon$ and a matrix $\rho$. If this agent lives in $l$ and chooses investment profiles $[a_{t,t+s}, b_{t,t+s}]_{s=0,...,S-1}$, the expectation and the variance of his end-of-life wealth can be written respectively as:

$$E [w_t] = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \varepsilon^l - \tilde{r}^l + (1 - \beta) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho_{s+1}^l \tilde{p}^l + \sum_{j=1}^{L} \tilde{a}_{t,t+s}^j \tilde{p}^j + \sum_{k=1}^{K} b_{t,t+s}^k \tilde{q}^k \right)$$

$$Var [w_t] = \frac{\beta^2}{(1 - \beta)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \sum_{j=1}^{L} \tilde{a}_{t,t+s}^j \tilde{r}_{t,s+1}^j + \sum_{k=1}^{K} b_{t,t+s}^k \tilde{q}_t^{k+1}$$

where

$$\tilde{a}_{t,t+s}^j = \begin{cases} a_{t,t+s}^j - \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho_{s+1}^l \tilde{p}^l & \text{if } j = l \\ a_{t,t+s}^j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The agent’s optimal investment profile is given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} \tilde{a}_{t,t+s} \\ \tilde{b}_{t,t+s} \end{bmatrix} = \frac{(1 - \beta)^3}{2 \gamma \beta^{s+2}} \beta^S \Sigma^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{p} \\ \tilde{q} \end{bmatrix}.$$
for $s = 0, \ldots, S - 1$, and his expected log-utility is

$$U^l = \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \left( \epsilon^l - \hat{r}^l + (1 - \beta) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho_{s+1}^l \right) + \frac{S(1-\beta)^4}{4\gamma\beta^2} \left[ \bar{p} \bar{q} \right]' \Sigma^{-1} \left[ \bar{p} \bar{q} \right].$$

Proposition 1 says that the optimal portfolio of any agent can be decomposed into:

- Investment in a mutual fund that contains all stocks and houses in all cities, with weights $(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})$. The mutual fund is the same for all agents. All agents within a cohort buy the same amount of mutual fund shares (but older agents buy more shares, purely because of the discount rate $\beta$). Given a vector of expected returns (which for now is still exogenous), the weights $(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})$ that the mutual fund puts on various stocks and real estate assets are given by a standard CAPM allocation. The portfolio puts more weight on an asset if its returns are less correlated to other assets and they have a higher expected value.

- Demand for real estate in the city where the agent lives, driven by a desire to hedge shocks to disposable income due to rent fluctuations. As the price of a house is linear in the rent, a house in a certain city is a perfect hedge against rent fluctuations in that city. The hedging demand is given by $(1 - \beta^{S-s}) \rho_{s+1}^l$. Hence, it depends on how well the agent is insulated from local productivity shocks at time $t$. The hedging demand varies across agents and across time for a given agent (the cross-sectional and life-cycle implications of this are explored in detail in the Discussion section). However, the hedging demand does not depend on the expected return of real estate in that city (if a city has a high return, that will be reflected in the mutual fund share only).\[15\]

Now that we have solved the portfolio allocation problem for any given vector of premia, we can find the equilibrium expected returns. Denote any (measurable) allocation of agents to cities with the indicator function $I^l_{\varepsilon, \rho}$, which takes value 1 if agents with personal characteristics $\varepsilon$ and $\rho$ locate to city $l$, and zero otherwise (such that $\sum_{l=0}^{L} I^l_{\varepsilon, \rho} = 1$ for all $\varepsilon$ and $\rho$).

**Proposition 2 (Asset Pricing)** Suppose that rents are given by equations (2), with given $\hat{r}$’s. Consider any allocation of agents to cities. Then, prices are given by equations (1) and

\[15\]Davis and Willen (2000) obtain a related result (Proposition 1 in their paper) on the decomposition of the optimal portfolio of agents who face labor risk into a speculative component and a hedging component.
(3) with discounts:
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{\bar{p}} \\
\tilde{\bar{q}}
\end{bmatrix} = 2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)^2 (1-\beta^S)} \sum \left[ \frac{n - R}{z} \right],
\]
where \( R = [R^1, ..., R^L]' \) and
\[
R^l = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \int_{\varepsilon} \int_{\rho} I_{\varepsilon, \rho} \rho^l \phi(\varepsilon, \rho) \, d\varepsilon \, d\rho.
\]

Houses and stocks are priced based on their contribution to systemic risk according to a classical CAPM formula. Proposition 2 finds the correct definition of systemic risk for this model. The weights of stocks in the market portfolio correspond to the quantity of stocks available, as in the regular CAPM. However, the weights of real estate are reduced by the total hedging demand. Namely, the weight of houses in city \( l \) is equal to the mass of homes \( n^l \) minus the integral of the hedging demand by residents of \( l \): \( R^l \).

To explore the pricing expressions in Proposition 2 further, define the *adjusted market portfolio* \( M \) as a portfolio allocation that includes
\[
\frac{n^l - R^l}{Q} \text{ units of housing in city } l \text{ for every city } l
\]
\[
\frac{z^k}{Q} \text{ units of stock } k \text{ for every stock } k
\]
with \( Q = \sum_{l=1}^L (n^l - R^l) + \sum_{k=1}^K z^k \). The mutual fund that all agents buy contains the adjusted market portfolio.

Denote the expectation and the variance of the adjusted market portfolio, respectively, with \( \bar{p}^M \) and \( Var (M) \). Define \( Cov (l, M) \) as the covariance between the return of real estate in city \( l \) and the return of \( M \). For every stock \( k \) define \( Cov (k, M) \) similarly. Then:

**Corollary 3** The expected return of real estate in city \( l \) is given by
\[
\bar{p}^l = \frac{Cov (l, M)}{Var (M)} \bar{p}^M,
\]
and the expected return of stock \( k \) is
\[
\bar{p}^k = \frac{Cov (k, M)}{Var (M)} \bar{p}^M.
\]

The expression in the Corollary is akin to the classical CAPM pricing formula where \( \frac{Cov (l, M)}{Var (M)} \) is a beta-factor for housing in city \( l \). The main innovation in our setting lies in the identification of the adjusted market portfolio, for which this formula is true.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{16}\)For instance, if one defined the market portfolio without the \(-R\) correction, such beta representation would not be valid.
Propositions 1 and 2 are really intermediate results. They rest on a specific conjecture about the stochastic process that determines local market rents, described in equations (2). But rents are not primitives and we must now check that for the location model used here the conjecture is in fact correct. It is useful to reiterate that the conjecture would in general not extend to other location models, implying that propositions 1 and 2 are only valid if accompanied by the specific spatial allocation model that we have chosen.

Besides closing the fixed-point argument, we also need to determine the vector of rent premia $\tilde{r}$, and to find the vector of hedging demands $R$.

For an agent with personal characteristics $(\varepsilon, \rho)$, the log-utility of locating in city $l$ is given by $U$ in Proposition 1, where now $\tilde{p}$ and $\tilde{q}$ are defined in terms of primitives through Proposition 2. For every $(\varepsilon, \rho)$, let

$$\tilde{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) \equiv \varepsilon^l + \frac{(1 - \beta)^2}{1 - \beta^S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) p_s^l,$$

with the utility of being in the countryside: $\tilde{u}^0(\varepsilon, \rho) = \tilde{u}^0\).\footnote{Assuming that $\varepsilon^0$ is without loss of generality. If it was not, one could re-define all the $\varepsilon$’s as differences with $\varepsilon^0$.}

Also let

$$\tilde{U} = S \frac{(1 - \beta)^4}{4\gamma^2} \left[ \begin{matrix} \tilde{p} \\ \tilde{q} \end{matrix} \right] \Sigma^{-1} \left[ \begin{matrix} \tilde{p} \\ \tilde{q} \end{matrix} \right].$$

Then, we can write the utility of locating in city $l$ as\footnote{To see this, note that:}

$$U^l = \frac{1 - \beta^S}{1 - \beta} \left( \tilde{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) - \tilde{r}^l \right) + \tilde{U}.$$

Namely, the agent’s utility can be decomposed into a component that is common to all agents (and depends on investment in the mutual fund) and an agent-specific component that depends on the city-agent effect $\varepsilon^l$ and the shock-insulation vector $\rho^l$ that the agent faces is he chooses to locate in city $l$.

