Titre du papier : "The valuation of domestic and foreign earnings and the impact of investor sophistication"

Intervenant : Ole-Kristian HOPE  
(Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)

Discutant : Olivier VIDAL

Professeur responsable du séminaire : Eve CHIAPELLO
The Valuation of Domestic and Foreign Earnings and the Impact of Investor Sophistication

Jeffrey L. Callen
Ole-Kristian Hope
Dan Segal

This version dated March 15, 2004.

Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3E6
Email addresses:
callen@rotman.utoronto.ca
okhope@rotman.utoronto.ca
dsegal@rotman.utoronto.ca

Abstract
Although several studies have examined how investors value domestic versus foreign earnings, the results are inconsistent. We re-examine this question employing a variance decomposition model which, in contrast to previous research, explicitly considers expectation models for domestic and foreign earnings and allows for time varying discount rates. We document that investors value domestic earnings significantly higher than foreign earnings. We further find that the relative valuation of foreign earnings is an increasing function of the degree of investor sophistication, measured as either the percentage of institutional holdings or the number of institutional owners. Finally, when we classify institutional investors as short-term and long-term following Bushee (1998), we find that the relative valuation of foreign earnings increases with the level of investment by long-term investors. In contrast, there is no significant relation between the degree of ownership by short-term (or "transient") investors and the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings. Overall, our results are consistent with Thomas' (1999) finding that investors on average underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings due to lack of understanding of firms' foreign operations caused in part by poor disclosure.

Acknowledgments
We have received valuable comments from Bruce Behn, Christian Leuz, Greg Miller, Wayne Thomas, Beverly Walther, Mike Welker, and workshop participants at the University of Alberta, Oklahoma State University, Queen's University, Singapore Management University, University of Toronto, University of Western Ontario, the Eight Annual Accounting and Finance Conference in Tel-Aviv, and the AAA Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Mid-year Meeting (Austin). We are also grateful to Brian Bushee for granting us access to his investor sophistication classifications.
1. INTRODUCTION

This paper investigates the value relevance of domestic and foreign earnings for U.S. multinationals, including the extent to which value relevance varies with investor sophistication.\(^1\) This paper is motivated by (i) the contradictory findings of the extant literature, (ii) the failure of this literature to incorporate an expectations model for foreign and domestic earnings to guide the empirical tests, and (iii) the potential for investor sophistication to influence the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings.

Several studies have examined the "value relevance" of foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings.\(^2\) Despite using similar research approaches to measure the relative contribution of domestic and foreign earnings, contradictory results are reported. Whereas Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) and Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) find that investors value foreign earnings significantly more than domestic earnings, Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) and Christophe and Pfeiffer (2002) obtain opposite results.\(^3\)

We contribute to this stream of research in several respects. We extend the variance decomposition methodology of Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2002) and Callen and Segal (2004) to evaluate and compare the value relevance of domestic and foreign earnings. In the context of the variance decomposition methodology, value relevance is measured by the contribution of each individual component of earnings to the variability of stock returns. In comparison, prior studies determine value relevance primarily by comparing the

---

1 Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), Bodnar, Hwang and Weintrop (2003) and Meek and Thomas (2003) claim that there has been surprisingly little research done on the value relevance of foreign operations.

2 In general, there are varied arguments to be made both for foreign earnings to be priced higher than domestic earnings and vice versa. These arguments are related but not limited to different risks and growth opportunities in domestic and foreign markets, economies of scale and synergy, institutional factors, investor preferences, market mispricing, agency costs of monitoring managers and sub-optimal cross-subsidization. See, for example, Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) and Christophe (2002).

3 Some of these differences could be due to different test specifications and time periods under investigation.
magnitude of the domestic and foreign coefficients in a regression of stock returns on these components of earnings.

The primary advantage of the variance decomposition methodology is that it incorporates an expectations model for foreign and domestic earnings to guide the empirical tests and, unlike alternative accounting valuation models, allows for expected discount rates to vary over time. The latter issue is important because it has been shown by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, 265), among others, that small changes in expected discount rates can have a large impact on security returns, especially when expected returns are persistent. Equally importantly, we consider the role that informed investors play in valuing components of earnings compared with less informed investors. Not all investors have the same insight into the firm or the same perception of differential earnings streams. Although researchers recently have shown considerable interest in the role of investor sophistication (e.g., Bonner, Walther and Young 2003; Bartov, Radakrishnan and Krinsky 2000), prior research has not examined the impact of investor sophistication on the valuation of domestic versus foreign earnings. Finally, we have a more extensive sample covering a longer time period than prior studies allowing for potentially more robust conclusions.

We find that both domestic and foreign earnings are value relevant. In addition, expected return news is also value relevant, suggesting that it is important to control for changes in discount rates. Directly related to our research question, we document that investors on average value domestic earnings significantly more than they value foreign earnings. As the relative valuation could be contextual and related to firm-specific factors, we test if this result is robust to alternative explanations. In particular, we consider firm size, growth opportunities, the ratio of

---

4 The need to incorporate time varying discount rates in accounting valuation models is also emphasized by Beaver (1998, 37). He says: "Thirty plus years ago, Miller and Modigliani (1960) spent considerable effort to estimate the cost of capital for one industry for three years. It is remarkable that the assumption of a constant [discount rate] across firms and time is the best we can do."
foreign earnings to total earnings, the sign of earnings and earnings changes, income taxes, and foreign exchange rate effects. None of these alternatives materially affect this result.

Using 2SLS tests that control for the endogeneity of institutional ownership, we find evidence suggesting that sophisticated investors value domestic versus foreign earnings differently from other investors. In particular, as investor sophistication increases, the relative weight placed on foreign earnings increases, although domestic earnings are significantly more value relevant even for high investor sophistication. This finding is consistent with sophisticated investors being better equipped to analyze the often scant publicly available information about a firm's foreign operations, and their being able to access information on these operations that less sophisticated investors are unable to obtain.

Finally, we document that institutional investors with a long-term investment approach value domestic versus foreign earnings differently from institutions with a short-term focus. Specifically, employing the classifications of Bushee (1998), we find that the relative valuation of foreign earnings increases with the level of investment by long-term investors. In contrast, there is no significant relation between the degree of short-term (or "transient") investors and the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings.

In what follows, Section 2 reviews the literature on the valuation of domestic and foreign earnings components and the role of sophisticated investors and presents our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the variance decomposition model used to assess the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings. Section 4 discusses the data and sample selection. Section 5 presents the major empirical results and the sensitivity analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

This section reviews the literature on the valuation of foreign earnings. This section also develops our hypotheses regarding the relative pricing of foreign and domestic earnings, including the role that sophisticated investors play in the process.

2.1 Investors' valuation of foreign versus domestic earnings

In a relatively early study, Boatsman, Behn and Patz (1993) examine whether equity valuations of U.S. multinationals are affected by SFAS 14 mandated geographical segment income disclosures. For the most part, the authors conclude that there is little evidence that geographical segment income disclosures affect equity values. In a similar study, Christophe and Pfeiffer (2002) find that domestic sales are significantly positively associated with Tobin's q, whereas foreign sales are not significant. In an alternative "changes" specification, they find that the estimated coefficient on changes in domestic sales is marginally significantly greater than the coefficient on foreign sales changes. Christophe and Pfeiffer (2002) conclude that investors do not value international operations as highly as domestic operations.

Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) split earnings into their domestic and foreign components. They document that both foreign and domestic earnings changes are significantly positively associated with annual excess stock returns and that the coefficient on foreign earnings is significantly larger than the coefficient on domestic earnings. They also find that the incremental impact of foreign earnings is positive when foreign sales growth exceeds domestic sales growth. These results suggest that the larger coefficient on foreign earnings is evidence of greater growth opportunities for foreign than for domestic operations.⁵

⁵ In a follow-up study, Bodnar, Hwang and Weintrop (2003) find similar results for firms domiciled in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Similarly, Garrod and Rees (1998) find that U.K. multinational firms are valued more highly than U.K. domestic firms.
Christophe (2002) replicates Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) and finds similar results. However, upon splitting the sample into observations with positive and negative earnings changes, he observes that although investors do not value domestic and foreign earnings changes differently for positive earnings changes, the estimated coefficient on foreign earnings changes is significantly larger than the estimated coefficient on domestic earnings changes when earnings changes are negative. Based on these findings, Christophe (2002) concludes that investors do not generally value foreign operations as highly as domestic operations.

