The Motives of Organizational Justice

Thierry Nadisic
HEC School of Management, Paris, France
thierry.nadisic@tiscali.fr

Abstract

The article proposes an answer to the question of why people care about justice in the workplace. It describes how the material and the relational motives can be considered as being only quasi-motives of justice linked to self-interest when one views them in the way they are accounted for by the material and relational models of justice. Two new models are proposed, the material deservingness program and the relational entitlement program, which seem better able to differentiate the justice motive from a self-interest motive. Besides, the role the four types of justice judgments play in each of these justice programs are described. The justice motive that these two new models account for is characterized as a control motive. Then the article looks for meta-motives that could explain this control motive using the main effect of fair process or fair outcome, the interactive effect of distributive and procedural justice on outcomes and an effect that is called the “fairness preference effect”. These three effects account for cases when justice is more valued than favorability for the three positions of recipients, observers and allocators. This leads to the explanation that people eventually give more importance to justice because of the two meta-motives of uncertainty-reduction and morality. In the end, this conceptualisation allows the author to propose a typology of the situations in which the different models and theories that account for the different justice motives may be more adapted as well as a hierarchy of the motives of organizational justice.

Keywords
Models of organizational justice, material benefits, relational benefits, the fair process effect, the fair outcome effect, the interactive effect, the fairness preference effect, motives of organizational justice, controlled and cognitively driven justice judgements, automatic and emotionally driven justice judgments.
The Motives of Organizational Justice

“When examining theories that provide accounts for why people care about justice, sometimes I wonder whether the notion of justice is needed at all in these theories. Although I am not completely sure, I have a suspicion that many of these theories would work as well without any reference to justice” (Mikula, 2005, p 205).

“People seem responsive to a sense of moral obligation about following the guidance of deontological principles in addition to – and importantly, sometimes in opposition to – their instrumental and interpersonal wants” (Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, 2003, p 1020)

“When we call an act moral it is not because of some physical aspects of the behavior or even because some good was achieved; rather, it is because we have inferred that some good intention lay behind the act, that the actor’s true goal was to produce a kind outcome to benefit one or more others, or a fair outcome to provide each relevant party with the benefit he or she deserves (typically based on consideration of equity or equality)” (Schulman, 2002, p 500).

The why-question

The favorability of a promotion decision is a significant predictor of the recipient’s organizational commitment and intention to quit right after the allocation. But the justice judgment about this outcome, or about the procedure that was followed to attain it, significantly predicts organizational commitment, turnover and job satisfaction not only during this short-term postallocation phase but also before the decision and one year later (Ambrose and Cropanzano, 2003). “The traditional emphasis in organizational justice work has been on [such] demonstrations of the basic justice phenomena [… but] this approach – although important – [… ] prevents justice researchers from being able to understand why employees react to justice” (Blader and Tyler, 2005, p 331). In this article we are looking to organize an argument to answer this why-question.

Two traditional models have suggested that people care about justice either to assure the favorability of material outcomes – this is the case of the instrumental model (Thibaut and Walker, 1975, 1978; Greenberg and Folger, 1983; Tyler, 1987) – or to derive a sense of belonging and self-worth from it – this is the proposition of what is now called the relational model – (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992). Another view has emerged recently that is named the moral virtues or the deontic model, which tells us that people care about justice just because they are moral (Folger, 1998; Folger, 2001; Cropanzano et al., 2001; Turillo et al., 2002; Cropanzano et al. 2003, Folger et al., 2005). What is generally under debate is the relative explanatory power of these three positions (Cropanzano et al., 2001).
What we would like to show in this paper is that these three explanations are not on the same level in the hierarchy of justice motives, at least if we characterize each explanation in a proper way. We think that the deontic model gives, in fact, a higher order account of the reason why people make and use justice judgments and not only outcome favorability judgments. But this position does not entail that the moral motive is the sole meta-motive. We propose that at the same **meta-level** there exists at least one **alternative view** that the deontic model has to be compared to.

First, we are going to present the two **traditional motives** of justice in a renewed way that will enable us to see that they are intrinsically **similar** and to find a **common first-order motive** that accounts for both. Secondly, we will show how the **moral motive** can encompass these models. We will also see how it complements another view, which allows us to take into account not only moral issues but also another important subject for people making fairness judgments: **uncertainty**. In the end, this conceptualisation will make it possible to answer our why-question.

1. **The first-order motive of organizational justice**

1.1. **The self-interest motive**

Not all people in all circumstances show a real interest in justice. On the contrary, they may act in a manner that simply maximizes their **self-interest**. We define self-interest, here, as the motive that leads someone to undertake actions “for the sole purpose of achieving a personal benefit or benefits. These benefits may be tangible (e.g. money, a promotion) or intangible (e.g. community standing, group status). The key defining feature is the intended beneficiary of the action” (Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, in press). This definition presents the advantage of neither being too broad, which would “pose the risk of tautology” (Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, in press) – and would not allow to identify other motives than self-interest –, nor too narrowly associated to material benefits only, which would pose the problem of considering social inclusion as an always altruistic motive (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler and Schminke, 2001).

It has been found that, at a time when gasoline was a scarce resource, “people believed that whatever **allocation** schemes most benefited themselves were the fairest” (Greenberg, 2001, p 251). This type of behavior can be identified whether the subject is in a **reactive** position (for example an employee who receives outcomes in exchange for his work) or in a **proactive** one (this is the case of a manager who shares resources among his subordinates). For instance, when in-group members in a company set up **procedures** in order to bar out-group members from being selected for some jobs, they do not really care about justice but much more about preserving their advantages (Stone-Romero and Stone, 2005, p 452). In the same line of thinking, we can say that the supervisor whose **interpersonal** behavior is described by a product manager of a telecommunications company in the following way: “He takes great pleasure in belittling me and publicly ridiculing me. He blames me for his mistakes… accuses me of things I never did nor was responsible for” is more interested in finding a scapegoat than in being fair to his subordinates (Bies, 2001, p 89). Managers judge that when their own superior withholds vital information, he shows little concern for justice (Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987, p 168), and more precisely, for what is now called **informational justice** (Greenberg 1993; Colquitt, 2001). Finally, we can identify a third position, that of an **observer** who may also put his own interests before justice concerns. For example, numerous customers who were made aware of a report on Nike’s employment practices in Third World countries, which showed that employees had quite often been
physically, and sexually, abused, did not withdraw their support from the company (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2002, p 134-135).