A given agent locates in city $l$ if and only if $U^l = \max_m U^m$. For every $L$-vector $\tilde{r}$, we can write the aggregate demand for location $l$ as

$$\nu^l(\tilde{r}) = \int_{(\varepsilon, \rho):\tilde{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) - \tilde{r}^l = \max_m (\tilde{u}^m(\varepsilon, \rho) - \tilde{r}^m)} \phi(\varepsilon, \rho) d(\varepsilon, \rho).$$

We obtain:

$$1 - \beta \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s (\varepsilon^l + (1 - \beta)^{(1 - \beta^{S-s+1})} p^l) = \varepsilon^l + \frac{(1 - \beta)^2}{1 - \beta^S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) p_s^l.$$
Proposition 4 (Location Choice) There is a unique linear stationary equilibrium. In it, an agent with personal characteristics \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) locates in city \(l\) if and only if
\[
\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{r}^l = \max_{j=0, \ldots, L} (\bar{u}^j (\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{r}^j)
\]
and \(\bar{r}\) is the unique value of the vector \(\bar{r}\) such that \(u^j (\bar{r}) = n^l\) in all cities.

The equilibrium rent in city \(l\) is
\[
r^l_i = y^l_i + \bar{r}^l.
\]

The most important step in Proposition 4 is the determination of the identity of marginal residents (the agents who are indifferent among all locations). In our location model, the personal characteristics of marginal agents turn out to be constant across cohorts. As the marginal resident indifference condition determines market rents, this means that the local rent processes are are the same, but for a constant term, of the local productivity processes, which verifies the linearity assumption in the rent process (2).

Despite the fact that the payoff of an agent in a given city is determined by \(S + 1\) parameters \((\varepsilon^l\ plus the vector \(\rho^l)\), the expected utility \(U^l\) of the agent in that city can be condensed into a simple expression containing \(\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho)\). For any possible vector of rents \(\bar{r}\), the demand function \(\nu^l (\bar{r})\) establishes how many agents will live in each location.

Hence, for every vector rent constants \(\bar{r}\), we identify a set of measure zero of agents (the marginal resident) such that their expected utility is the same in every city and in the countryside:
\[
\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{r}^l = \bar{u}^0 \text{ for all } l.
\]

Note that this correspond to multiple personal characteristic profiles: all the vectors \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) that yield the same \(\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho)\). One can show that the vector of expected utilities of the marginal resident in different location is monotonic in the rent constant vector \(\bar{r}\). This means that the mapping can be inverted: given the identity of the marginal resident, there is only one vector of rents that guarantees that that agent is indeed the marginal resident.

The assumption that the distribution of individual characteristics \(\phi (\varepsilon, \rho)\) has full support guarantees that the demand function is continuous. As the marginal resident determines the vector of location demands, one can find the (unique) marginal resident that guarantees that demand equals supply in every location. This marginal resident is associated to the rent constant vector \(\bar{r}\). In equilibrium, we have that demand equals supply in every city:
\[
\nu (\bar{r}) = n;
\]
and that the identity of the marginal residents is given by the set of values \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) such that, given the equilibrium rent vector, the expected utility is the same in every city and in the countryside:

\[ \bar{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{r}^l = 0 \text{ for all } l. \]

A key feature of our location equilibrium is that the characteristics of the marginal resident are cohort-invariant. It is this feature that guarantees that the rent process is linear and that the CAPM characterization is valid. If, for instance, agents could change city, the time-invariance property would not hold and the rent process would not be linear. As a result, the CAPM characterization would fail.

### 3.1 Example

While we obtained closed-form solutions for portfolio decisions and asset premia, Proposition 4 does not express rents in closed form. This is natural as the probability distribution over individual characteristics, \(\phi(\varepsilon, \rho)\), is left in a general form. By making appropriate assumptions over personal characteristics and geography, one can arrive at closed-form expressions for all variables, as the following example illustrates.

Assume that:

- Agents in each cohort draw city-specific endowments \(\varepsilon\) from a uniform distribution defined over \([0, 1]^L\);
- At each age, all agents face the same city-specific insulation parameter \([\bar{p}_s]_{s=1}^{L}\);
- All cities have same size: \(n_l = \frac{1}{L} N\) for every \(l\), with \(N \in (0, 1)\).

**Proposition 5** An agent with human capital \(\varepsilon\) locates in city \(l\) if: (i) \(\varepsilon^l = \max_m \varepsilon^m\); and (ii) \(\varepsilon^l \geq (1 - N)^{\frac{1}{2}}\). The equilibrium rent in city \(l\) is

\[ r^l = (1 - N)^{\frac{1}{2}} + \frac{(1 - \beta)^2}{1 - \beta^{S}} \bar{p}^l \sum_{s=1}^{S} (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \bar{r}^l. \]

In the special case with two cities only \((L = 2)\), the equilibrium allocation is depicted in the plot below. The agents who locate in the countryside are those with a low \(\varepsilon^1\) and a low \(\varepsilon^2\) (the bottom right square region) locate in the countryside. Those who locate in city 1 have \(\varepsilon^1 \geq (1 - N)^{\frac{1}{2}}\) and \(\varepsilon^1 \geq \varepsilon^2\) (bottom right trapezoid). Those who locate in city
2 have \( \varepsilon^2 \geq (1 - N)^{1/2} \) and \( \varepsilon^2 \geq \varepsilon^1 \).

\[ \]  

4 Discussion

Our spatial asset pricing model yields a rich set of implications linking spatial and financial variables. We begin this section by discussing cross-sectional and life-cycle implications. We then turn to talent allocation across cities. We explore the pricing of portfolios of stocks and portfolios of real estate. We conclude with a short discussion of how the model can be extended to include economies of agglomeration and frictions in the housing market.

4.1 Returns on Housing across Cities

Our model yields predictions on cross-sectional differences in real estate returns (Proposition 2 and Corollary 3). To get a qualitative feel for those predictions, consider a simple benchmark: assume that shocks across cities are uncorrelated and suppose there are no stocks. Let \( \text{Var}(\tau^l) = \sigma_l^2 \). Proposition 2 yields

\[
\hat{p}^l = 2\gamma \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^{\delta^l})} \sigma_l^2 \left( n^l - R^l \right) .
\]

The expected return in a city is an increasing function of the variance of shocks in that city and of the outstanding real estate stock \( n^l - R^l \). In turn, the latter is a decreasing function of the average shock insulation parameter \( (R^l) \) in that city. The value of \( R^l \) is determined in equilibrium.
Consider a location that specializes in an industry and thus with low shock-insulation parameters: All residents, whether old or young, are affected by industry productivity shocks in the same way. The residents have a low demand for housing for hedging purposes. The city’s homeownership rate is low, and so are prices. On the contrary, a city centered around an industry with high shock-insulation parameters – perhaps a high-tech industry where the old struggle to catch up with innovation or a highly protected sector, where older worker face implicit insurance – will display a high hedging demand for housing, high homeownership rates, and high prices at "equal rents."