Denis et al. (2002) compare the effects on firm value of geographical and industrial diversification. Although they show an increase in the extent of geographical diversification by firms over time, geographical diversification is associated with a reduction in firm value for the average firm.6 Consequently, Denis et al. (2002) conclude that the costs of global diversification outweigh the benefits.7 The evidence in Bodnar et al. (1999), however, is in direct contrast to Denis et al. (2002). Using a methodology similar to Denis et al. (2002), they find that global diversification is associated with higher firm value. Neither set of authors attempts to reconcile their disparate results.

Based on the above discussion and the contradictory findings, our first hypothesis (stated in the alternative) is non-directional and investigates the relative pricing of domestic and foreign earnings:

**H1: Domestic and foreign earnings are priced differently by investors.**

---

6 This result holds also after controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification decision.

7 Consistent with Denis et al. (2002), Click and Harrison (2000) document that multinationals have disproportionally high levels of assets in relation to the earnings they generate, and that foreign assets in particular are associated with value destruction.
2.2 The role of investor sophistication

The first hypothesis investigates investors' *average* valuation of domestic versus foreign earnings. In this section, we examine whether the relative valuation of domestic versus foreign earnings is a function of the degree of investor sophistication. We follow the extant accounting literature and use institutional ownership (both the percentage of shares held by institutions and the number of institutions holding shares) as a proxy for investor sophistication: (e.g., Hand 1990; Walther 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller 2003). Consistent with prior literature, institutions consist of banks, insurance companies, investment companies and their managers, independent advisors, and others.\(^8\)

There are several reasons why more sophisticated investors may place different values on foreign versus domestic earnings than other investors. In general, prior research has documented that sophisticated investors behave differently from other, less informed, investors. Findings in the psychology and accounting literatures indicate that more experienced individuals have more appropriate cue weights (e.g., Slovic 1969; Bonner, Walther and Young 2003). Sophisticated investors have superior abilities (Beaver 1998) and consequently can learn better from experience (Bonner and Walker 1994). Economic incentives are potentially important as well. Institutional investors have much larger investment portfolios and, therefore, have much more to gain or lose in absolute dollar terms from their investment decisions. Furthermore, the costs to engaging in more in-depth firm analysis are lower for institutions, in part because of their superior access to databases and analytical tools (Bonner et al. 2003).

Many studies report results that are consistent with superior information gathering, analysis and pricing abilities of sophisticated investors. Price (1998) finds that informed investors appear to make greater use of accounting disclosures and non-earnings information to form more precise earnings expectations. Bonner et al. (2003) document that sophisticated investors incorporate the information inherent in the relative accuracy of analyst forecasts to a greater

\(^8\) Source: CDA/Spectrum.
extent than less informed investors, consistent with sophisticated investors (institutions) having greater abilities and exhibiting more adaptive strategies. Although investors on average exhibit distance, language and cultural biases in making investment decisions, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) document that such biases are less prevalent among more sophisticated investors. In a similar vein, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) provide evidence that less sophisticated investors demonstrate behavioral biases in the way they process pro forma earnings information relative to more sophisticated investors. The efficiency of a firm's stock price appears to be associated with the degree of sophistication of the firm's marginal investor (e.g., Walther 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkataraman 2002; Battalio and Mendenhall 2003).

More directly related to our study, Thomas (1999) shows that foreign earnings tend to be more persistent than domestic earnings and that, on average, investors underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings. This finding is consistent with investors not understanding (or not trusting) foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) posits that one possible explanation for the existence of market mispricing is that it is difficult for investors to understand fully the origin of firms' foreign earnings (op. cit., 265). Such an explanation seems plausible given the relative paucity of information on foreign operations provided by many firms (e.g., White, Sondhi and

---

9 Although Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) use institutions to proxy for investor sophistication, as their sample is from Finland, their definition of an institution differs from U.S. studies that use filings required by section 13(f) of the Securities and Exchange Act (enacted by Congress in 1975). Bhattacharya et al. (2003) define sophisticated investors as "large investors" based on the dollar value of shares traded. Hence, their results are not directly comparable to other studies that use institutional holdings as a proxy for investor sophistication. Battalio and Mendenhall (2003) use both trade size and percentage shareholding by institutions as proxies for sophistication. They show that small trade size is significantly negatively correlated with the fraction of the firm's shares held by institutions.

10 Thomas (1999) shows that abnormal returns can be made by using publicly available data about the foreign component of total earnings.

11 In a subsequent study, Thomas (2003) hypothesizes that that his 1999 result should be less pronounced for firms that are followed by more sophisticated investors. Based on factors that previous research has found to be associated with institutional investors, he finds that the "foreign earnings anomaly" is decreasing in firm size, the market-to-book ratio and return on equity. By focusing directly on institutional holdings, our study complements Thomas (2003) and provides a more direct test of the effect of investor sophistication.
Fried 2003, 577). 12 If it is the case that the average investor finds it more difficult to evaluate the foreign component of earnings, more sophisticated investors should be in a better position to make such evaluations. Ke and Petroni (2003) suggest that the informational advantage of institutions stems both from direct communication with management and from their ability to process publicly available information in a sophisticated manner. Similarly, Bradshaw et al. (2003) argue that institutions, as sophisticated investors, are the class of U.S. investors most likely to base their investment decisions on detailed financial analysis.

Based on the above literature review, sophisticated investors are likely to value foreign versus domestic earnings differently from other investors. This leads to our second hypothesis (stated in the alternative):

\[ \text{H2: The valuation weights placed on foreign versus domestic earnings are a function of the degree of investor sophistication.} \]

2.3 Short-term versus long-term institutional investors

Consistent with most extant research, our second hypothesis focuses on institutional investors as sophisticated investors. However, recent research has documented that there are distinct groups among institutions that differ in their objectives and information needs.

Bushee (1998) classifies institutions into three groups – transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer - based on factors such as portfolio turnover, diversification, and momentum trading. "Transient" institutions are characterized as having high portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings (Bushee 2001). They are short-term focused investors whose investments are based on the likelihood of short-term trading profits. According to Bushee (2001, 214), the short

\[ \text{footnote} \]

12 Khurana, Pereira and Raman (2003) similarly find that financial analysts fail to fully incorporate the higher persistence of foreign earnings. They argue that their findings help explain the market mispricing documented by Thomas (1999).
investment horizons of transient investors create little incentive for them to gather information relevant to long-run value.

"Dedicated" investors and "quasi-indexers" both provide long-term, stable ownership to firms. Dedicated institutional investors hold large stakes in a limited number of firms. Such ownership creates incentives to invest in monitoring management and to rely on information beyond current earnings to assess managers' performance. Quasi-indexers generally follow indexing and buy-and-hold strategies, and are characterized by high diversification. Although quasi-indexers follow a passive investment strategy, Monks and Minow (1995) argue that these investors have strong incentives to monitor management to ensure that it is acting in the best interest of the firm. In addition, Porter (1992) argues that long-term investors have better access to private information about their portfolio firms. Given the divergence in objectives and information needs, our third hypothesis (stated in the alternative) examines whether the level of ownership by short-term (or transient) investors has different implications for the relative valuation of foreign earnings than long-term investors (dedicated and quasi-indexers):

**H3: The difference between the pricing of domestic and foreign earnings is related (not related) to the level of investment by long-term (short-term) institutional investors**
3. THE VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION MODEL

3.1 The valuation of domestic and foreign earnings

This section describes the model we use to assess the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings. Specifically, we extend the accounting valuation model of Vuolteenaho (2002), which in turn is based on Campbell and Shiller's (1988a, 1988b) dividend growth model. The Appendix briefly derives these models.