These behaviors seem to be common. Still, all the organizational research done since Adams’ seminal article (Adams, 1965) proves that justice matters for many people in many situations. His equity theory has shown that, for distributive justice purposes, people sometimes accept to have their own outcomes lowered (Adams, 1963). With regard to the fairness of the procedures and social interactions, we have been aware of a “fair process effect” for more than twenty-five years (Folger et al., 1979). It consists in “the positive effect that people’s procedural fairness perceptions have on their subsequent reactions” even if the outcomes received are judged to be unfavorable (Van den Bos, 2005, p 274). This “fair process effect is arguably the most replicated and robust finding in the literature on organizational justice and one of the most frequently observed phenomena among the basic principles in the organizational behavior and management literature” (Van den Bos, 2005; Greenberg, 2000). As for people who are in a proactive position, justice matters too; in a case vignette study on managers who had to make bonus allocations, it was proved that “justice motives per se may figure prominently in the way managers resolve allocation problems” (Meindl, 1989). Finally, third-party observers may also act for justice motives: in the above mentioned Nike case, the company’s sales decreased and its stock prices went down significantly. So, “investors and customers […] can also react to mistreatment” (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2002), at least some of them. Let us now pay some attention to those cases that prove to be widespread and in which justice seems to have more value than mere self-interest maximisation. We will later go into further detail about these types of behaviors.

1.2. The two quasi-motives, the two justice programs and the control justice motive

We can undoubtedly say that people who do not worry about justice act in a self-serving manner, but the motives of the people who consider it important are less easy to track down. In this section we are going to discuss the case of people who are in a reactive position in organizations, which is the position that has been the most intensively studied by organizational justice researchers. In this context, we are first going to identify the general needs of employees. This will then enable us to explain why justice matters for them.

Let us follow the presentation that two justice scholars made of these needs: “Loosely speaking, people can be said to have two broad sets of needs. On the one hand, of course, are the basic needs that are requisite for individual survival: These are demands for concrete material things such as food and shelter. This would also include legal tender (i.e. money) that can be readily exchanged for goods. […] We shall refer to these simply as economic needs. The second class of needs is more directly tied to our social natures. To a greater or lesser extent, people desire to be valued and esteemed by others. […] Among other things, this would include a sense of dignity and the respect of one’s peers. In this discussion we shall refer to them simply as socioemotional needs. […] There is no way for us as humans to fulfil these desires completely by ourselves. To some extent, people must look to other humans for status and esteem” (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998).

To satisfy these needs, employees try to get benefits from their company. Let us refer again to two justice researchers concerning these benefits: “Economic, sometimes called ‘instrumental’, benefits are those that have to do with material well-being, comfort, and standard of living. They tend to be easily monetizable and relatively concrete. Socioemotional benefits are those that refer to one’s standing in and identification with a group. Socioemotional benefits are often called ‘symbolic’ because they provide an indication of one’s status and value within the context of some social group. Of course, economic and
socioemotional goods are closely related [...] The acquisition of surplus material goods often suggests something positive about one’s social status and personal worth”. Then these authors remark that “social institutions are prolific sources of economic and socioemotional benefits” (Cropanzano and Ambrose, 2001). This view is based on the resource theory (Foa and Foa, 1974, 1980). But the six original categories (love, status, information, money, goods and services) have been arranged into “two large[r] families” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p 35). As socioemotional benefits are closely linked to relational issues, we shall name them relational benefits later on.

Why would a firm distribute such valued benefits to someone in order to satisfy his needs? We propose to answer this question by considering the two benefits one by one. This will naturally lead us to the reason why people make justice judgments.

1.2.1. The material side of justice

When an employee enters a new employment relationship with a company, there begins an exchange, which is, at least in part, characterised by an exchange of material benefits. The employee has to carry out tasks and receives material outcomes for it. This type of relation is close to what has been named an exchange relationship (Clark and Mills, 1993), the market pricing form of social relations (Fiske, 1992) or the economic exchange relationship (Blau, 1964).

In this context, the employee may feel a fundamental fear: the fear of exploitation. Indeed, he gives his time, uses his resources with effort and “allow[s his] own outcomes to depend on the actions and choices of others, [running] the risk that those others will take more than they give” (Lind, 2001, p 62). This fear is based on what Lind terms the “material side” of “the fundamental social dilemma”: “on the one hand, by [...] contributing effort and personal resources to a social or organizational entity, people can extend their individual capacities to accomplish goals [...] On the other hand, [...] sacrifice for a group, organization or society can limit individual freedom of action [...and] invite exploitation (Lind, 2001, p 61)”.

How can one assure that the relationship is not exploitative? A very simple answer would be for the employee to judge only the favorability of the outcomes he receives, whatever he personally does for the organization. This is the case of the drivers who judged fair the allocation scheme that was the most beneficial for them selves. But people may also compare what they get to what they have given. It is in this way that we can say that they make justice judgments. There are four ways to make these justice judgments.

Concerning the allocation of material rewards, people think, whatever their cultural background (in this case Chinese people react in the same fashion as Americans), that the rule of contribution (also named the equity rule) is the fairest (Chen, 1995). The distributive justice judgment, which follows the contribution rule, has been formulated by Adams (Adams, 1965). It consists for the employee in calculating a ratio expressing the amount he receives on the inputs he makes and then comparing his personal ratio to the one of a referent person. The employee feels that he is treated with fairness if he finds that the two ratios are equal. So an employee can react positively even if his outcome becomes unfavorable, provided that his inputs have diminished in the same way, or, if his inputs have remained stable, provided that the referent person’s ratio has diminished accordingly.

To sum up, we can say that an employee makes distributive justice judgments when receiving material rewards in exchange for the work he has done. These rewards, whether they are constituted by pay, bonus, benefits or other, can be considered as “distributive justice antecedents [...] that affect perceptions of distributive justice” (Ambrose and Arnaud,
2005, p 66). The judgment itself follows a mechanism based on the contribution rule. We would like to name this whole process the **material deservingness program**. Indeed deservingness relates to “outcomes that are earned or achieved as a product of a person's actions” (Feather, 1999) and has as a central feature “the contingency between an outcome and an action for which the person is perceived to be responsible”. It concerns “the evaluative structure of actions” (Feather, 2003, p 368). If the outcomes are in line with the actions, a sense of fairness is experienced. Thus we think that this concept is well adapted to account for the way people judge if they are justly rewarded materially. When after the implementation of this program an employee feels justly treated, this appeases his fear of exploitation and he is satisfied with the economic exchange he has with the company.