4.2 Home Ownership over the Life Cycle

The model also yields intertemporal predictions on home-ownership rates. We know from Proposition 1 that housing demand for hedging purposes depends on the shock-insulation parameter, which in turn varies with age. The hedging demand by someone at age $s$ anticipating a shock-insulation parameter the following period of $\rho_{s+1}$ is

$$D^l_s = (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \rho_{s+1}^l.$$

If one assumes that the shock-insulation parameter can be written as $\rho_s^l = k_s^{s-1},$ with $k \in (0,1)$ (implying $\rho_1^l = 0$ and $\rho_s^l$ linearly increasing in age), we have

**Proposition 6** Local home ownership has an inverted U-shape over $i$’s lifetime. For every agent $i$ in city $l$, there exists an age $\hat{s}$ such that local homeownership is increasing until $\hat{s}$ and decreasing afterwards.

For instance, if $\beta = 0.95$, $S = 60$, and $k = 1$, the hedging demand over the life-cycle is plotted in the graph below.
This result offers another explanation—alternative to credit constraints—for why home-ownership rates should be lower for younger people. When young, households do not need much insurance against rent shocks because their earnings provides such insurance. As they get older earnings provide less insurance, their hedging demand for homeownership increases. Against this force is the fact that as agent gets older, the number of remaining periods of life decreases, reducing the demand for insurance; this last point was made by Sinai and Souleles (2005) who also provide evidence of its empirical relevance.

4.3 Talent Allocation

Does our market equilibrium have the potential to create productive inefficiency?

Let us begin by defining and characterizing productive efficiency in this context. Let the economy’s total product at time $t$ be

$$Y_t = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \int_{(\epsilon, \rho) : \bar{a}^l(\epsilon, \rho) - \bar{\rho}^l = \max_{m} (\bar{a}^m(\epsilon, \rho) - \bar{\rho}^m)} y^l_{t,t+s} \left( \epsilon^l, \rho^l \right) \phi(\epsilon, \rho) d(\epsilon, \rho).$$

Suppose a planner wishes to maximize the expected discounted sum of future total products

$$Y = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s E[Y_{t+s}].$$

We begin by characterizing the solution of the production maximization problem:

**Proposition 7** The allocation of agents to cities that maximizes $Y$ depends only on $\epsilon$ not on $\rho$: An agent with $\epsilon$ locates in city $l$ if $\epsilon^l - \bar{\epsilon}^l = \max_{m} (\epsilon^m - \bar{\epsilon}^m)$, where $\bar{\epsilon}$ is the unique vector that guarantees that the mass of agents in every city equals housing supply.

Next, we can show that productive efficiency is not achieved, except in very special circumstances:

**Proposition 8** Exactly one of the following statements is true:

(i) For all cities, $\bar{p}^l = 0$;

(ii) The linear stationary equilibrium does not maximize $Y$.

The previous proposition says that productive efficiency is reached if and only the expected return on real estate is zero in every city. In that case, insurance against the rent risk is available at zero cost (if the return is positive insurance carries a negative price). Agents base their location decisions exclusively on $\epsilon$. Expected returns on real estate are
zero when: (i) The covariance matrix $\Sigma$ is such that there is no systemic risk; (ii) The local productivity shocks are uncorrelated and the number of cities goes to infinity (there is still systemic risk coming from stocks). Outside these restrictive conditions, the distribution of $\rho$ matters in location choices and the equilibrium allocation does not maximize expected product.

Of course, productive inefficiency does not imply overall inefficiency. Our market equilibrium is constrained-efficient given the insurance options available in the model. Full insurance is offered only if local labor shocks – and hence local house prices – are uncorrelated with systemic risk. Outside that special case, local real estate prices carry systemic risk and location choices are affected by the desire of agents to stay away from risk that is costly to hedge.

To reinforce the point of this proposition, we fully solve an in closed-form. For ease of exposition, we let $S = 2$, and restrict the stock market to a single stock. We assume agents enjoy a constant insulation parameter $\rho$ over life. Each cohort is equally divided in two agent-types: type 0 agents have no insulation ($\rho = 0$), type 1 agents have full insulation, $\rho = 1$.\textsuperscript{19} The distribution of agent-city match parameter is independent of agent type, $\varepsilon$, uniform over the unit interval. An agent $(\varepsilon, \rho)$ locates in the city if and only if

$$\frac{1}{\beta^2} \sum_{s=0}^{1} \beta^s (\varepsilon - \bar{\rho} + (1 - \beta) (1 - \beta^{3-s}) \rho \bar{\rho}) \geq 0.$$ 

The marginal city dwellers of type 0, $\bar{\varepsilon}^0$, and type 1, $\bar{\varepsilon}^1$ satisfy

$$\begin{cases} 
\bar{\varepsilon}^0 = \bar{\rho} \\
\bar{\varepsilon}^1 = \bar{\rho} - \frac{(1-\beta)\rho(1+\beta-2\beta^3)}{1+\beta}.
\end{cases}$$

The market clearing condition on the spatial market is $\left(1-\frac{\bar{\varepsilon}^1+1-\bar{\varepsilon}^0}{2}\right) = n$, which yields a solution for the rent premium as a function of the housing price discount

$$\bar{\rho} = 1 - n + \frac{(1-\beta) (1 + \beta - 2\beta^3)}{2 (1 + \beta)} \bar{\rho}.$$ 

The asset market clearing conditions are

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2n \\ 2z \end{bmatrix} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta}\right) \frac{(1-\beta)^3}{2\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \bar{\rho} \\ \bar{\rho} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} (1-\beta^3) \left( n - \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\bar{\varepsilon}^1}{2} \right) \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

Let $\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_h^2 & \sigma_h s \\ \sigma_h s & \sigma_s^2 \end{bmatrix}$. Replacing $\bar{\rho}$ with the equation above and rearranging yields a solution for the stock price discount, $\bar{q}$, as a function of $\bar{p}$, and a solution for $\bar{p}$, hence a full

\textsuperscript{19}This example is not, strictly speaking, included in our model because it violates the assumption that the distribution of types is continuous and has full support.
characterization of the equilibrium

\[ \bar{q} = \frac{2\gamma}{(1-\beta)^3(1+\frac{1}{\beta})}\left(\sigma_{hs}\left(2n - (1-\beta^{2+1})\left(\frac{n}{2} + \frac{(1-\beta)(1+\beta-2\beta^{2+1})}{4(1+\beta)}\bar{p}\right)\right) + 2z\sigma^2_s\right), \]

\[ \bar{p} = \frac{(2n\sigma^2_h - (1-\beta^2)\frac{n}{2}\sigma^2_h + 2z\sigma_{hs})}{\left(1+\frac{1}{\beta}\right)(1-\beta^2)\frac{n}{2}\sigma^2_h + (1-\beta^{2+1})\frac{(1-\beta)(1+\beta-2\beta^{2+1})}{4(1+\beta)}\sigma^2_h}. \]

With numerical values \( \beta = n = z = -\sigma_{hs} = 0.5 \) and \( \sigma_h = \sigma_s = \gamma = 1 \), the equilibrium solution is \( \bar{\varepsilon}^0 = \bar{\varepsilon} = 0.69 \), \( \bar{\varepsilon}^1 = 0.31 \), \( \bar{p} = 1.12 \), \( \bar{q} = 3.52 \). Maximizing output would have required \( \bar{\varepsilon}^0 = \bar{\varepsilon}^1 = 0.5 \).