Campbell and Shiller show that a firm's current unexpected returns can be expressed as a log-linear function of unexpected changes in future expected dividends and unexpected changes in future expected returns (discount rates).\(^\text{13}\)

\[
r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta d_{t+j} - \Delta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j}
\]

where

\(\Delta\) denotes the first differencing operator

\(E_t\) is the expectations operator and \(\Delta E_t = E_t(\cdot) - E_{t+1}(\cdot)\).

\(r_t = \log\text{ equity return (cum dividend)} \) in excess of the risk free rate

\(d_t = \log\text{ dividends at time t}\)

\(\rho\) is a constant error approximation term.

Vuolteenaho (2002) extends Campbell and Shiller's model by incorporating the accounting Clean Surplus relation into the model, thereby replacing dividends with net income.\(^\text{14}\)

The resulting model takes the form:

\(^{13}\) Small case letters denote the logs of the capitalized variables. We abstract from any additive error approximation terms when describing the models.

\(^{14}\) This extension is not obtained by simply substituting for dividends in equation (1) using the Clean Surplus relation. Rather, it follows from the dynamics of the book to market ratio. See the Appendix.
\[ r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = \Delta E \sum_{j=0}^\infty \rho^j (\text{roe}_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) - \Delta E \sum_{j=1}^\infty \rho^j r_{t+j} \]  

(2)

where

\text{roe}_t = \log \text{book return on equity in period } t = \log (1 + X_t/BV_{t-1})

\text{BV}_t = \text{book value of equity at time } t

X_t = \text{net income in period } t

i_t = \log \text{of one plus the risk free rate in period } t

Using the log approximation (\ln(1+X) \approx X), we decompose the (log) return on equity in equation (2) into domestic earnings and foreign earnings scaled by book value of equity, denoted \text{DEARN} and \text{FEARN}, respectively. Specifically,

\text{roe}_t = \log(1+X_t/BV_{t-1})

\approx X_t/BV_{t-1}

= DX_t/BV_{t-1} + FX_t/BV_{t-1}

= \text{DEARN}_t + \text{FEARN}_t  

(3)

where DX_t is net income from domestic operations and FX_t is net income from foreign operations. Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) yields the following valuation equation:\textsuperscript{15}

\[ r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = \Delta E \sum_{j=0}^\infty \rho^j (\text{DEARN}_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) + \Delta E \sum_{j=0}^\infty \rho^j \text{FEARN}_{t+j} - \Delta E \sum_{j=1}^\infty \rho^j r_{t+j} \]  

(4)

\textsuperscript{15} In Equation (4), i is subtracted from \text{DEARN}. Subtracting it from \text{FEARN} instead does not change the results.
Defining the unexpected stock return components as expected-return news (nr), domestic earnings news (nD) and foreign earnings news (nF), equation (4) can be expressed as:

\[ r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = nD_t + nF_t - nr_t \]  
(5)

where

\[ nr_t = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} \]  
(6)

\[ nD_t = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (DEARN_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) \]  
(7)

\[ nF_t = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j FEARN_{t+j} \]  
(8)

Equation (5) shows that the unexpected change in current stock returns increases with domestic and foreign earnings news and decreases with expected return news. An unanticipated increase in the firm's expected domestic or foreign earnings conveys positive information about the firm's prospects and hence translates into higher returns. Conversely, an unexpected increase in future expected returns due to higher risk, for example, translates into negative unexpected current returns, similar to the effect of an increase in the yield rate on bond prices.

Equation (5) can be used to provide a variance decomposition of the unexpected change in returns. Specifically, taking variances of both sides of this equation yields

\[ \text{var}\{r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)\} = \text{var}(nr_t) + \text{var}(nD_t) + \text{var}(nF_t) \]

\[ - 2\text{cov}(nr_t,nD_t) - 2\text{cov}(nr_t,nF_t) + 2\text{cov}(nD_t,nF_t) \]  
(9)

Equation (9) can be used to assess the relative impact of domestic and foreign earnings news and expected-return news in explaining equity returns. The greater is the variance (or covariance) of any factor(s) on the right-hand side of the equation, the more power that factor has
in explaining unexpected returns. Value relevance is thus measured by the contribution of each individual component of earnings and the return news to the variability of stock returns.

3.2 Estimation

The return variance decomposition [equation (9)] cannot be implemented *inter alia* without estimates (of the dynamics) of future expected returns and the future expected values of the two net income components. Following Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2002) and Callen and Segal (2004), we implement the variance decomposition using a log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In general, VAR estimation is facilitated by assuming that the dynamics of the data are well described by a (stationary) time-series model. Specifically, define \( z_{it} \) to be a vector of firm-specific state variables that follows the vector autoregressive process:

\[
z_{it} = A z_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t} \tag{10}
\]

Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002) and Callen and Segal (2004), the VAR coefficient matrix \( A \) is assumed to be constant over time and over firms. The error term vectors \( \eta_{i,t} \) are vectors of shocks and are assumed to have a variance-covariance matrix \( \Omega \) and to be independent of everything known at \( t-1 \).

We estimate both a parsimonious short VAR and a richer long VAR specification. The short VAR state variables consist of one lag of each of log stock returns, domestic earnings scaled by book value of equity, foreign earnings scaled by book value of equity, and log book to market
The long VAR includes two lags for each of the state variables. The short VAR can then be described as a system of (mean-adjusted) equations:

\[ r_t = \alpha_1 r_{t-1} + \alpha_2 \text{DEARN}_{t-1} + \alpha_3 \text{FEARN}_{t-1} + \alpha_4 \text{bm}_{t-1} + \eta_{1t} \]  
\[ \text{DEARN}_t = \beta_1 r_{t-1} + \beta_2 \text{DEARN}_{t-1} + \beta_3 \text{FEARN}_{t-1} + \beta_4 \text{bm}_{t-1} + \eta_{2t} \]  
\[ \text{FEARN}_t = \gamma_1 r_{t-1} + \gamma_2 \text{DEARN}_{t-1} + \gamma_3 \text{FEARN}_{t-1} + \gamma_4 \text{bm}_{t-1} + \eta_{3t} \]  
\[ \text{bm}_t = \delta_1 r_{t-1} + \delta_2 \text{DEARN}_{t-1} + \delta_3 \text{FEARN}_{t-1} + \delta_4 \text{bm}_{t-1} + \eta_{4t} \]  

We estimate the regressions using fixed effects panel data in order to account for the temporal correlation across observations and to maintain the heterogeneity of the sample firms.

As shown by Campbell (1991), the variance decomposition of these valuation models can be implemented empirically by combining the residuals from the VAR estimation with the unexpected current return valuation equation [equation (4)]. Formally, let \( e_i = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0) \) where the 1 is in the \( i \)th position. The unexpected change in returns is computed as:

\[ r_t - E_t[r_t] = e_1 \eta_{1t} \]

Equation (10) implies that forecasts of the state vector \( z_{it} \) can be computed as:

\[ E_t[z_{it+1|t}] = A^{i+1} z_{it} \]

Using equation (13), the revision in expected future returns is computed as:

---

16 The book to market ratio is included in the parsimonious VAR because our model is generated from this ratio (see the Appendix). Vuolteenaho (2002) similarly includes the book to market ratio in his VAR specifications.