But people make other types of justice judgments. The best known is the **procedural justice judgment**. The role this type of judgment has, regarding material benefits, has been accounted for by what is generally called the **instrumental model** of procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker, 1975, 1978). According to this model, people care about procedural justice because it allows them to guarantee fair outcomes - and not to guarantee the maximization of any outcomes, as it is sometimes stated (see Tyler and Blader, 2000, p 14; Van den Bos, 2005, p 284 and Cropanzano and al., p 20 on this subject) - but we will delve into that subject later. Let us now describe the mechanism:

As in the case of the distributive justice judgment, there are **antecedents to procedural justice** (Ambrose and Arnaud, 2005, p 66). It is generally assumed that there are seven of them (Thibaut and Walker 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al, 1980; Colquitt, 2001): the possibility to express one’s views, the opportunity to have some influence on the outcomes, the consistency with which the procedure is applied, the suppression of bias in the decision making process, the accuracy of the information used for the decision, the right to appeal the outcome and lastly the ethicality of the procedure. These antecedents are second order antecedents. Indeed, it is when he receives material benefits, such as pay or bonuses… (which are first order antecedents) that the employee makes his procedural judgment. The process consists in verifying that all these seven antecedents are present (we will see below that, in fact, the process is more complex than that). This is what makes the employee feel that the procedure is fair. This process plays the same role as the distributive justice judgment process when it happens alone. There could be some variation in the number of procedural justice antecedents or in their level, depending on the material benefits the allocation concerns or the situation in which the allocation takes place. In this respect, there has been a warning that procedural justice must not be assimilated to its antecedents (Mikula, 2005). Still, a lot of studies have proved that these seven antecedents are relevant to many allocations and situations (Colquit 2001, Jouglard-Trischler and Steiner, 2005). Therefore, the procedural justice judgment allows the employee to assess the fairness of his outcome and hence plays a complementary role in the material deservingness program.

We could ask what sort of **link exists between this procedural justice judgment and the fairness of the outcome**. We can identify two general answers to this question. First, the procedure is the means by which an outcome is produced. In this respect some procedures are very precisely defined in order to calculate an outcome on the basis of well-known quantitative data. For example, such rules may be used to define the salary of a trader (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). In this case, the outcome and the procedure are conceptually very close to each other. Thus, assessing the fairness of the procedure will be quite easy and involves only some of the procedural justice antecedents (probably mainly consistency and accuracy of the information used). But, generally, the situation is not so simple, as no single procedure is able to calculate an outcome with precision when there is some complexity in the identification of the inputs or in the implementation of the calculus program of the outputs.
For example, “performance evaluations cannot always establish the ‘objective facts’ or truth about one’s performance level (Cropanzano et al, 2001)”. This is the reason why people will not simply trust a system of formal procedures designed by an expert, even if it is said to be based on accurate information. They will give importance to their capacity to influence the decision by influencing the process. They will want to be sure that all the procedural justice antecedents are present. Indeed, these will enable them to correct the process according to their views. So they will, in the most frequent case, have a preference for a system that allows to manage disagreement. It is this case that the researchers generally have in mind when they use the procedural justice concept (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). For instance, they view an appraisal session “less as a fact-finding test and more as a trial involving two parties with potentially conflicting interests (Cropanzano et al., 2001)” The distinction we have just made has some similarity with the one made about adjudicative conflict resolution procedures, between non-adversary procedures – that are adapted to resolving fact-conflicts – and adversary procedures – that are best at resolving distribution conflicts (Thibaut and Walker, 1978; Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 203). Whatever the case, the fact that people use procedural justice judgements in order to make distributive justice judgements is attested to by the “attributional model” of procedural justice (Gilliland, 1994). Indeed, this model has shown how fair procedures are judged important by employees because they make the level of allocations reflect each employee’s input level (Blader and Tyler, 2005, p 343).

Two other justice judgments are commonly made by people at work: interpersonal and informational justice judgments. These were distinguished only recently (Greenberg, 1993; Colquitt, 2001) but are sometimes still considered as one single form of judgment, the interactional justice judgment (Bies and Moag, 1986). The process is the same as that of the procedural justice judgment. An employee who receives a material outcome tries to determine its fairness. He judges if the following five antecedents are present: candid communication, thorough explanations, reasonable explanations, timely communication and personalized communication. This allows him to make his informational judgment. Moreover, he tries to see if the four further antecedents have been present: politeness, dignified treatment, respect, and absence of improper remarks and comments, which enables him to make his interpersonal justice judgment. These judgments, then, tell him if his outcome is fair. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that when the supervisor shows consideration (which heightens the interpersonal justice judgment), this makes his employee expect to have “a potential influence” on him (Barry and Shapiro, 2000) and thus that interpersonal justice may enhance fair outcomes. As for the informational justice judgment, when employees see their managers trying to “appear fair” (Greenberg, 1990) by communicating about a decision in order to prove that the decision was fair, this can have as an effect an “outcome-related revision” and make the employees think their outcomes are fair (Shapiro and Brett, 2005). Thus the interpersonal and the informational justice judgments may also be part of the material deservingness program.

We know now on what grounds a procedural, an interpersonal or an informational judgment can replace a distributive judgment. But we do not know yet why people in fact make these judgments to make sure that their outcomes are fair. Why don’t they simply use their distributive justice judgment? Why do they need these complementary judgments? We think that the best answer to this question is given by the fairness heuristic theory (or FHT).

For the FHT, “the various forms of fairness are far more fungible than one could think from existing work on the organizational and social justice judgments” (Lind, 2001). Moreover, people are very often in a situation where they do not have all the information to calculate their, or a referent person’s, ratio in order to make their distributive justice judgment following the contribution rule. In these conditions, they use procedural justice judgment (in
the sense of the FHT, procedures include procedural, interpersonal and informational components; we can call this view the procedural large acceptance view) as “heuristic substitutes” when forming judgments about their outcomes. For the particular case of informational justice, it has been argued that “employees often have little direct knowledge of the procedures by which organizational decisions are made [and that] explanations offered by leaders may be the central – if not sometimes the sole – basis on which employees decide whether a situation is fair or unfair” (Bobocel and Zdaniuk, 2005, p 470). Using the frame of the FHT, it has been proved that when people are in a situation of information certainty and are able to process their distributive judgment, they do not rely on their procedural justice judgment to evaluate the fairness of their outcomes (Van den Bos et al., 1997). Further proof consistent with this heuristic power of procedural justice (in the large sense) are the high correlations generally found with the different forms of justice. These correlations are often high, showing that the different judgments overlap with each other (Colquitt et al., 2005).