### 4.4 Housing and Stock Indices

As in CAPM one can price any portfolio with respect to the market. In this model, the relevant market is defined by the adjusted market portfolio \( M \), discussed in Corollary 3.

In particular, one can price a housing-only index with weights \( \frac{n-R}{1-1}, \frac{R}{1-1} \) (we call it \( H \)) and a stock-only index with weights \( \frac{z}{1-z} \) (called \( S \)). We have:

\[ p^H = \frac{Cov(H, M)}{Var(M)} p^M, \]
\[ p^S = \frac{Cov(S, M)}{Var(M)} p^M. \]

Note that \( H \) can be interpreted as an index tracking the market portfolio of REITs: it is the housing demand vector that is the same for all agents. It includes all houses that are not owned by local residents for hedging purposes. The following result is immediate (by putting together the two return expressions above):

**Corollary 9** The relative returns of the housing index and the stock index are given by

\[ \bar{p}^H = \frac{Cov(H, M)}{Cov(S, M)} \bar{p}^S. \]

The corollary implies that, ceteris paribus, the difference between real estate returns and stock returns is related to home-ownership rates. The higher the fraction of residential property owned by local residents, the lower the returns on real estate.

Our model can also be used for predictions on stock returns. Often, the return of a stock is computed according to a CAPM formula that takes into account stocks only. Namely, the return of stock \( k \) is assumed to be

\[ q^k = \frac{Cov(k, S)}{Var(S)} \bar{p}^S. \]
In our setting, this expression is of course incorrect, because it does not take into account the presence of housing. The correct expression is \( \bar{q}^k = \frac{\text{Cov}(k,M)}{\text{Var}(M)} \tilde{p}^M \). The ratio between the wrong expression and the correct one is

\[
\frac{\tilde{q}^k}{\bar{q}^k} = \frac{\text{Cov}(k,S) \text{Var}(S)}{\text{Cov}(k,M) \text{Var}(M)} \tilde{p}^S \tilde{p}^M.
\]

If one assumes that dividend shocks are more volatile than the whole economy which includes productivity shocks (\( \text{Var}(S) > \text{Var}(M) \)) and stock \( k \) is more correlated with the stock index than with the whole economy (\( \text{Cov}(k,S) > \text{Cov}(k,M) \)), then we must conclude that the ratio between the two expressions is greater than one, namely the beta’s predicted by the stock-only CAPM are systematically higher than the beta’s predicted by our model.

### 4.5 Economies of Agglomeration

In the core of the paper we assumed that there are no production externalities (or amenity externalities, if one embraces the amenity interpretation of our model). Our set-up can be easily extended to incorporate externalities. Most results still hold, except possibly uniqueness.

Assume that the income of an agent if he locates in \( l \) is now given by

\[
y_{l,t+s}^l (\varepsilon^l, \rho^l) = y_{l,-1}^l + \varepsilon^l (E^l) + \sum_{m=0}^{s} (1 - \rho^l_m) \tau^l_{t+m},
\]

where \( E^l \) is the collection of \( \varepsilon^l \) of other agents living in city \( l \).

It is easy to see that Propositions 1 and 2 hold as stated. Proposition 4 can be re-stated as follows. For every \((\varepsilon, \rho, E^l)\), let

\[
\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho, E^l) = \varepsilon^l (E^l) + \frac{(1 - \beta)^2}{1 - \beta^S} \tilde{p}^l \sum_{s=1}^{S} (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \rho^l_s.
\]

As before, an agent locates in city \( l \) if and only if \( U^l = \max_m U^m \).

An allocation of agents to cities is described by \( E = (E^1, ..., E^L) \). Hold \( E \) constant. For every \( L \)-vector \( \tilde{r} \), the aggregate demand for location \( l \) is

\[
u^l (\tilde{r}, E) = \int_{(\varepsilon, \rho): \bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho, E^l) - \tilde{r}^l = \max_m (\bar{u}^m (\varepsilon, \rho, E^m) - \tilde{r}^m)} \phi (\varepsilon, \rho) d (\varepsilon, \rho).
\]

**Proposition 10** An allocation \( E \) is part of a linear stationary equilibrium if and only if:

(i) for all \((\varepsilon, \rho)\), an agent with personal characteristics \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) locates in city \( l \) if and only if

\[
\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho, E^l) - \tilde{r}^l = \max_m (\bar{u}^m (\varepsilon, \rho, E^m) - \tilde{r}^m)
\]

and (ii) \( \tilde{r} \) is the unique value of the vector \( \tilde{r} \) such that \( \nu^l (\tilde{r}, E) = n^l \) in all cities.
Thus, the equilibrium characterization part of Proposition 4 is still valid. What is missing is existence and uniqueness, which will depend on the properties of the functions \( \varepsilon^l(\cdot) \). While it would not be difficult to find conditions on \( \varepsilon^l(\cdot) \) that ensure existence, multiplicity of equilibrium is an intrinsic feature of models with economies of agglomeration. Our model does not help predict which equilibrium will arise, but it describes portfolio allocation and asset pricing in each equilibrium.

4.6 Ownership Only

In our frictionless model, there are no intrinsic advantages to owning or renting. Consider instead the extreme case where renting is impossible. An agent can move to city \( l \) only if he buys one house there. In this world, all houses are owned by residents and all residents own exactly one house. Agents can still invest in stocks.

Note that the covariance matrix can be written as
\[
\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix}
\Sigma_{\tau \tau} & \Sigma_{\tau \nu} \\
\Sigma_{\nu \tau} & \Sigma_{\nu \nu}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

We first characterize the optimal portfolio allocation:

**Proposition 11** Given a vector of stock premia \( \tilde{q} \), the optimal portfolio allocation for an agent with parameters \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) is
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{q}^1 \\
\vdots \\
\tilde{q}^K
\end{bmatrix}
= \Sigma^{-1}
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & \ldots & 1 \\
\tilde{q}^1 & \ldots & \tilde{q}^K
\end{bmatrix}
- \begin{bmatrix}
cov(\nu^1, \tau^1) & \ldots & cov(\nu^k, \tau^1) \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots
\end{bmatrix}
\omega_s \left( \rho_{s+1}^l \right),
\]
where \( H = \frac{\beta^{s-s+2}}{(1-\beta)^n} \) and
\[
\omega_s \left( \rho_{s+1}^l \right) = \left( 1 - \rho_{s+1}^l \right) \left( 1 - \beta^{s-s-1} \right) + \beta^{s-s-1}.
\]

The expected utility of an agent with parameters \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) if he locates in city \( l \) can be expressed as
\[
U^l(\varepsilon, \rho) = \kappa_0 - \kappa_1 \tilde{p}^l + \kappa_2 \varepsilon^l + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho_s^l + \zeta_s \left( \rho_s^l \right)^2,
\]
where \( \kappa_0, \kappa_1, \xi_s, \) and \( \zeta_s \) do not depend on \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) or on \( \tilde{p}^l \).

The optimal portfolio allocation is different from the one in the frictionless case. Agents can no longer choose their real estate investment. They must buy one house in the city they live in and they cannot buy property elsewhere. They must resort to stocks – a less effective hedge than local real estate – to insure against the risk created by local productivity shocks.

The amount stock \( k \) that a certain agent demand is determined by two components:
• A classical speculative element (the same that was present in Proposition 1)

• A hedging element, which is a function of $-\text{cov}(\tilde{\nu}^k, \tau^l)\omega(\rho^l_{s+1})$, where $\omega_s(\rho^l_{s+1})$ is a measure of hedging demand and $-\text{cov}(\tilde{\nu}^k, \tau^l)$ determines the value of stock $k$ as a hedge for homes in city $l$. If dividend shocks are positively correlated with local productivity shocks, the hedging demand is negative.