17 An alternative estimation method is weighted least squares where the weight in each cross-section is the number of firms in the corresponding year in order to account for the different number of observations in each cross section (year). To account for possible cross-sectional correlation, the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method can be used to obtain consistent robust standard errors. The results obtained using this alternative estimation method are very similar to the results reported.
\[
\Delta E_i \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} \equiv E_i \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} - E_{i-1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} \\
= e^1 \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j A^j \eta_{i,j} = e^1 \rho A (I - \rho A)^{-1} \eta_{i,j}
\]

(14)

Similarly, the revision in expected future domestic earnings is computed as:

\[
\Delta E_i \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (DEARN_{t+j} - i_i) \equiv E_i \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (DEARN_{t+j} - i_i) - E_{i-1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (DEARN_{t+j} - i_i) = e^2 (I - \rho A)^{-1} \eta_{i,t} = \lambda^2 \eta_{i,t}
\]

(15)

From equations (5), (12), (14), and (15) the revision in expected future foreign earnings is computed (residually) as:

\[
\Delta E_i \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (F EARN_{t+j}) \equiv r_i - E_{i-1} r_i - \Delta E_i \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (DEARN_{t+j} - i_i) + \Delta E_i \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} = (e^1 - e^2) (I - \rho A)^{-1} \eta_{i,t} = \lambda^3 \eta_{i,t}
\]

(16)

The variances and covariances of the variance decomposition [equation (9)] are obtained from the estimated variance-covariance matrix \( \Omega = \text{E}(\eta_{i,t}, \eta_{i,t}^\prime) \). Specifically, the variances and covariances of expected return news, domestic earnings news, and foreign earnings news are computed as:

\[
\text{var}(nr_i) = \lambda^1 \Omega \lambda_1 \\
\text{var}(nD_i) = \lambda^2 \Omega \lambda_2 \\
\text{var}(nF_i) = \lambda^3 \Omega \lambda_3 \\
\text{cov}(nr_i, nD_i) = \lambda^1 \Omega \lambda_2 \\
\text{cov}(nr_i, nF_i) = \lambda^1 \Omega \lambda_3 \\
\text{cov}(nD_i, nF_i) = \lambda^2 \Omega \lambda_3.
\]
We compute robust standard errors of the variance components using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method.

4. SAMPLE AND DATA

Accounting and stock return data are from annual Compustat and CRSP files for 1984 through 2001. Institutional ownership data are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum database.

4.1 Compustat restrictions and variables definitions

We initially include companies in the sample if they are domiciled in the U.S. with non-missing values of pretax domestic income (DATA 272) and pretax foreign income (DATA 273). These restrictions result in a Compustat sample of 39,721 (3,310) firm-years (firms).

We use DATA 60 for book value of equity and DATA 172 for net income. Restricting the sample firms to observations with non-missing and positive book values reduces the sample to 33,828 (3,299) firm-years (firms).

To compute net income from domestic and foreign operations we require non-missing foreign taxes payable (DATA 64), foreign deferred taxes (DATA 270), and total income taxes (DATA 16). These restrictions reduce the sample to 18,153 (2,831) firm-years (firms). Net income from foreign operations is computed as pretax foreign income (DATA 273) minus foreign income taxes. Foreign income taxes are computed as foreign taxes payable (DATA 64) plus foreign deferred taxes (DATA 270). Domestic net income is computed as pretax domestic income (DATA 272) minus domestic income taxes. The latter is computed as total income taxes (DATA 16) minus foreign income taxes.

---

18 The source of segment data to compute domestic and foreign earnings is SEC Regulation §210.4-08(h), General Notes to Financial Statements – Income Tax Expense. These data were first included in Compustat in 1984.
We further restrict the sample to companies with at least two lags of book value of equity, one lag of net income, one lag of net income from domestic operations, and one lag of net income from foreign operations. These restrictions reduce the sample to 13,457 (2,285) firm-years (firms).

Finally, we require non-missing values of foreign and domestic sales revenues on the Compustat Segment File. This reduces the sample to 10,289 (1,771) firm-years (firms).

4.2 CRSP restrictions and variable definition

We compute annual stock returns from monthly CRSP data adjusted for dividends. Returns are computed over a period starting nine months before and ending three months after the fiscal year end. If the firm was delisted we use the delisted return. We remove firm-years for which the firm did not have at least one monthly valid stock return. We also require that there is a valid stock return during the last month of the fiscal year in order to ensure that the return predictability is not spuriously induced by stale prices. We restrict the sample to companies with at least two lags of returns and market value of equity.19

4.3 The merged sample

Matching the CRSP sample with the Compustat sample reduces the sample size to 9,283 (1,642) firm-years (firms). Merging the sample with the CDA/Spectrum database and requiring non-missing values of institutional holdings reduce the sample to 7,932 (1,511) firm-years (firms).

To ensure that there is no significant discrepancy between the sum of domestic and foreign earnings and total net income, we compute the difference between the sum of domestic

19 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Christophe and Pfeiffer 2002), we exclude very small firms from our sample. In particular, we eliminate observations with lagged market value less than $10 million. We are careful not to impose restrictions on year t variables because these are the dependent variables in the regression
and foreign income and net income, scaled by book value of equity. We remove the top and bottom 5 percent of the ratio for the current and lagged year.\textsuperscript{20} This restriction reduces the sample to 6,599 (1,408) firm-years (firms). In addition, we eliminate observations with return on equity, computed as net income scaled by lagged book value of equity, less than -1.

Finally, in order to ensure that our results are not driven by extreme observations, we eliminate the top and bottom half percentile of the independent variables in the short VAR specification, that is, lagged excess return, lagged domestic return on equity, lagged foreign return on equity, and lagged book to market ratio.\textsuperscript{21} After imposing these data constraints the final sample consists of 6,342 (1,351) firm-years (firms). Table 1 summarizes our sample selection procedures.

5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Given our requirement that firms have international operations, it is not surprising that the sample firms are large, with a mean market value of equity of $3.7 billion. The table also reveals considerable variation and skewness in firm size. The sample firms have mean (median) return on equity of 0.12 (0.13) and book-to-market ratio of 0.61 (0.52). The mean (median) domestic and foreign earnings (scaled by book value) are 0.07 (0.08) and 0.05 (0.03), respectively. Foreign earnings account for 50% of total earnings on average (whereas the median is 23%).\textsuperscript{22} The year-to-year growth rate in sales revenues is higher

\textsuperscript{20} After these removals, the difference between total reported earnings and the sum of domestic and foreign earnings is negligible (when scaled by beginning book value). The mean difference is 0.001, and the first and third quartiles are for all practical purposes equal to zero.

\textsuperscript{21} We re-ran all tests with different outlier removal rules as well as different screens to ensure domestic and foreign earnings equal total reported earnings. The reported results are robust to such alternatives.

\textsuperscript{22} The high value for the mean ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings is strongly affected by a few observations. Deleting the top and bottom half percentile of the foreign to total earnings ratio reduces the
for foreign sales than for domestic sales, with means (medians) of 0.43 (0.11) and 0.28 (0.07), respectively. Higher growth rates can translate into higher valuation multiples, and we consider the effect of differential growth in our tests. Finally, there is extensive variation in the number of institutions holding shares in the sample firms, the percentage of shares held by institutions, and the percentage of shares held by short- and long-term institutional investors.

5.2 Tests of H1: Valuation of domestic versus foreign earnings

The parameter estimates for the short VAR model and their standard errors are shown in Panel A of Table 3. The return equation shows that returns are positively associated with lagged domestic and foreign earnings (at the 1% level and 10% level, respectively). Both domestic and foreign earnings are significantly positively associated with past returns, but the parameter estimate for domestic earnings is approximately three times that of foreign earnings. Foreign earnings are more strongly associated with past foreign earnings by comparison to the association of domestic earnings with past domestic earnings, consistent with the finding of Thomas (1999) that foreign earnings are more persistent.

Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of the variance decomposition for the short and the long VAR. For both specifications, domestic earnings news and foreign earnings news are each significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). Domestic earnings are, however, more value relevant than foreign earnings, and the difference between the two is significant at less than the 1% level. Expected return news is also significant at the 1% level, suggesting that it is important to control for changes in expected discount rates. Panel C provides an intuitive representation of these results. The table shows that for the short (long) VAR, domestic earnings explain about 40% (42%) of the total variance of the unexpected change in returns whereas foreign earnings explain...
about 25% (22%).\textsuperscript{23,24} By comparison, expected return news explains less than 5% of the total variance.