Up to now we have demonstrated that the four justice judgments have at least one common role: they allow a recipient to have a certain control over the distribution of material resources. Indeed, they assure him that, in his organization, a material deservingness program exists that is consistently applied in order to make the link between inputs and outputs understandable. Thus people know that if they have both motivation and the capacity to attain a certain level of performance, they will be given material benefits accordingly, in a predictable way. This alleviates their fear of exploitation and enables them to measure their efforts.

Still, there remains some variance that is not shared by the different justice judgments. This may be due to measurement problems (Ambrose and Arnaud, 2005) but this may be caused by real differences in the four justice judgments as well. Two cases can be identified: the employee may feel that one allocation in particular is not fair (having in that case a very low distributive justice judgment) while thinking that all the conditions are there to make allocations fair in general (implying that his procedural, interpersonal and informational judgments are at a high level). But this situation cannot, in the long run, continue to exist. Indeed, a distributive justice judgment that would be repeatedly low cannot be very different from the other justice judgments that have the same function to ensure outcome fairness. The second reason that can explain the remaining differences between justice judgments is precisely that they do not have the same function. We shall discuss this topic further in the next section.

1.2.2. The relational side of justice

Generally, an employee not only has a material exchange with his firm. The relationship is also characterised by a relational dimension (Rousseau et al., 1998). The employee not only brings his competencies and effort but also his identity and receives not only material outcomes but also self-esteem and a sense of belonging. This type of relation is close to what has been named a communal relationship (Clark and Mills, 1993), the communal sharing form of social relations (Fiske, 1992) or the social exchange relationship (Blau, 1964).

In this relational context, the employee may feel a fundamental fear: the fear of rejection. Indeed, he links his identity with his firm, which “makes [him] more than just an individual, but he also runs the risk of the negative identity consequences of being rejected or excluded, conditions that would diminish this aspect of [his] self”. This fear is based on what Lind calls “the other aspect of the fundamental social dilemma”, and that we could term “the relational side” of the dilemma: “On the one hand, by identifying with […] a social or organizational entity, people can […] secure a self-identity that incorporates a broader social
meaning than they could ever achieve alone. On the other hand, identifying with [...] a group, organization or society, can [...] open the door to rejection and loss of identity (Lind, 2001, p 61)”. “Even short of such instances of outright rejection as a layoff or firing, [the employee’s] personal identity is vulnerable to the implication of exclusion in more modest organizational rejections (Lind, 2001, p 63).”

How can one assure that one’s identity will not be hurt or diminished? A solution could consist in struggling to always obtain the highest recognition and the best inclusion for oneself, at the expense of the others, whatever the situation, as in the case that we quoted above of the supervisor of a product manager in a telecommunications company. But we propose that people often prefer to make justice judgments. They make them in a specific way, which is different from the way they make sure that they have been justly rewarded materially. We think that three cases can be identified.

The first case is the one which is traditionally studied in organizational justice research. It deals with “situations in which an authority figure makes some sort of decision that impacts one or more members of a collective”. This is why justice is “almost always examined in a hierarchical decision-making context” (Colquitt et al., 2005, p 595). The underlying model that researchers have in mind is the following one: an allocation is attributed by a supervisor to a subordinate of his. This allocation obeys some distributive rule, generally the contribution rule. This allocation is the result of a formal procedure, which has some structural characteristics that people assess in order to assure that this procedure is fair. The procedure is actually applied when the allocation is made materially. At this moment a social interaction occurs between the supervisor and his employee. It is then that the interpersonal and informational characteristics of this social process make the employee feel interactionally more or less fairly treated. It is on this model that the material view of justice judgments (which we have seen above) is based.

Within this framework, researchers have discovered that people make procedural, interpersonal and informational justice judgments not only heuristically to replace distributive judgments (in a situation where the equity model could not be processed) in order to make sure that they have control over their material rewards. A relational model of procedural justice, (in its broadest acceptance, including procedural, interpersonal and informational justice), based on the social identity theory, was designed to show that these justice judgments were also linked to the self-esteem and the sense of belonging of the employee (Tyler, 1999). But the way the mechanism is described by this model makes one think that it is fairness by itself that produces relational benefits. Moreover, this model views these relational benefits as “incidental to cooperation and not determinants of it” (Blader and Tyler, 2005”). We are going to propose an alternative explanation.

We think that the way people use their procedural judgment in relation with relational benefits has some similarity with the way they use their distributive justice judgment to assure that material benefits are properly allocated to them. Our hypothesis is that all the procedural (in a broad acceptance) antecedents that we have listed above (like the possibility to express one’s views, candid communication or absence of improper remarks and comments), bring by themselves relational benefits. Indeed, it was shown in two studies that employees who receive a polite treatment from their supervisor, a display of concern for their rights or the possibility to describe their problem before a decision is made (Tyler, 1999, p 239) “both indicate more pride in membership in their organization and report a greater feeling that they are respected by others within their organization” (Tyler, 1999, p 223).

We hypothesize that when a decision is made, in a hierarchical context, in an organization with which an employee has associated his identity, the employee, at the same time as he is processing the material deservingness program, will process another justice
program based on the procedural justice judgment (in the large sense) and according to a **group equality rule**. This program appears to be different from the material deservingness one because the benefits concerned are not the same, and because we think, on the basis of Resource Theory (Foa and Foa, 1974, 1980), that different kinds of benefits should be allocated by different rules. The employee will assess whether he receives as many relational benefits and on as high a level as the other persons who, belonging to the same group, have linked their identity to this group in the same way. Consequently, this model enables the employee to assure that relational benefits are distributed to him in a proper way. We would like to name this whole process the relational entitlement program. Indeed “being entitled to something usually implies that there is a set of agreed-on rules, norms, or principles that exist within a person's social environment and that have prescriptive force”. Moreover, “they refer to a person's rights”, within “groups and categories of people”, and injustice occurs “when these rights are violated”. Thus, “a member of a group may be entitled to the same rewards as another member in terms of the rules that the group has set up to govern the way it functions”. For instance, it can be said that someone is entitled to “a fair procedure” (Feather, 1999; 2003, p 368). Hence, we think that the concept of entitlement is able to account for the way people use the group-equality rule in order to assess if they are relationally justly treated.