The next proposition characterizes asset pricing:

**Proposition 12** For a given allocation of agents to cities, the excess return on stocks is given by

$$\bar{q} = H\Sigma_{\nu\nu}z + \frac{H}{S}\Sigma_{\nu\tau}\Omega,$$

where $\Omega = \begin{bmatrix} \Omega^1 & \cdots & \Omega^L \end{bmatrix}'$ and

$$\Omega^l = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \int_{l(\varepsilon,\rho)=l} \omega_s(\rho^l_{s+1}) \phi(\varepsilon, \rho) \, d(\varepsilon, \rho).$$

Our asset pricing characterization now refers only to stocks: as real estate investment is fully determined by location decisions, nothing can be said about house prices until location decisions are discussed. Stock prices have two components: a classical beta-pricing element, $H\Sigma_{\nu\nu}z$, and an additional part that depends on their use for hedging against local productivity risk, proportional to $\Sigma_{\nu\tau}\Omega$.

To understand the hedging component of the stock price, note that $\Omega$ is a vector of aggregate hedging demands, one for every city. The total hedging demand $\Omega^l$ in city $l$ depends on the size of the city and how low the average shock-insulation parameter is for residents of that city. The price of stock $k$ depends on how its dividend shocks covary with productivity shocks in all cities, weighted by the total hedging demand in every city.

To discuss optimal location, let

$$\bar{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) = \frac{1}{\kappa_1} \left( \kappa_2 \tilde{\varepsilon}^l + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho^l_s + \zeta_s \left( \rho^l_s \right)^2 \right).$$

For every $L$-vector $\hat{\rho}$, we can write the aggregate demand for location $l$ as

$$\nu^l(\hat{\rho}) = \int_{\bar{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{\rho}^l = \max_j \bar{u}^j(\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{\rho}^j} \phi(\varepsilon, \rho) \, d(\varepsilon, \rho).$$

Then, we have
Proposition 13 There is a unique linear stationary equilibrium. In it, an agent with personal characteristics \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) locates in city \(l\) if and only if

\[
\tilde{u}^l(\varepsilon, \rho) - \tilde{p}^l = \max_{j=0, \ldots, L} \left(\tilde{u}^j(\varepsilon, \rho) - \tilde{p}^j\right)
\]

and \(\tilde{p}\) is the unique value of the vector \(\tilde{p}\) such that \(u^l(\tilde{p}) = u^l\) in all cities.

The equilibrium price in city \(l\) is

\[
p^l_t = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} y^l_t + \tilde{p}^l.
\]

As in the frictionless case, the equilibrium housing price is ultimately determined by the preferences of marginal residents. As before, the expected utility of an agent who locates in city \(l\) depends only on the value of his parameters for city \(l\) (i.e. \(\varepsilon^l\) and \(\rho^l_s\), for all \(s\)).\(^{20}\)

As in Proposition 4, there exists a unique price vector for which aggregate demand equals aggregate supply.

5 Conclusion

Our model is just a first step towards a theory of spatial asset pricing. The goal of the present paper was to obtain a simple, tractable setup to illustrate the presence of links between location decisions and asset prices.

The main lesson of the present paper is possibly a negative result. The properties of asset pricing with real estate depend heavily on the underlying geographic location model. The results we present here are valid only under a very specific set of assumptions about how agents are matched to locations. If, for instance, we were to assume that agents can move more than once, our CAPM characterization would fail (because the characteristics of the marginal resident would no longer be time-invariant. Also, our results would no longer be valid if labor productivity parameters did not enter the payoff function linearly.\(^{21}\)

This dependence implies that real estate prices can be discussed in a meaningful way only within the context of a spatial model of asset pricing. While this negative result makes it harder to find a “universal” real estate pricing model, it also means that spatial asset pricing can yield a wealth of testable implications involving both individual location variables and real estate prices.

\(^{20}\) However, now the expected utility of an agent who locates in city \(l\) takes a different form (quadratic in \(\rho^l_s\)).

\(^{21}\) Of course, one can always assume an exogenous location model, namely one where there is only one location or there are many locations but agents cannot choose where they live. Such a model, while perfectly valid at a theoretical level, would have limited practical use in economies, such as the US, where regional price differences are sizeable and they are linked to human capital mobility.
References


Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

The cash flow at period \( t+s \) for agent born at \( t \), living in city \( l \) is

\[
v_{t,t+s} = y_{t,t+s} - r_{t+s}^l - \sum_j \left( p_{t+s}^j - r_{t+s}^j \right) a_{t,t+s}^j - p_{t+s}^j a_{t,t+s-1}^j
- \sum_k \left( q_{t+s}^k - a_{t+s}^k \right) b_{t,t+s}^k - q_{t+s}^k b_{t,t+s-1}^k\]

for \( s = 0, ..., S - 1 \) and

\[
v_{t,t+S} = \sum_j p_{t+S}^j a_{t,t+S-1}^j + \sum_k q_{t+S}^k b_{t,t+S-1}^k.\]

The end-of-life wealth of an agent born in \( t \) (evaluated at the beginning of his life) is:

\[
w_{t} = \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta^s v_{t,t+s} \]

Plug in the income process and the linear prices:

\[
w_{t} = \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \left( y_{t-1} + e^{l} + \sum_{m=0}^{s} \left( 1 - r_{m}^l \right) r_{t+m}^l - y_{t-1} - \sum_{m=0}^{s} r_{t+m}^l - r_{t}^l \right)
+ \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{j=0}^{S-1} \beta^j a_{t,t+s}^j \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1}^l + (1 - \beta) p_{t+s}^l \right)
+ \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{k=0}^{S-1} \beta^k b_{t,t+s}^k \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1}^l + (1 - \beta) q_{t+s}^k \right)
= \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \left( e^{l} - r_{t}^l \right) - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \sum_{m=0}^{s} r_{m}^l r_{t+m}^l
+ \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{j=0}^{S-1} \beta^j a_{t,t+s}^j \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1}^l + (1 - \beta) p_{t+s}^l \right)
+ \frac{1}{\beta^S} \sum_{k=0}^{S-1} \beta^k b_{t,t+s}^k \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1}^l + (1 - \beta) q_{t+s}^k \right)\]
because \( \rho_0' = 0 \). Note that

\[
\sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \sum_{m=0}^s \rho^l_m r_{t+m} = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \rho^l_s r_{t+s} \sum_{m=s}^{S-1} \beta^m = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \rho^l_s r_{t+s} \beta^s \sum_{m=0}^{S-1-s} \beta^m = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \rho^l_s r_{t+s} \beta^s \frac{1 - \beta^{S-s}}{1 - \beta} = \sum_{s=1}^{S-1} \rho^l_s r_{t+s} \beta^s \frac{1 - \beta^{S-s}}{1 - \beta} \text{ because } \rho_0 = 0
\]

Then,

\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( (\epsilon^l_t - \rho_l^t) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho^{l+1}_{s+1} \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1} \right) + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \sum_j a^j_{t,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^j \right) + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \sum_j b^k_{t,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^k_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{q}^k \right)
\]