These results indicate that, on average, investors value domestic earnings significantly more than they do foreign earnings. Our findings are consistent with Denis et al. (2002) who document that global diversification (on average) reduces firm value.\textsuperscript{25} They argue that this finding stems, in part, from inefficient investment policies.\textsuperscript{26} The results are also consistent with those of Christophe and Pfeiffer (2002). The lower weight on foreign earnings compared with domestic earnings observed in our study is also consistent with Thomas (1999) who finds that investors underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) emphasizes the difficulty investors face when trying to understand the origin of firms' foreign earnings, in part caused by low-quality disclosures related to foreign operations. Given this uncertainty, investors cautiously underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings.

\textsuperscript{23} Note that the total variability of excess stock returns is computed based on the variances of domestic earnings news, foreign earnings news, expected return news, and their covariances. Consequently, the ratio of the individual news components to the total variance can exceed one.

\textsuperscript{24} In the remainder of the paper, for brevity we report only results using the short form VAR specification. No inferences are affected when the long form specification is used.

\textsuperscript{25} Our study differs from Denis et al. (2002) in that we examine how investors value (or perceive) foreign versus domestic operations, rather than whether engaging in foreign investments is value enhancing or value reducing.

\textsuperscript{26} This explanation has some theoretical support from the models of Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000). In their model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm, Rajan et al. (2000) show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions. The distortion is greater the more diverse the firm's divisions are.
5.3 Sensitivity analyses for H1

To minimize the possibility that alternative explanations drive the reported results in Table 3 and the testing of H1, we undertake several robustness checks. We consider the impact of firm size, differential growth, sign of earnings and sign of earnings changes, the ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings, income tax issues, and foreign exchange rate effects.

5.3.1 Size

Firm size could proxy for a host of factors, including information availability and stability of operations. In Panel A of Table 4 we present results by size quintiles, where size is measured as the market value of equity. For all size groups, domestic earnings receives a higher valuation multiple than foreign earnings, and the difference between domestic and foreign earnings is significant. Hence, the results reported in Table 3 cannot be explained by size factors. Untabulated results further show that, as expected, stock return variability is greatest for the smallest firms and decreases monotonically with firm size. Similarly, the panel shows that the estimated variability of domestic and foreign earnings generally decreases with firm size (consistent with the results in Vuolteenaho 2002). This finding could reflect in part the greater stability of operations for larger firms.

5.3.2 Growth

Although the VAR estimation controls for overall firm growth opportunities by explicitly incorporating the book-to-market ratio, we further examine whether the results can be attributed to differential growth between domestic and foreign operations. In Panel B of Table 4, we split the sample into five groups based on the magnitude of the difference in growth between domestic and foreign sales revenues. We measure growth as the year-by-year percentage change in sales, computed from the Compustat segment file. The variation of domestic earnings exceeds that of foreign earnings for all growth groups. Moreover, there is no discernible pattern in the difference
between domestic and foreign earnings across growth quintiles. Hence, we conclude that differential growth does not explain the results in Table 3.

5.3.3 Sign of earnings and sign of earnings changes

Christophe (2002) documents that the sign of earnings changes has a major impact on estimated valuation coefficients in an ERC model. However, Panel C of Table 4 demonstrates that the results are robust to the sign of earnings changes using the VAR model. Specifically, we divide the sample into four groups: positive earnings changes for both domestic and foreign earnings, positive domestic and negative foreign, negative domestic and positive foreign, and negative for both groups. For all groups the domestic earnings news exceeds that of foreign earnings and the difference is statistically significant. Unreported results show that similar results obtain when we split the sample based on the sign of earnings levels rather than earnings changes. Consequently, the VAR results are not sensitive to the sign of earnings and earnings changes (in contrast to the findings of Christophe 2002).

5.3.4 Ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings

As a corollary to examining the sign of earnings, we further consider the ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings. If foreign earnings constitute a material portion of total income, one might expect investors to pay close attention to the foreign earnings component and to value them more highly. Panel D of Table 4 shows results of the VAR model for five groups based on the ratio of foreign income to the absolute value of total income. For all five groups domestic earnings receives a higher coefficient than foreign. Although there is no monotonic relation, the difference between domestic and foreign earnings is lower for high percentages of foreign
earnings. Hence there appears to be a positive relationship, albeit not a very strong one, between the "value relevance" of each earnings component and its contribution to total income.27

To alleviate potential concerns that our results are related to the relative weight of foreign to domestic earnings, we conduct two additional tests (not tabulated for brevity).28 For the first test, we estimate nF, (foreign earnings news) and nD, (domestic earnings news) for each firm (compare equations 7 and 8). We then rank each of the news items by the ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings. We find that there is no relation between nF, and the relative size of foreign earnings to domestic earnings. Nor is there any relation between nD, and the relative size of foreign earnings to domestic earnings. The same result holds if we rank by revenues rather than earnings. As an additional test, we classify observations into two groups: foreign earnings scaled by book value greater than domestic earnings scaled by book value and vice versa.29 We then rank the observations within each group according to the difference between the two components of earnings (i.e., domestic earnings minus foreign earnings) and compute the mean of the absolute value of nD, and nF,.30 Unreported results show that it does not matter whether the foreign earnings component is greater or smaller than the domestic earnings component, the absolute value of nD, exceeds the absolute value of nF, for all groups. In conclusion, there is no "scale effect" in our reported results.

5.3.5 Income taxes

27 We have repeated this sensitivity analysis using foreign sales as a percentage of total sales instead of the ratio of foreign earnings to total earnings. For all quintiles domestic earnings are significantly more value relevant than foreign earnings. Further, there is no discernible pattern across quintiles.

28 Note, however, that we argue that "scale effects" such as the relative weights of foreign and domestic earnings do not affect our model and results. The reasoning is as follows. Equation (5) is proved mathematically from first principles (i.e., not by intuition alone). Since the left hand side is denominated in changes in returns, necessarily (i.e., mathematically) each of the news components on the right hand side is denominated in changes in returns. There is no scale effect in changes in returns space.

29 For 38% of the observations, foreign earnings exceed domestic earnings.

30 Note that we have to look at the absolute values because in the variance decomposition computation we essentially square the related news items.
Another factor that could possibly affect the relative valuation is income taxes. Prior research has found at least some evidence consistent with firms shifting income to countries with low tax rates (e.g., Collins, Kemsley and Lang 1998; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson 1993). These studies acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate tax effects since researchers only have access to external financial statements and not income tax records. We have re-run our tests using domestic and foreign earnings before taxes and find similar results as those reported (not tabulated). Although this sensitivity analysis does not exclude the possibility that firms manage their pretax earnings to minimize taxes, our robustness test alleviates the concern that our results are driven by differential tax expense for domestic and foreign operations. Based on our final sample of 6,342 observations (i.e., without removing any extreme tax expense observations), the mean (median) income tax expense as a percent of pretax income is 0.27 (0.35) for domestic operations and 0.33 (0.29) for foreign operations.

5.3.6 Foreign exchange rate effects

Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) note that foreign income changes incorporate an exchange rate effect. However, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) demonstrate that their results are not affected by changes in exchange rates. Similarly, Denis et al. (2002, footnote 16) state that their results and the results in prior literature suggest that "exchange rate volatility has little impact on the valuation effect of global diversification." Nevertheless, given the potential importance of foreign exchange rate effects, we examine whether incorporating the unrecognized foreign exchange gains or losses, recorded in other comprehensive income, affects reported results. Specifically, we add the change in the accumulated foreign exchange translation adjustment (Compustat item 230) to foreign earnings. No inferences are changed when using this adjusted foreign income number (not reported in table for brevity).
Collectively, the evidence presented in tables 3 and 4 and the additional sensitivity analyses described above suggest that domestic earnings are more important in explaining stock returns than foreign earnings.

5.4 Tests of H2: The impact of investor sophistication

We employ two empirical proxies for the level of investor sophistication: the percentage shares in a company held by institutions and the number of institutions holding shares. Panel A of Table 5 reports the variances of domestic and foreign earnings and the difference between them by quintiles formed on the basis of the percentage of total shares owned by institutions. Although the coefficient on domestic earnings is higher regardless of institutional ownership, the difference between domestic and foreign decreases monotonically with the percentage ownership by institutions. The difference for the fifth quintile (i.e., the group with the highest percentage of institutional ownership) is only 37% of the difference for the first quintile. Panel B reports results using the number of institutions holding the stock. These results are similar and suggest that the relative valuation of earnings components depends on the degree of investor sophistication.