**Applicability** of this process is supported by studies that show how socioemotional benefits are considered justly allocated when the rule followed is that of equality. For example, two different studies show that managerial friendliness has been judged fairly allocated when every employee in an American firm could benefit equally from it, contrary to material benefits like profit sharing or pay raises, which were considered fairly distributed by the rule of contribution (Martin and Harder, 1994; Chen, 1995). Further support for this way of designing the relational entitlement program is found in one of the well accepted procedural justice antecedents by itself: consistency. Consistency, in fact, equates with equality and it is not really a part of procedural justice, as it is also a distribution rule (Cropanzano and Ambrose, 2001). It has been called a superordinate rule (Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987). We have called the rule used the group equality rule because we think that equality applies only to people who share exactly the same belongingness to a group, whether it is a firm, a department or a team. Consequently, each identity link with a group enables a person to expect specific relational benefits. For example, an employee will not expect to profit from the same right to have a word on the determination of his salary, depending on his status in the firm. This idea has some relation with the one proposed by two scholars, that “there are many situations when firms should not treat everyone the same procedurally” and that “some individuals get more voice than others” (Cropanzano and Ambrose, 2001), but we still do not think that a contribution rule is adapted for procedural justice antecedents.

Neither do we think that we can talk about non-comparative principles of justice for all relational benefits. For example, a researcher argued that even if a journal reviewer is equally “rude and abusive” about “different manuscripts” […] of equal quality”, people would still feel “some residual resentment or anger as the target of such treatment” because of “the violation of non-comparative principles” (Bies, 1987, 2001). But it can be argued that resentment and anger in this case are due to the fact that people do not feel justly treated when receiving negative relational outcomes whereas they each have begun to associate their identity to the journal (where they hoped to be published) in the same way. That is, the unfavorable relational benefit they received was not in accordance with the relational link they brought. Besides, if we consider the case of a reviewer who, in the same situation, would have been polite and respectful, but significantly warmer, more sensible and encouraging with one author in particular despite of the equal quality of the manuscripts, he would be likely to have been judged unfair. Moreover, if the author who benefited from a more respectful
treatment has the same salient characteristics as the reviewer (in terms of sex, race, nationality or field specialization), the accusation of discrimination on the ground of in-group bias would be adapted. Consequently, even in judging the allocation of relational benefits, people may appeal to comparative principles.

Still, as everybody belongs to the same group of human beings, there is a “core of human dignity” that everybody shares (Folger, 1998, p 28). This enables everyone to receive the same level of a core set of relational benefits. “This social covenant has respect for human dignity as an inviolable core germane to unique fairness claims on an irreducible minimum of deserved social treatment.” And “crossing this line is an ultimate universal affront.” (Folger, 1998). It is only in this way that we can talk about “non-comparative principles of justice” (Bies, 1987, 2001). But even in this case, where we approach universality, we could say that the comparative principles are still suitable if we compare human beings to other living beings on earth that are not entitled to the same relational core benefits. In the same way, for people who do not think that all human beings belong to the same “moral community” (Opotow, 1990; Deutsch, 2000), those who are excluded are considered as not deserving the same core set of relational benefits as insiders.

Thus, people, when they are receiving material outcomes, make fairness judgments about the process in order to ensure that they receive the relational benefits they are entitled to. But there is a second case that has not been the object of much research. In the same “hierarchical decision-making context” people can receive an allocation, attributed by a supervisor who applies some distributive rule. This allocation is again the result of a formal procedure that is interactionally applied when the allocation is made. But the difference with the precedent case is that the allocation can be intrinsically relational.

This is the case when an employee is recruited and follows a formal integration process. For instance, some large firms organize training for all the graduates who have been newly recruited in order to introduce them to the culture and the rules of their new work frame. On this occasion they are given a lot of relational benefits but almost nothing material: they are welcomed as valued new members of their company, maybe by the president himself, who encourages them in their new job; they receive a lot of information and are able to ask any questions they want. An explorative study has shown that the distributive rule concerned is generally the equality rule for all the people belonging to the group admitted to the training (Gilliland and Gilliland, 2001). The traditional distinction between the different forms of justice has been proved to be suitable to this type of situation. Furthermore, research shows the relevance of justice judgments to these training situations (Quinones, 1995; Gilliland and Gilliland, 2001). We suggest that people, during the integration process, make justice judgments in order to ensure that they are given the relational benefits they are entitled to as full-fledged members of the group at the same level as their colleagues. Another instance of a formal relational allocation concerns the attribution of offices. The type of office can be seen largely as a relational benefit “reflecting the organizational status of job incumbents” (Greenberg, 1988). It has been demonstrated that, in an insurance company, this benefit was allocated following a group-equality rule: depending on their status (underwriter trainee, associate underwriter or underwriter) employees were attributed an office with standardised characteristics (number of occupants, existence of door, m² per occupant and desk size). When employees were not allocated the type of office adapted to their status, they felt unfairly treated and reacted by altering their performance at work (Greenberg, 1988). These examples give strong support for our relational entitlement justice program in the case where people are formally allocated only relational benefits.
Lastly, we can identify a third case, beyond the hierarchical decision-making context, that also accounts for the link justice judgements have with relational benefits. We use as a basis Bies’ distinction between the “exchange context”, which represents the hierarchical decision-making context, and the “encounter perspective”, which refers to the fact that there are “important justice concerns raised by people in their everyday encounters in organizations (Bies, 2005, p 101)”. A close view is the one which considers that employees make justice judgments concerning “entities” like the firm as a whole (Cropanzano and al, 2001b). It has been argued that the two are “practically analogous” (Colquitt and al., 2005, p 595). But we think they may be quite different. Indeed, a justice judgement concerning an entity can be made of a set of discrete justice judgments concerning only experiences of decision processes. This point of view would not be the same as the one saying that an entity justice judgment is made of discrete judgements concerning specific decisions and also of overall judgments linked to everyday organizational life. Following the “encounter perspective”, we believe that employees can make justice judgments independently from a decision-making situation.