Hence,

\[
E[w_t] = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \epsilon^l_t - \rho_l^t + (1 - \beta) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho^{l+1}_{s+1} \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1} \right) + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \sum_j a^j_{t,t+s}^2 \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} r_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^j \right) + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \sum_j b^k_{t,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^k_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{q}^k \right)
\]

\[
Var[w_t] = \frac{\beta^2}{(1 - \beta)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \text{Var} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^L \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} r_{t+s+1}^j + \sum_{k=1}^K \tilde{b}^k_{t,t+s} \nu_{t+s+1}^k \right]
\]

where \( \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} = a^j_{t,t+s} - (1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \rho^{l+1}_{s+1} \) and \( \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} = a^j_{t,t+s} \) for all \( j \neq l \). In a matrix form, this is re-written as

\[
E[w_t] = \frac{1}{\beta^3} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \epsilon^l_t - \rho_l^t + (1 - \beta) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \rho^{l+1}_{s+1} \bar{p}^j + \left[ \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} \right] \left[ \bar{p} \right] \right)
\]

\[
Var[w_t] = \frac{\beta^2}{(1 - \beta)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \left[ \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} \right] \left[ \tilde{b}^j_{t,t+s} \right] \left[ \Sigma \left[ \tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} \right] \left[ \tilde{b}^j_{t,t+s} \right] \right]
\]

The first-order conditions yield

\[
\left[ \begin{array}{c}
\tilde{a}^j_{t,t+s} \\
\tilde{b}^j_{t,t+s}
\end{array} \right] = \frac{(1 - \beta)^3}{2\gamma \beta^{s+2}} \beta^3 \Sigma^{-1} \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\bar{p} \\
\bar{q}
\end{array} \right],
\]

36
Plug back into the utility function:

\[
U = \frac{1}{\beta S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s (\varepsilon^t - \bar{\varepsilon}) + \frac{1}{\beta S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s \left(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}\right) p_{s+1}^l (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^l \\
+ \frac{1}{\beta S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s (1 - \beta) \left(\frac{(1 - \beta)^3}{2\gamma S + 2} \beta^S \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right] \Sigma^{-1} \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right]\right) \\
- \gamma \frac{1}{\beta S} \left(1 - \beta\right)^2 \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2s} \left(1 - \beta\right)^3 \left(1 - \beta\right)^3 \frac{1}{2\gamma S + 2} \beta^S \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right] \Sigma^{-1} \Sigma \Sigma^{-1} \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right] \\
= \frac{1}{\beta S} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^s (\varepsilon^t - \bar{\varepsilon}) + (1 - \beta) \left(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}\right) p_{s+1}^l (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^l \left[1 + (1 - \beta) \beta^{S-s+1} + \frac{1 - \beta^S}{4\gamma S^2} \right] \Sigma^{-1} \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right].
\]

Proof of Proposition 2

The demands for assets excluding the hedging motive can be written as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{a}_{t-s,t} \\
\tilde{b}_{t-s,t}
\end{bmatrix} = \frac{(1 - \beta)^3}{2\gamma S + 2} \beta^S \Sigma^{-1} \left[\frac{\bar{p}}{\bar{q}}\right]
\]

for \(s = 0, ..., S-1\). Since all agents have the same portfolio and there is a measure one of agents in each cohort, the aggregate portfolio demand for assets (excluding the hedging motive), is

\[
\sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{a}_{t-s,t} \\
\tilde{b}_{t-s,t}
\end{bmatrix} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta} + \frac{1}{\beta^2} + ... + \frac{1}{\beta^{S-1}}\right) \begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{a}_{t,t} \\
\tilde{b}_{t,t}
\end{bmatrix} = \frac{1 - \beta^S}{(1 - \beta) \beta^{S-1}} \begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{a}_{t,t} \\
\tilde{b}_{t,t}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The housing demand in city \(l\) by people with age \(s\) due to the hedging motive is

\[
(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}) \int_{\varepsilon} \int_{\rho} I_{\varepsilon,\rho} l^l S_{t-l+1} \phi(\varepsilon, \rho) d\varepsilon d\rho.
\]

It is then easy to see that the total housing demand in city \(l\) due to the hedging motive is \(SR^l\), where \(R^l\) is defined as in the statement of the proposition.

The supply of houses minus the hedging demand in every city is \(S(n - R)\). The housing market clearing condition is therefore

\[
\frac{1 - \beta^S}{(1 - \beta) \beta^{S-1}} \tilde{a}_{t,t} = S(n - R).
\]

Hence

\[
\tilde{a}_{t,t} = S \left(\frac{(1 - \beta) \beta^{S-1}}{(1 - \beta^S)}\right) (n - R)
\]

and by analogy

\[
\tilde{b}_{t,t} = S \left(\frac{(1 - \beta) \beta^{S-1}}{(1 - \beta^S)}\right) z.
\]
Plugging in the demand function yields a solution to the housing and stock risk premia yields
\[
S^{(1 - \beta)\beta S - 1} \left[ \begin{array}{c} (n - R) \\ z \end{array} \right] = \frac{(1 - \beta)^3}{2\gamma^2} \beta S^{\sum_{i=1}^N} \left[ \begin{array}{c} \bar{p} \\ \bar{q} \end{array} \right]
\]
\[
2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^N)} \sum \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right] = \left[ \begin{array}{c} \bar{p} \\ \bar{q} \end{array} \right].
\]

**Proof of Corollary 3**

Note that
\[
\text{Cov}(l, M) = \frac{1}{Q} \left( \sum_{m=1}^L (n^m - R^m) \text{Cov}(\tau^l, \tau^m) + \sum_{k=1}^K z^k \text{Cov}(\tau^l, \nu^k) \right)
\]
\[
\text{Var}(M) = \frac{1}{Q^2} \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right]' \Sigma \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right]
\]

The expected return of a zero-cost market portfolio containing one unit of $M$ is given by
\[
\bar{p}^M = \frac{\sum_{l=1}^L (n^l - R^l) \bar{p}^l + \sum_{k=1}^K z^k q^k}{\sum_{l=1}^L (n^l - R^l) + \sum_{k=1}^K z^k} = \frac{1}{Q} \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right]' \left[ \begin{array}{c} \bar{p} \\ \bar{q} \end{array} \right]
\]
\[
= 2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^N)} \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right]' \Sigma \left[ \begin{array}{c} n - R \\ z \end{array} \right] = 2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^N)} \text{SQVar}(M).
\]

Similarly
\[
\bar{p}^l = 2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^N)} \left( \sum_{m=1}^L (n^m - R^m) \text{Cov}(\tau^l, \tau^m) + \sum_{k=1}^K z^k \text{Cov}(\tau^l, \nu^k) \right)
\]
\[
= 2\gamma S \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)^2 (1 - \beta^N)} \text{SQCov}(l, M)
\]

Hence, we can write
\[
\bar{p}^l = \text{Cov}(l, M) \frac{\bar{p}^l}{\text{Var}(M)}.
\]

The proof for $k$ follows similar lines and is omitted.

**Proof of Proposition 4**

It is immediate to see that a solution to $\nu(\hat{r}) = n$ constitutes a linear stationary equilibrium: no agent wants to change location, by definition $r^l = y^l \hat{r}$, and the conditions for Propositions 1 and 2 are satisfied.

To prove existence, note that $\nu^l(\hat{r})$ is continuous in $\hat{r}$ and that $\lim_{\hat{r} \to -\infty} \nu^l(\hat{r}) = 1$ and $\lim_{\hat{r} \to -\infty} \nu^l(\hat{r}) = 0$. 