We formally test whether the observed difference between the variability of domestic earnings and foreign earnings decreases with the level of institutional ownership by regression analysis. We estimate the variance decomposition separately for each firm-year observation by estimating the firm-year's covariance matrix and assuming that all observations have the same VAR coefficient matrix. We then compute the difference between the two components of earnings for each observation.\(^{31}\) Finally, we regress the difference on the proxy for investor

\(^{31}\) As a sensitivity analysis, we repeat the analysis at the portfolio level. Specifically, we form 100 portfolios based on the level of institutional ownership such that each portfolio has the same number of observations. We estimate the variance decomposition separately for each portfolio by assuming that the observations in each portfolio share the same covariance matrix and all observations (across portfolios) share the same VAR coefficient matrix. We compute the difference between the two components of earnings for each portfolio, and regress the difference on the mean institutional ownership of each portfolio. As an additional test, we estimate the variance decomposition for each portfolio assuming portfolio-specific
sophistication and test whether the estimated coefficient is negative. Bushee (1998) documents that institutional investors affect the firm's investments in research and development, suggesting that it may be important to consider the endogenous nature of ownership when examining firms' investment decisions in domestic and foreign operations. The Hausman (1978) test rejects exogeneity of institutional ownership with respect to our list of instruments (described below) at the 5% level. Consequently, we report results of tests using two-stage least squares.

We base our instruments for institutional ownership on Bushee (2001). Firm size (SIZE), measured as the log of market value of equity, controls for the fact that institutions generally prefer large firms. Standard & Poor's stock rating (RATE) is included to proxy for the prudence of the investment. The average trading volume divided by the average number of shares outstanding (LIQ) controls for liquidity preferences. We further add an indicator variable for whether a firm is included in the S&P 500 index (SP500) as some institutions index a portion of their investments. Dividend yield (DYLD) controls for institutions' preference for dividends. We include two measures of risk, the market - model beta (BETA) and leverage measured as debt to assets (LEV). To capture firm performance, we incorporate market-adjusted returns for the year (MAR), an indicator variable equal to one if earnings are greater than zero, and zero otherwise (DPOS), and the average sales growth over the last three years (SGR). Finally, we include the firm's R&D intensity (R&D), measured as R&D expense divided by sales revenue.

VAR coefficient matrices. The results obtained using these alternative methodologies are consistent with those reported here.

32 However, note that the emphasis in our study is not the level of domestic earnings compared with foreign earnings but the valuation weights placed on each.

33 This test involves first regressing institutional ownership on the instruments. In the second stage, the difference between the variability of domestic and foreign earnings is regressed on the proxy for investor sophistication as well as the residuals from the first stage. If the residuals have significant explanatory power, institutional ownership is presumed to be endogenous to the set of instruments.

34 We have also estimated the regression using OLS as well as panel data firm fixed effects and find results consistent with those reported.
Panel C of Table 5 shows the results of the 2SLS tests. Models 1 and 2 use the percentage of total shares held by institutions and the number of institutions holding the stock as proxies for investor sophistication, respectively. Most of the estimated coefficients for the first stage equation are highly significant and consistent with those reported by Bushee (2001). More importantly, the estimated coefficient on investor sophistication is negative as predicted and significant at less than the 1% level (two-tailed test). This result holds for both proxies of investor sophistication, namely, the percentage ownership by institutions and the number of institutions holding shares in the company. The evidence provided in Panel C supports the findings in Panels A and B of Table 5 and suggest that sophisticated investors weigh earnings from foreign operations relatively more than other investors do.

Our research suggests that not all investors are equal in interpreting information about firms and valuing earnings components. In particular, sophisticated investors presumably are both better equipped to analyze publicly available disclosures and to utilize other non-public sources to learn about the underlying operations of firms – be they domestic or international. Building on Thomas (1999) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), our results are consistent with sophisticated investors being less biased than other investors. They are also consistent with Price's (1998) and Ke and Petroni's (2003) conclusions that informed investors make better use of both firm-provided disclosures and privately acquired information about the firms in which they invest. In addition, our findings are consistent with Thomas (2003) who documents that the "foreign earnings anomaly" (i.e., that investors on average underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings) is decreasing in proxies for the level of investor sophistication.

Our results are also consistent with Denis et al.'s (2002) argument that global diversification destroys value because of sub-optimal investments. In addition, they argue that extending a corporation's operations internationally leads to a more complex organization, which in turn leads to higher costs of coordination (i.e., an agency cost argument). Bushee (1998) argues that institutions have strong incentives to incur the costs of explicitly monitoring managers.
Consequently, greater institutional ownership mitigates the agency costs associated with increased global operations.

5.5 Tests of H3: Short-term versus long-term institutional investors

Table 6 reports 2SLS results of tests that examine whether the level of investment by long-term (short-term) institutional investors is related (not related) to the difference between the pricing of foreign and domestic earnings. We use the same methodology as above, but split institutional ownership into short- and long-term orientation based on Bushee's (1998) classifications. Following Bushee (2001), we use the same set of instruments for both short-term and long-term investors.

The first-stage results in Table 6 are for the most part consistent with the results in Bushee (2001). The table further reveals significant differences between short-term and long-term investors. Models 1 and 2 show that whereas the difference between the pricing of domestic and foreign earnings is significantly negatively related to the amount of investment by long-term institutional investors (5% level, two-tailed), there is no significant relation between this pricing difference and short-term or "transient" investors. We also report results where we include both short-term and long-term investors in the same regression. Model 3 of Table 6 shows that the results also hold with this alternative specification. Overall, these results are consistent with our earlier discussion in Section 2 regarding sophisticated investors' analysis of financial information, access to private information, and monitoring of managers' investment decisions. These arguments are most descriptive for longer-term, stable investors who have strong incentives to invest in scrutinizing their investments and monitoring firm performance. Short-term investors, on the other hand, are typically viewed as momentum traders who primarily focus on short-term gains.

6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we employ a variance decomposition model to assess the relative importance of domestic versus foreign earnings. We document that investors on average value domestic earnings significantly higher than foreign earnings. This finding is robust to a number of alternative explanations such as the sign of the earnings components, the sign of the change in foreign and domestic earnings, the differential in growth rates of foreign and domestic sales, firm size, taxes, and exchange rate effects.

Not all investors may have the same insight into the firm or the same perception of differential earnings streams, however, and this motivates our second hypothesis. We find that the difference between the valuation of domestic and foreign earnings decreases with the level of investor sophistication. Finally, we compare short-term (or "transient") and long-term institutional investors using Bushee's (1998) classifications. We show, consistent with our predictions, that the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings is only significantly related to the level of ownership by long-term, stable institutional investors.

One possible explanation for the lower valuation of foreign operations is the poor disclosure about these operations. Multinational firms often do not provide sufficient details on their foreign operations for investors to assess the risk and return characteristics of these operations. In addition, given the latitude in segment definition as manifested in SFAS 14 (and SFAS 131), there is a lack of comparability and consistency in segment definition both across firms and over time for the same firm. Another possible explanation is agency based. Management may find that investment in foreign markets is a desirable outlet for sub-optimal investments as foreign operations are harder to understand and monitor by investors.

The negative association between the degree of investor sophistication and the difference in the valuation of domestic earnings and foreign earnings provides further evidence that sophisticated investors differ from other investors. In our context, potential explanations include sophisticated investors' greater ability to analyze publicly available information pertaining to the operations of the firm and/or direct communication with management.
A possible extension to our current work involves examining whether institutions that have more experience with non-U.S. stocks value foreign earnings differently from other investors. One way of testing this would be to separate investors based on the percentage of their portfolios in foreign companies.
APPENDIX

This Appendix describes the derivation of the Campbell and Shiller (1988a; 1988b) model and the Vuolteenaho (2002) extension.