This is not a new hypothesis, as several studies have shown that outside the organization people make justice judgments in their everyday life, for example concerning the relation they have with their friends (Mikula, 1986; Mikula et al., 1990), although there is no reference to material benefits nor to formal procedures in the strict sense. Eight clusters have been found that account for all the types of injustices that people may feel. For example “letting somebody down” and “lack of loyalty” are considered as unjust behaviors. We can assume that when people feel unfairly treated in one of these two ways, it is because they do not receive the relational benefits they think are due to them regarding the identity link they have made with someone who is considered a friend. And we can think that they try to assess the justice of the situation by comparing themselves to other friends who have the same link with the person who has been unfair with them. The results presented enable us to think that, in their everyday organizational life, people make justice judgements in order to assure not only that they receive the material benefits they are entitled to but also the relational benefits they deserve. Moreover these results allow us to hypothesize that people use the relational entitlement program to make their relational judgments.

At least in the first case, when a recipient receives a material outcome, he may sometimes not be able to assess procedural justice (in a large sense). If he has enough information to process his distributive judgment through the equity model (imagine an employee who incidentally learns of his annual bonus before knowing anything about the decision process and judges that this is not in line with his inputs), he will use this distributive justice judgment to replace the procedural one (Van den Bos et al., 1997). In this case, assessing the fairness of a material allocation will help him to judge if the relational benefits he is entitled to are distributed to him with fairness. An explanation for this effect is given by Lind, who argues that material outcomes also “carry a message of inclusion” (Lind, 2001, p 63).

We have now demonstrated that the justice judgments of the process (and sometimes even the distributive judgment) have one common second role: they make it possible for a recipient to control the distribution of relational resources. Indeed, they assure him that in his organization, a relational entitlement program exists that is consistently applied in order to make the link between identity input and relational outputs understandable. Thus people know that if they associate their identity with the firm and its subgroups, they will be given relational benefits accordingly, in a predictable way. This appeases their fear of rejection and loss of identity, and enables them to work in a serene climate.
This way of thinking entails that the four justice judgments are different insofar as they account for two different benefits. Distributive judgments allow one to make sure that material benefits are justly allocated and the other procedural, informational and interpersonal judgments guarantee that relational benefits are distributed with justice. Even if sometimes a distributive justice judgment may replace a procedural one and a procedural justice judgment may replace a distributive one, this would predict that the correlations between the distributive justice judgment and the three others are fewer than the correlations between the three procedural judgements (in a broad sense). Data confirm this prediction (Colquit and al., 2001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corrected population correlations</th>
<th>Distributive justice</th>
<th>Procedural justice (in a strict sense)</th>
<th>Interpersonal justice</th>
<th>Informational justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distributive justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural justice (in a strict sense)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1, adapted from Coquitt et al., 2001

A question remains: why, then, are the three justice judgements of the process different from each other? They could share the same function and still represent three distinct aspects of the process (as there is a difference between the structural, the informational and the interpersonal components of a procedure) and thus produce three different but related judgements. They could also be different because they account for different benefits, but, as for now, research does not say anything about this hypothesis. Only allocations of material and relational benefits have been identified to be the subjects of procedural, informational and interpersonal justice judgments.

We can find further theoretical and empirical support for the way of distinguishing between the material deservingness program and the relational entitlement program we here propose. First, it has been argued that “the power of introducing different relational forms […] has the potential to enhance our understanding of […] the trust-justice linkage” (Lewicki et al., 2005), of the justice judgments linked to the distribution of tasks (Mikula, 2002) or of the relation between justice and OCB (Moorman and Byrne, 2005). Finally, it was stated that “the answer to the question ‘what is fair?’ changes as a result of the nature of the exchange” (Cropanzano et al., 2001). The justice judgments dynamics we are describing fits this view well. Second, it was proposed that “it is the two sorts of outcomes (economic and socioemotional) that drive justice perceptions” and that “one could envision one family of justice perceptions that is based on economic allocations and another type that is based on the socioemotional allocations”, which enables to conclude that we can in this way identify “two new types of justice” (Cropanzano and Ambrose, 2001, p 127). Concerning the more specific case of the fairness of the procedure, the same two authors view it, exactly as we did, as “determined by whether a person ultimately receives some economic or socioemotional benefit”. Another author “reconceptualized [procedural justice] as possessing outcome-like features (Folger, 2001). This way of thinking is consistent with the view that procedural justice is as instrumental as distributive justice (Mikula, 2005). Third, two studies show that people are able to make distinctive judgments concerning what people deserve and what people are entitled to. Deservingness judgments were made on the basis of the quality of the inputs (operationalized as the amount of effort exerted by a candidate running for an election or as the amount of help given by a relative to a person suffering from an illness). By contrast, entitlement judgments were based on social norms (operationalized as the eligible status by virtue of age or as the same belongingness to a more or less closed group by the suffering and
the helping person). Fourth, and finally, it was asserted that **equality** and the **contribution rule** are the two most important distribution rules in an organizational context (Kabanoff, 1991). They refer to the two broad subsystems of a firm that have been distinguished since the appearance of the human relations school of thought: the economic one and the social one (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1956). And these two criteria were shown to be accepted as corresponding each to one of these subsystems: the equality rule is better able to foster cooperativeness and social harmony, whereas the contribution one tends more to develop productivity and efficiency (Deutsch, 1985).

Of course the **two justice programs** that we have described independently are in fact closely related. First, the two benefits are interrelated. As we already remarked, when an employee receives a material outcome, this reveals his status in the group (Lind, 2001; Foa and Foa, 1974, 1980; Cropanzano and Ambrose, 2001). Secondly, the fear of being exploited and the fear of being excluded drive to a single “fundamental social dilemma” (Lind, 2001). And, for the author, the most prevalent is the second one. Thirdly, it is very difficult to concretely distinguish the material from the relational role of the justice judgments of the process. They are said to be inexorably intertwined (Shapiro and Brett, 2005). Lastly, the two justice programs are sometimes used interchangeably, depending on the characteristics of the situation. For instance, when coworkers are highly interdependent and when the objective is to foster a common spirit, even material outcomes are judged fairly distributed by the equality rule. And, sometimes, third-party observers may judge it fair that employees who are responsible for their results receive relational allocations according to the contribution rule (Heur and al., 1999).