38
To prove uniqueness, suppose that the system $\mathbf{v}(\hat{r}) = \mathbf{n}$ has two distinct solutions $\hat{r}$ and $\hat{r}'$. Assume without loss of generality that there exists a non-empty set of cities $\hat{L}$ for which $(\hat{r}')^l < \hat{r}^l$. The set of agents who locate in a city in $\hat{L}$ is given by

$$ \left\{ (\mathbf{e}, \rho) : \max_{l \in \hat{L}} (\hat{u}^l (\mathbf{e}, \rho) - \hat{r}^l) \geq \max_{j \notin \hat{L}} (\hat{u}^j (\mathbf{e}, \rho) - \hat{r}^j) \right\} $$

Note however, that this set must become strictly larger when $\hat{r}$ is replaced by $\hat{r}'$, because all elements $\hat{u}^l (\mathbf{e}, \rho) - \hat{r}^l$ on one side become strictly larger and all elements $\hat{u}^j (\mathbf{e}, \rho) - \hat{r}^j$ on the other side do not become larger. Hence, more agents will want to locate in cities in $\hat{L}$, but this is impossible as the mass of agents who locate in $\hat{L}$ must sum up to $\sum_{l \in \hat{L}} n^l$ in both solutions. □

**Proof of Proposition 5**

In the limit,

$$ \hat{u}^l = \hat{l}^l + \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^S} \left( 1 - (S + 1) \beta^S + S\beta^{S+1} \right) \hat{p}^l \hat{p}_{s+1}^l. $$

As $\hat{p}_{s+1}^l$ are the same for all agents and the $\hat{l}$’s are uniformly distributed, we write

$$ \mathbf{v}^l (\hat{r}) = \int_{\hat{l} : \hat{l} - \hat{r} = \max_m (\hat{l} - \hat{r})} d\hat{l} $$

This problem is symmetric in $l$. Hence, the unique solution to $\mathbf{v}^l (\hat{r}) = \frac{1}{L} N$ for $l = 1, ..., L$ must be symmetric in $l$, namely $\hat{r}^l = \hat{r}$. This means that the mass of agents who locates in the city is $\mathbf{v}^0 (\hat{r}) = \hat{r}^L$. This implies $\hat{r} = (1 - N)^{\frac{1}{L}}$. The equilibrium rent is given by

$$ \hat{r}^l = \hat{r} + \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^S} \hat{p}^l \sum_{s=1}^{S-1} \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s+1} \right) \hat{p}_{s}^l. $$

□

**Proof of Proposition 6**

Given the assumed relationship between $\hat{p}_{s}^l$ and $s$,

$$ D_s^l = \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s} \right) k \frac{s}{S-1}. $$

It is easy to see that $\lim_{s \to 0^+} D_s^l = 0$ and $D_s^l = 0$. Next note that

$$ \frac{d}{ds} D_s^l = \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s} \right) k \frac{1}{S-1} + \log \beta \cdot \beta^{S-s} k \frac{s}{S-1} $$

and

$$ \frac{d^2}{ds^2} D_s^l = 2 \log \beta \cdot \beta^{S-s} k \frac{1}{S-1} - \left( \log \beta \right)^2 \beta^{S-s} k \frac{s}{S-1} < 0 $$

□
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider any allocation of agents to cities. Suppose an agent with \((\varepsilon^l, \varepsilon^m)\) is allocated to city \(l\) and another agent with \(((\varepsilon^l)’, (\varepsilon^m)’)\) is allocated to \(m\). Swapping agents does not increase total expected production if and only if
\[
\varepsilon^l - (\varepsilon^l)’ \geq \varepsilon^m - (\varepsilon^m)’
\]
If this holds true for every agent, one can find a unique vector \(\tilde{\varepsilon}\) such that the condition in the statement is satisfied. ■

Proof of Proposition 8
According to proposition 4, in a linear stationary equilibrium agents are assigned to cities according to
\[
\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho) = \varepsilon^l + \frac{(1-\beta)^2}{1-\beta^S} \rho \sum_{s=1}^{S} \left(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}\right) \rho_s
\]
suppose that an agent with a certain \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) locates in city \(l\). His next preferred city is \(m\), and the utility difference between the two cities is given by
\[
D = \bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho) - \bar{u}^m (\varepsilon, \rho),
\]
where \(D\) is sufficiently low. Consider another agent with \((\varepsilon’, \rho’)\) which is identical to \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) except that \((\varepsilon’) = \varepsilon^l + \delta\) and \(\sum_{s=1}^{S} \left(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}\right) (\rho’) = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \left(1 - \beta^{S-s+1}\right) \rho_s - \alpha\). Given a positive \(\rho’\), it is always possible to find \(\alpha\) and \(\delta\) such that \(\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon’, \rho’) < \bar{u}^m (\varepsilon’, \rho’).\) By the assumption that \(\phi\) has full support, agents with \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) and \((\varepsilon’, \rho’)\) exist. The sum of expected outputs of the two agents would be higher if the agents switched cities. ■

Proof of Proposition 10
The first part is immediate. If \(E\) is an allocation and prices are linear, then every agent is using \(\bar{u}^l (\varepsilon, \rho, E^l) - \bar{r}^l\) as a criterion to locate and rents must equate demand and supply. The argument for the uniqueness of \(\bar{r}^l\) (given \(E\)) is unchanged from the proof of Proposition 4. ■

Proof of Proposition 11
Consider an agent born in period \(t\) with parameters \((\varepsilon, \rho)\) who locates in city \(l\). His wealth at the end of his life is
\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} y_{t-s} + \varepsilon^l + \sum_{m=0}^{S} (1 - \rho_m) \varepsilon^l_{t+m} + \sum_{k} b_{t+s} \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \rho_{t+s+1} + (1-\beta) \rho_k^l\right) - \frac{1}{\beta} \rho^l_t + \rho^l_{t+s}.
\]
Conjecture $p_t = \frac{1}{1-\beta} y_t - \tilde{p}$. This implies $p_{t+S} = \frac{1}{1-\beta} y_{t+S} - \tilde{p} = \frac{1}{1-\beta} (y_t + \tau_{t+1} + \ldots + \tau_{t+S-1} + \tau_{t+S}) - \tilde{p} = p_t + \frac{1}{1-\beta} \left( \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \tau_{s+1} \right)$. Replacing in the above equation yields

$$w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t + \sum_{m=0}^{s} (1 - \rho_m) \tau_{t+m} + \sum_k b_{t+k} \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \rho_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right) \right)$$

$$+ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p_t + \sum_{s=1}^{S-1} \frac{1}{1-\beta} \tau_{t+s}$$

$$w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t + \sum_{k} b_{t+k} \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \rho_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right) \right) + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \sum_{m=0}^{s} (1 - \rho_m) \tau_{t+m}$$

$$+ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p_t + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \frac{1}{1-\beta} \tau_{t+s+1}.$$
We have therefore
\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( y_{t-1} + \varepsilon^t + \sum_k b^t_{k,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^t_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right) \right) \\
+ \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \left( 1 - \beta^{s-s-1} \right) \left( 1 - \rho^t_{s+1} \right) \tau^t_{t+s+1} \\
+ \frac{\beta^S - 1}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_t + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p^t_t + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_{t+s+1} \\
\]

\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( y_{t-1} + \varepsilon^t + \sum_k b^t_{k,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^t_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right) \right) \\
+ \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \left( 1 - \beta^{s-s-1} \right) \left( 1 - \rho^t_{s+1} \right) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \beta^{s-s-1} \right) \tau^t_{t+s+1} \\
+ \frac{\beta^S - 1}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_t + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p^t_t. \\
\]