A1. The Campbell-Shiller model

Campbell and Shiller start with the basic definition of stock return:

\[ r_t = \log\left(\frac{P_t + D_t}{P_{t-1}}\right) = \log(P_t + D_t) - \log(P_{t-1}) \]

\[ = p_t - p_{t-1} + \log(1 + \exp(d_t - p_t)) \]

(A1)

where

\( r_t \) = log (cum dividend) equity return at time \( t \)
\( P_t \) = market value at time \( t \)
\( D_t \) = dividends at time \( t \)
\( p_t \) = log market value at time \( t \)
\( d_t \) = log dividends at time \( t \)

In order to generate a (log) linear valuation equation, Campbell and Shiller linearize equation (A1) by a Taylor approximation yielding

\[ r_t \approx h + \rho p_t + (1 - \rho)d_t - p_{t-1} \]

(A2)

where \( h \) is a constant and \( \rho<1 \) is a constant error approximation term. Replacing the approximation symbol by an equality, solving equation (A2) forward for price, taking expectations and assuming the transversality condition \( \lim_{j \to \infty} \rho^j p_{t+j} = 0 \) yields the valuation equation:
\[ p_t = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho} + E_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j [(1 - \rho)d_{t+j} - r_{t+j}] \right] \]  

(A3)

where \( \kappa \) is a constant. Substituting equation (A3) into equation (A2) and taking expectations yields the unexpected change in current returns:

\[ r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta d_{t+j} - \Delta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} \]  

(A4)

A2. The Vuolteenaho model

Vuolteenaho (2002) starts with basic definition of the log book to market ratio \( bm_t \):

\[ bm_t = \log \left( \frac{BV_t}{P_t} \right) = \log \left( \frac{(1 + \frac{X_t}{BV_t}) - \frac{D_t}{BV_{t-1}}}{\frac{BV_t}{BV_{t-1}} * \frac{BV_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}} \right) \]  

(A5)

where \( BV_t \) is the book value of equity at time \( t \) and \( X_t \) is net income in period \( t \). Using a Taylor series approximation (by expanding around a convex combination of the unconditional means of the log dividend-to-book-value and the log dividend-to-price ratios) yields

\[ roe_t - i_t - r_t \approx \rho bm_t - bm_{t-1} \]  

(A6)

where \( roe_t = \log \) book return on equity in period \( t = \log (1 + X_t/BV_{t-1}) \) and \( i_t = \log \) of one plus the risk free rate in period \( t \).

Replacing the approximation symbol by equality, solving equation (A6) forward for the lagged book to market ratio price and assuming that \( \rho^{N+1}bm_{t+n} \) converge to a finite limit as \( N \to \infty \) yields:
\[ bm_{t-1} = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (roe_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) \]  

(A7)

Solving (A6) for \( r_t \) and taking the difference in expectations between time \( t \) and time \( t-1 \) yields the Vuolteenaho model:

\[ r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) = \Delta E \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (roe_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) - \Delta E \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} \]  

(A8)
REFERENCES


Table 1: Sample selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compustat observations with non-missing domestic and foreign earnings for 1984-2001</td>
<td>39,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: missing or negative book value of equity</td>
<td>(5,893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: observations without data on income taxes, domestic and foreign sales revenues, and required lags for book value of equity, net income, domestic income and foreign income (see Section 4)</td>
<td>(23,539)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: missing stock return data from CRSP</td>
<td>(1,006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: missing data on institutional holdings in CDA/Spectrum</td>
<td>(1,351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement that sum of domestic and foreign income is close to net income:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We eliminate the top and bottom 5% of the difference between the sum of domestic and foreign income and net income (scaled by book value of equity)</td>
<td>(1,333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of extreme observations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We eliminate outliers, defined as the top and bottom half percent of lagged values of excess return, domestic and income (scaled by book value of equity), and book to market</td>
<td>(257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final sample (1,351 distinct firms)</td>
<td>6,342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Q3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MV</td>
<td>3.697</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>2.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEARN</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEARN</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign%</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth_dom</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth_for</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst_Percent</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst_Number</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term investors</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term investors</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanations

MV is market value of common equity in millions.

Return is the cum dividend annual stock return.

ROE is return on equity, defined as net income divided by beginning book value of equity.

BM is book value of equity divided by market value of equity.

DEARN is domestic earnings divided by beginning (total) book value of equity.

FEARN is foreign earnings divided by beginning (total) book value of equity.

Foreign% is foreign earnings divided by the absolute value of total net income.

Growth_dom is the year-to-year percent change in domestic sales revenues.

Growth_for is the year-to-year percent change in foreign sales revenues.

Inst_Percent is the number of shares in a firm held by institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding.

Inst_Number is the number of institutions owning shares of the firm.

Short-term investors is number of shares in a firm held by short-term (or "transient") institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding (based on Bushee 1998).

Long-term investors is number of shares in a firm held by long-term (or "dedicated" plus "quasi-indexers") institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding (based on Bushee 1998).
Table 3: Estimated parameters of the VAR model and tests of Hypothesis 1

Panel A: Estimated parameters from the short VAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$R_{t-1}$</th>
<th>DEARN$_{t-1}$</th>
<th>FEARN$_{t-1}$</th>
<th>BM$_{t-1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R_t$</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>0.126***</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEARN$_t$</td>
<td>0.106***</td>
<td>0.330***</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
<td>-0.064***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEARN$_t$</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
<td>0.420***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM$_t$</td>
<td>-0.795***</td>
<td>0.215***</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.915***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Test of hypothesis 1 (Variance decomposition of mean-adjusted returns)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>cov(nr,nD)</th>
<th>cov(nr,nF)</th>
<th>cov(nD,nF)</th>
<th>VR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short VAR</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>-0.029***</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long VAR</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.040***</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>-0.010***</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Relative variance decomposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VR</th>
<th>V(nr)/VR</th>
<th>V(nD)/VR</th>
<th>V(nF)/VR</th>
<th>Vnr/VnD</th>
<th>VnD/VnF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short VAR</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>1.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long VAR</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>1.943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)
**  Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed)
*   Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)
Table 3: Estimated parameters of VAR model and tests of Hypothesis 1, continued

Explanations
Panel A of Table 3 lists the parameter estimates for the short VAR. The model variables include the mean-adjusted cum dividend annual excess return $r$, (the first element of the state vector $z$); the mean-adjusted domestic earnings scaled by book value of equity (the second element); the mean-adjusted foreign earnings scaled by book value of equity (the third element), and the mean-adjusted book to market ratio (the fourth element).

The parameters in the table correspond to the following system:

$$z_{t,i} = A z_{t-1,i} + \eta_{t,i}, \quad \Omega = E(\eta_{t,i} \eta_{t,i}^\prime)$$

Two numbers are reported for each parameter. The first number is the fixed effects panel data estimate and the second is its standard error. The short VAR is based on one lag each of the mean-adjusted cum dividend annual return $r$, the mean-adjusted domestic earnings scaled by book value, the mean-adjusted foreign earnings scaled by book value, and the mean-adjusted book to market ratio. The long VAR is based on two lags each of these variables. The sample for the short (long) VAR is comprised of 6,342 (4,849) firm-years.