Still, the two programs can be distinguished and are generally applied in specific situations. Ultimately, their relative importance depends on the type of relation binding an employee to his firm. For instance, sales persons may be in a more economic exchange relationship than employees in an R&D laboratory and in an engineering design company, who may be in a more social exchange relationship. In the first case, employees are likely to give more importance to their material deservingness program because they prefer material benefits and, in the second case, they may be more prone to process their relational entitlement program because they value relational benefits more. This may explain why distributive justice (which has more importance in the material deservingness program) is a better predictor of turnover intentions for salesmen (Roberts et al., 1999) and procedural justice (which is mainly used in the relational entitlement program) a better one for engineers (Dailey and Kirk, 1992; see Conlon et al., 2005, p 310 for another presentation).

Now, many people may give importance to the two types of benefits. We suggest that as for them, a compensatory effect may apply between relational and material benefits. When they feel that they are unjustly treated with regarding one sort of benefits, they are far more sensitive to the fairness with which the other one is allocated to them. If this complementary allocation is fair, then this has a mitigating effect on their subsequent reactions. This interaction between the two justice programs may take the form of an interactive effect between distributive and procedural justice. This effect has been said to be one of the most robust effects in the organizational justice literature (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996, 2005). We do not develop here the interactive effect between outcome favorability and procedural justice, as we will propose a different explanation for this similar (but not identical) effect later on.

We are now able to **conclude** that justice does not give material or relational advantages by itself. In our view, it is not accurate to say that fairness gives material rewards or that it gives a sense of self-worth or belongingness by itself, nor that it is valued because it
allows to obtain favorable outcomes. The role of justice is rather to assure that these outcomes, which are valued and expected in the relation with a firm (with no reference to justice), are given according to one’s deservingness and entitlement.

An illustration can clarify the point. Think about two friends who like playing cards together. A player may be interested in the outcome, consisting in winning the game. She may also be looking forward to receiving relational benefits from a friendly relationship. Let us suppose that she is not merely self-interested and that she takes some interest in the fairness of the game. But why would she care for it? If she is more interested in winning the game, she will be prone to judge if the score, on the long run, is consistent with her competencies as a player. And if she makes clear progress by learning how to be more effective, for instance in a club, she would expect this improvement to impact her success when she plays with this friend (if this is not the case, she may feel unjustly treated, and he may think that her friend is cheating). If there is some disagreement about the rules, she will value the opportunity to have a voice, in order to assure that the results of the game remain consistent with the different value of the two friends as card players. Thus, she will give more importance to her material deservingness program. If she is more interested in the relational benefits she gets from her friend, she will give less importance to the final result of the game. She will assess if her friend takes her opinion into account when they disagree and she will evaluate if her friend shows respect, politeness and sensitivity. This assessment will enable her to confirm that she receives the relational benefits she expects, in accordance to the strength of the link she has with her friend, and in comparison with what is shown by this friend to other people who share the same type of link with her. Consequently, she will be more prone to process her relational entitlement program. In any case, the player knows that justice does not, by itself, give her what she desires. It only makes it possible to check if the benefits (win the game, be recognized as a real friend) are allocated in accordance with the quality of her competencies or with the quality of the link she has built with her friend.

Another example, derived from a real work setting, may be useful. It shows that it is not because fairness (in this case fair procedures) can, in some conditions, bring favorable outcomes that this is true in general. Take the case of a consultant (firm A) who works on a project in a client’s company (firm B) far from the headquarters of firm A. He does not work with his colleagues and superior from firm A and cannot talk to them as often he would like to. He works very hard and has good results in firm B. But this employee cannot show the quality of his work, and must only hope that the client will show his satisfaction to his superior in firm A. Imagine that he does not get the bonus he expects and that he knows several colleagues in the headquarters of firm A receive much more than he does. He will feel the outcome unjust, and also the procedure, because he is not given a voice and because his work is not appraised on accurate information. Now imagine the contract with this client comes to an end and the employee comes back to firm A to work on a new project with his superior. His good work will be better appraised and he will be able to have more voice. This will assure him that he will get better outcomes. So, fair procedures can really drive more favorable outcomes but some conditions must be present: for instance, an unfair former situation and inputs of the quality required. But this is particular case of a more general one, where procedures are judged fair because they bring fair outcomes and not favorable ones.

In this line of thinking, justice may be viewed as a global program, made of two subprograms that follow adapted rules in order to make a link between inputs and outputs, that is, between what an employee brings to the firm and how he is rewarded for it. We argue that when we talk about material and relational motives, we do not talk about the reasons why people are interested in justice. We only talk about why people work for an organization. Of course, both may be sometimes in line when fairness equates favorability. But as soon as justice means unfavorable outcomes, people who are only driven by material or relational
motives will become dissatisfied. Thus, these motives could be named at best quasi-justice motives, in reference to the traditional distinction between a “fair behavior that is motivated by a concern for fairness” and a “quasi-fair” behavior that is superficially similar, but stems primarily from other motivational bases” (Leventhal, 1980, p 52, emphasis in the original text). The question of why people are really interested in justice is in fact a different question. It pertains to what the global justice program makes possible: controlling the results of one’s behavior because the link between the two is stable. And this link has to be consistent across sufficient time and among people who are referent to each other with regard to what they give, what they receive and the way they are treated. So, people, when they are in a reactive position, care about justice because it allows them to make sure that they have a certain control over the way benefits are allocated to them, whatever these benefits are.

We have seen that people who give importance only to favorable outcomes are interested in maximising mere self-interest, whether material or relational. But people who care about justice because it gives them control over the way material and relational benefits are allocated to them may still pursue some sort of self-interest. We have tried to prove that the two traditional motives of human behavior in the relations with a firm cannot account for the motives underlying the justice judgment. But this does not say anything about these ultimate motives. Why do people seek control, and especially this type of control through justice? As we propose to name the justice motive the need for control, we shall in the following discussion talk about the justice meta-motives to refer to the second order motives that can explain this first order motive.

II/ The two meta-motives of organizational justice

We have just described how people make justice judgments in order to have a control over the way valued material and relational benefits are distributed to them. Before describing these processes, we justified their interest by claiming that in some cases people care more about justice than about mere self-interest. We gave some examples to support this assertion. Before answering the why question by identifying the meta-motives of organizational justice, we have to give a more precise account of this phenomenon.