Note \( \frac{\beta^S - 1}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_t + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p^t_t = \frac{1}{\beta^S} \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^S} \tau^t_t - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^S} (1 - \beta) p^t_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \tau^t_t - (1 - \beta) p^t_t \right) \). Using \( p^t_t = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (y_{t-1} + \tau_t) - \bar{p}^t_t \) this yields
\[
\frac{\beta^S - 1}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_t + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta^S} \right) p^t_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \tau^t_t - (1 - \beta) p^t_t \right) \\
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \tau^t_t - (1 - \beta) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (y_{t-1} + \tau_t) - \bar{p}^t_t \right) \right) \\
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} (-y_{t-1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^t_t). \\
\]

So we now have
\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( y_{t-1} + \varepsilon^t - y_{t-1} + (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^t_t + \left( 1 - \rho^t_{s+1} \right) \left( 1 - \beta^{s-s-1} \right) + \beta^{S-s-1} \right) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_{t+s+1} \\
+ \sum_k b^t_{k,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^t_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right) \\
\]

\[
w_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \varepsilon^t + (1 - \beta) \bar{p}^t_t + \left( 1 - \rho^t_{s+1} \right) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s-1} \right) + \beta^{S-s-1} \right) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \tau^t_{t+s+1} \\
+ \sum_k b^t_{k,t+s} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \nu^t_{t+s+1} + (1 - \beta) q^k \right). \\
\]
Then

\[
E [w_t] = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-s} \left( \varepsilon^l + (1 - \beta) \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix} \right) \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{p}^1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{p}^l \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{p}^L \\ \tilde{q}^1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{q}^K \end{bmatrix},
\]

\[
Var [w_t] = \frac{\beta^2}{(1 - \beta)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-s)} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix} \Sigma \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix},
\]

where

\[
\omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) = (1 - \rho_{s+1}^l) \left( 1 - \beta^{S-s-1} \right) + \beta^{S-s-1}.
\]

The first-order condition for the optimal stock investment is

\[
\begin{bmatrix} \tilde{q}^1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{q}^K \end{bmatrix} = H \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uv} \\ \Sigma_{uu} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix} = H \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uv} \\ \Sigma_{uu} \end{bmatrix} \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k) + H \Sigma_{uv} \begin{bmatrix} b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix},
\]

where

\[
H = \frac{\beta^{s-s+2}}{(1 - \beta)^3}.
\]

The vector of individual demands for stocks is

\[
\begin{bmatrix} b_{t,t+s}^1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t,t+s}^K \end{bmatrix} = \frac{\sum_{uv}^{-1}}{H} \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{q}^1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{q}^K \end{bmatrix} - \sum_{uv}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uv} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uu} \end{bmatrix} \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k).
\]

Let

\[
\mathbf{h}^l = \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uv} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{uu} \end{bmatrix} \omega_s (\rho_{s+1}^k).
\]
The expectation and the variance of final wealth are given respectively by

\[
E[w_t] = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \varepsilon^l + (1-\beta) \left( \bar{p}^l + b' \bar{q} \right) \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \varepsilon^l + (1-\beta) \left( \bar{p}^l + \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q} - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov} (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\ \vdots \\ \text{cov} (\nu^k, \tau^l) \end{bmatrix} \omega_s \right) \right) \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s-S} \left( \varepsilon^l + (1-\beta) \left( \bar{p}^l + \bar{q} \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q} - \bar{q} \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \omega_s \right) \right)
\]

and

\[
Var[w_t] = \frac{\beta^2}{1-\beta^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \left( \text{Var} (\tau^l) \omega^2_s + b' \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov} (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\ \vdots \\ \text{cov} (\nu^k, \tau^l) \end{bmatrix} \omega_s + b' \Sigma_{\nu \nu} b \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{\beta^2}{1-\beta^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \left( \text{Var} (\tau^l) \omega^2_s + \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q} - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \omega_s \right) + \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q} - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \omega_s \right) \right) 
\]

\[
= \frac{\beta^2}{1-\beta^2} \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{2(s-S)} \left( \text{Var} (\tau^l) \omega^2_s + \frac{1}{H} (h^l)' \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \bar{q} \omega_s - (h^l)' \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} h^l \omega^2_s 
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{H^2} \bar{q} \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \bar{q} - 2 \bar{q} \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} h^l \omega_s + (h^l)' \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} h^l \omega^2_s 
\]

Proof of Proposition 12

The market clearing condition is

\[
S \begin{bmatrix}
\bar{z}^1 \\
\vdots \\
\bar{z}^K
\end{bmatrix} = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \sum_{l=0}^{L} \int_{l(\varepsilon, \rho) = l} b_{l,t+s} \begin{bmatrix}
\phi (\varepsilon, \rho) \\
\omega (\rho_{s+1})
\end{bmatrix} d (\varepsilon, \rho)
\]

\[
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \sum_{l=0}^{L} \int_{l(\varepsilon, \rho) = l} \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q}^l - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov} (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\ \vdots \\ \text{cov} (\nu^k, \tau^l) \end{bmatrix} \omega_s \right) \phi (\varepsilon, \rho) d (\varepsilon, \rho)
\]

\[
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \sum_{l=0}^{L} \int_{l(\varepsilon, \rho) = l} \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q}^l - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov} (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\ \vdots \\ \text{cov} (\nu^k, \tau^l) \end{bmatrix} \omega_s \right) \phi (\varepsilon, \rho) d (\varepsilon, \rho)
\]

\[
= \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \sum_{l=0}^{L} \int_{l(\varepsilon, \rho) = l} \left( \frac{\Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu}}{H} \bar{q}^l - \Sigma^{-1}_{\nu \nu} \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov} (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\ \vdots \\ \text{cov} (\nu^k, \tau^l) \end{bmatrix} \omega_s \right) \phi (\varepsilon, \rho) d (\varepsilon, \rho)
\]
where

\[ \Omega^l = \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \int_{l(x, \rho) = l} \omega (\rho_{s+1}^l) \phi (x, \rho) \, d (x, \rho). \]

Then,

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{q}^1 \\
\vdots \\
\tilde{q}^K 
\end{bmatrix} = H \Sigma_{\nu \nu} \begin{bmatrix}
z^1 \\
\vdots \\
z^K 
\end{bmatrix} + \frac{H}{S} \sum_{l=0}^{L} \begin{bmatrix}
cov (\nu^1, \tau^l) \\
\vdots \\
cov (\nu^K, \tau^l) 
\end{bmatrix} \Omega^l
\]

\[ = H \Sigma_{\nu \nu} z + \frac{H}{S} \Sigma_{\nu \tau} \Omega, \]

where

\[ \Omega = \begin{bmatrix} \Omega^1 & \cdots & \Omega^L \end{bmatrix}'. \]

Proof of Proposition 13

Given a vector of house premia \( \tilde{p} \), and agent with \((x, \rho)\) locates in \( l \) if

\[ U^l = \max_{j=0, \ldots, L} U^j \]

but we this is equivalent to

\[ -\kappa_1 \tilde{p}^l + \kappa_2 \tilde{z}^l + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho_s^l + \zeta_s \left( \rho_s^l \right)^2 = \max_{j=0, \ldots, L} \left( -\kappa_1 \tilde{p}^j + \kappa_2 \tilde{z}^j + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho_s^j + \zeta_s \left( \rho_s^j \right)^2 \right) \]

or

\[ \frac{1}{\kappa_1} \left( \kappa_2 \tilde{z}^j + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho_s^j + \zeta_s \left( \rho_s^j \right)^2 \right) - \tilde{p}^j = \max_{j=0, \ldots, L} \left( \frac{1}{\kappa_1} \left( \kappa_2 \tilde{z}^j + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \xi_s \rho_s^j + \zeta_s \left( \rho_s^j \right)^2 \right) - \tilde{p}^j \right). \]

The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4 and it is omitted.