Panel B of Table 2 lists the variance decomposition for the short VAR and long VAR where the variances are defined as follows:

1. $VR = \text{Total variance of mean-adjusted excess returns} = \text{var}(nr) + \text{var}(nD) + \text{var}(nF) - 2\text{cov}(nr,nD) - 2\text{cov}(nr,nF) + 2\text{cov}(nD,nF)$
2. $\text{var} (nr) = \text{variance of expected-return news}$
3. $\text{var} (nD) = \text{variance of domestic earnings news}$
4. $\text{var} (nF) = \text{variance of foreign earnings news}$
5. $\text{cov} (nr,nD) \text{ and cov}(nr,nF) \text{ are the covariance of expected-return news with domestic earnings news and foreign earnings news, respectively}$
6. $\text{cov}(nD,nF) \text{ is the covariance between domestic earnings news and foreign earnings news}$
7. $\text{DIFF} \text{ is the difference between the variance of foreign earnings news and the variance of domestic earnings news} = \text{var}(nF) - \text{var}(nD)$
8. $\text{The standard errors (in parentheses) of the variances are computed using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method.}$

Panel C lists the relative size of each variance component to the total variance and the relative size of each variance component to other variance components.
Table 4: Robustness tests for Hypothesis 1

Panel A: Effect of firm size (variance decomposition for size quintiles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.099***</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>-0.040***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>-0.033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.074***</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>-0.029***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)

Explanations
See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we show separate (short VAR) results for quintiles of market value of equity to test if variations in firm size explain the results documented in Table 3, Panel B. Quintiles 1-5 are in increasing order of firm size measured as market value of equity.
Table 4: Robustness tests for Hypothesis 1, continued

Panel B: Effect of differential growth rates between domestic and foreign operations (variance decomposition for growth difference quintiles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>-0.034**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)

* Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)

Explanations

See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we show separate (short VAR) results for quintiles of differential growth to test if variations in growth explain the results documented in Table 3, Panel B. Quintiles 1-5 are in increasing order of the differences in percentage growth in sales revenues between domestic and foreign operations (i.e., domestic – foreign growth).
Table 4: Robustness tests for Hypothesis 1, continued.

Panel C: Effect of sign of earnings changes (variance decomposition for different combinations of sign of earnings changes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D_P, F_P</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.047***</td>
<td>-0.033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_P, F_N</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_N, F_P</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>-0.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_N, F_N</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>-0.041***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)

Explanations

See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we show separate (short VAR) results for different combinations of the sign of earnings changes for domestic and foreign earnings to test if the sign of earnings changes explain the results documented in Table 3, Panel B (compare the discussion in Christophe 2002).

D_P, F_P: Positive domestic earnings change, positive foreign earnings change
D_P, F_N: Positive domestic earnings change, negative foreign earnings change
D_N, F_P: Negative domestic earnings change, positive foreign earnings change
D_N, F_N: Negative domestic earnings change, negative foreign earnings change
Table 4: Robustness tests for Hypothesis 1, continued.

Panel D: Effect of variations in the ratio of foreign to total income (variance decomposition for quintiles of foreign income as percent of total income)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.101***</td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td>-0.029**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>-0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>-0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.074***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)

** Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed)

Explanations

See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we show separate (short VAR) results for quintiles of the ratio of foreign income to the absolute value of total income to test if variations in the magnitude of foreign earnings explain the results documented in Table 3, Panel B. Quintiles 1-5 are in increasing order of the ratio of foreign earnings to (the absolute value of) total income.
Table 5: Tests of Hypothesis 2 (The impact of investor sophistication)

Panel A: Using the percentage shares owned by institutions (variance decomposition for quintiles of number of shares held by institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.121***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
<td>-0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.077***</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)

Explanations

See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we test if sophisticated investors (measured as the percentage of shares owned by institutions) value domestic versus foreign earnings differently from other investors (H2). Quintiles 1-5 are in increasing order of the percentage shares held by institutions. A regression test of H2 is presented in Panel C of this table.
Table 5: Tests of Hypothesis 2 (The impact of investor sophistication), continued

Panel B: Using the number of institutions owning shares in a firm (variance decomposition for quintiles of number of institutions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>var(nr)</th>
<th>var(nD)</th>
<th>var(nF)</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>-0.042***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.080***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.074***</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)

Explanations
See explanations for Table 3, Panel B. In this table we test if sophisticated investors (measured as the number of institutions owning shares) value domestic versus foreign earnings differently from other investors (H2). Quintiles 1-5 are in increasing order of the number of institutions owning shares in a firm. A regression test of H2 is presented in Panel C of this table.
Table 5: Tests of Hypothesis 2 (The impact of investor sophistication), continued

Panel C: 2SLS tests of investor sophistication and the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIFF</td>
<td>DIFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.053*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.058*** (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional ownership percent</td>
<td>-0.054*** (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of institutions</td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Institutional ownership %</th>
<th>Number of institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.141*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.654*** (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>0.059*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.561*** (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATE</td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.009*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP500</td>
<td>-0.030*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIQ</td>
<td>0.323*** (0.028)</td>
<td>0.296*** (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYLD</td>
<td>-0.402*** (0.132)</td>
<td>0.752** (0.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETA</td>
<td>-0.009** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.034*** (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEV</td>
<td>0.044*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>0.968*** (0.07)</td>
<td>4.878*** (0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPOS</td>
<td>0.026*** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGR</td>
<td>-0.049*** (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.098*** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>-0.065* (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.083 (0.086)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5, Panel C: Explanations

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)
**  Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed)
*   Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)

Size: Log of market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year
ROE: Return on equity (net income divided by ending book value of equity)
BM: Book value of equity divided by market value of equity
RATE: Standard & Poor's stock rating
SP500: Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is included in the S&P 500, zero otherwise
LIQ: Liquidity (log of average monthly volume divided by shares outstanding over prior year)
DYLD: Dividend yield (Compustat 21/24)
BETA: Market model beta estimated from up to 36 prior monthly returns
LEV: Leverage, measured as debt to assets (Compustat (9 + 34)/6)
MAR: Market-adjusted returns over the fiscal year
DPOS: Indicator variable that takes the value of one if earnings are positive, zero otherwise
SGR: Average sales growth over prior three years (Compustat 12)
R&D: R&D expense divided by sales (Compustat 46/12)

We first regress the proxy for investor sophistication (percent held by institutions and number of institutions, respectively) on instruments based on Bushee (2001). We then use the fitted value from this regression as the measure of investor sophistication in a regression where DIFF, the difference between domestic and foreign earnings news for each firm-year observation (compare explanations for Table 3, Panel B), is the dependent variable and test whether the estimated coefficient on investor sophistication is negative. We estimate the variance decomposition separately for each firm-year observation by computing the covariance matrix for each observation and assuming that all observations have the same VAR coefficient matrix.

Starting with the sample described in Table 1, we require LIQ, DYLD, BETA, LEV, and R&D to be positive. We further require MAR and SGR to be non-missing. In addition, we remove the top and bottom percentile of DIFF, SGR, and BETA. These requirements result in a sample of 5,447 firm-year observations.
### Table 6: 2SLS tests of short- versus long-term institutional investors and the relative valuation of domestic and foreign earnings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIFF</td>
<td>DIFF</td>
<td>DIFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term institutional investors</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term institutional investors</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.031**</td>
<td>-0.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Short-term investors</th>
<th>Long-term investors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIFF</td>
<td>DIFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATE</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP500</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>-0.013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIQ</td>
<td>0.179***</td>
<td>0.198***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYLD</td>
<td>-0.266***</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETA</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEV</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>0.799***</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPOS</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGR</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
<td>-0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Explanations

*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed)
* Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)

See explanations of the instruments in Table 5, Panel C

Short-term investors: "Transient" investors following Bushee (1998)

Long-term investors: "Dedicated" investors and "quasi-indexers" following Bushee (1998)

In Model 1 (2) [3], we first regress the proxy for short-term institutional investors (long-term institutional investors) [short- and long-term investors] on instruments based on Bushee (2001).

We then use the fitted values from this regression as the test variable in a regression where DIFF, the difference between domestic and foreign earnings news for each firm-year observation (compare explanations for Table 3, Panel B), is the dependent variable, and test whether the estimated coefficient on investor sophistication is negative. We estimate the variance decomposition separately for each firm-year observation by computing the covariance matrix for each observation and assuming that all observations have the same VAR coefficient matrix.

For brevity, we do not report the first-stage results for Model 3.

Starting with the sample described in Table 1, we first intersect this data set with data on classifications of institutional investors through 1999 obtained from Brian Bushee, resulting in a sample of 4,132 firm-year observations. We require LIQ, DYLD, BETA, LEV, and R&D to be positive. We further require MAR and SGR to be non-missing. In addition, we remove the top and bottom percentile of DIFF, SGR, and BETA. These requirements result in a sample of 3,591 firm-year observations.