2.1 The fairness effect

The fair process effect, or the positive effect that a fair process has on recipient’s subsequent attitudes and behaviors, is now a well-documented phenomenon (Folger et al., 1979; Greenberg 2000, Van den Bos, 2005), and many justice researchers work on it nowadays. It has almost become the standard on which one evaluates the interest of organizational justice research. But before the introduction of procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980; Greenberg and Folger, 1983), another important effect had been proved: the positive effect that distributive justice has on subsequent attitudes and behaviors (Adams, 1965). We can call this effect the fair distributive effect. This has been pointed out only recently (Lind and Van den Bos et al., 1997; Lind and Van den Bos, 2002). Notice that the fair process effect and the fair distributive effect only pertain to recipients’ (or observers’) positive reactions vis-à-vis the allocator, i.e. in an organizational context, the manager or the firm.

But whatever the procedural or distributive nature of the concept, its importance is not fully accounted for as long as we consider it intrinsically. It has been stated that the effect by itself is “obvious – indeed, mundane” (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 2005, p 527). Moreover, for some researchers, “current research has neglected the importance of fairness relative to other
constructs” (Ambrose and Arnaud, 2005, p 78) and thus “we need to be able to demonstrate that fairness is more important to individuals than other psychological variables” (Ambrose and Arnaud, 2005, p 79). **Comparing fairness to favorability** could be a way of following such a direction. We propose to make such a comparison for the three cases of a recipient, an observer and an allocator. There are two ways of demonstrating that fairness is more important than favorability for recipients: either by verifying if, when people receive bad outcomes, fairness can mitigate their negative reactions, or by discovering that people may sometimes even prefer fairness to favorability, which might make them choose to receive negative but fair outcomes rather than favorable but unfair ones. The first effect is known as the *interactive effect*. The second can be called the *fairness preference effect*. For observers and allocators the importance of fairness will be proved if they prefer to implement fairness even at some cost for themselves.

It is possible to show people’s taste for a fair treatment for the two types of benefits they value. This will lead us to study the interactive effect and the fairness preference effect from a material as well as a relational point of view. Now, if there is large empirical support concerning material benefits, unfortunately, regarding relational ones, data are less readily available. We will also try to show these fairness effects whatever the actor’s position. Our point here will not be to distinguish the importance of these effects, depending on the recipient’s, the observer’s or the allocator’s point of view. Although this would be an interesting question, as, for example, an experiment showed that 33% of the few people who were unjust as allocators, chose, when they became observers, to punish unfair allocators (Kahneman et al., 1986). Moreover, field research supports judgment differences between an allocator who will generally judge a same unfairness less unfair than a recipient, even if he recognizes the injustice (Mikula, 1998). Our objective will only consist in proving that, at least sometimes, people may judge fairness more important than material or relational favorability.

### 2.1.1. The material fairness effect

The preference for fairness to favorability by a **recipient** was proved by distributive researchers very early-on. Adams showed that people felt guilty when they were overpaid and in reaction tried to re-establish the equity of the deal. In a piece-rate pay context, one way they used to cope with the problem was to diminish their production while simultaneously improving the quality of their work. It allowed them to restore a just balance between work and payment by simultaneously reducing their earnings and increasing their inputs (Adams, 1963). More recently, studies came to the same conclusions. In some experiments named Ultimatum Bargaining Games or UBG (Kahneman et al., 1986; Van Dijk and Vermunt, 2000), recipients were in a position to be allocated a sum of money. The allocator could choose to be just by following the contribution rule and sharing the sum equally between himself and the recipient, according to the fact that the inputs of both participants were the same. But the allocator could decide to be unjust and keep the largest amount of money for himself. On his side, the recipient could react by accepting the allocation, then both participants received what was decided by the allocator, or by refusing it. In this latter case, no one earned anything. Depending on the experiments, recipients did not accept an offer that did not reach 20% to 30% of the total amount of money shared. Even if “the results do not indicate whether these individuals were motivated by a reluctance to participate in an unfair transaction, or by a wish to punish an unfair allocator, or perhaps by both” (Kahneman et al., 1986, p 290), they support the hypothesis that people may **prefer fair outcomes** even at some material cost for themselves.
As regards the fairness of the procedures and interpersonal and informational interactions, they yield positive reactions at work. This is what was called the fair process effect. A way to explain it, as we saw in the first part of the article, is that fair procedures allow one to make sure that material outcomes are allocated fairly. Still, there is “an [other] important and robust finding in the organizational justice literature”: the “interactive effect”, which refers to “the tendency for outcome favorability to interact with procedural fairness to influence employees’ work attitudes and behaviors”. Mainly, it takes the following form: “High procedural fairness reduce[s] the effect of outcome favorability on employees’ support for decisions, decision makers, and organizations, relative to when procedural fairness [is] low.” (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 2005, p 526). This effect is similar to the one we presented in the first part of the article between procedural justice and distributive justice. But, even if Brockner and Wiesenfeld treat the two effects as being the same, we think the two are quite different. This is the reason why we give a different explanation for each. When an employee experiences a negative outcome, if the procedure (in the large sense) is fair, then, this will mitigate his negative attitudes and behaviors. We could ask why it is procedural fairness that interacts with outcome favorability. The fairness heuristic theory can give an answer to this question. When receiving a negative outcome, people assess if the outcome is just before deciding what kind of attitudes and reactions to adopt. And as we saw above, people use procedural justice as a heuristic for distributive justice. This entails that we should be able to discover a similar interactive effect with respect to outcome favorability and distributive justice, when distributive justice is assessable, and, indeed, this fair outcome effect was found in experiments (Van den Bos et al., 1997; Lind and Van den Bos, 2002). Whatever the mechanism, the well-documented interactive effect shows that fairness can mitigate negative reactions that could follow a negative outcome.

Taken together, the fairness preference effect and the interactive effect support the assertion that recipients give more importance to fairness than to favorability as regards material allocations.

As regards the observer’s position, some studies show that he has a preference for fairness rather than material favorability for himself. We saw that in the Nike case, some investors and customers reacted to unfairness by removing their support from the firm, even if it cost them money. In the same way, studies show a fairness preference for third-party observers. In an experiment that followed an economic game, the sort of which we described above (Kahneman et al., 1986), participants had to take an observer’s position and to react to unjust and just allocations made previously by allocators to recipients. This time, recipients involved in the economic game that took place before the experiment did not have the choice to refuse the offer made by the allocator. This is the reason why the game was named a Dictator Game (or DG). The observers could choose (1) to reward a just allocator, while at the same time punish an unjust one, or (2) to reward an unjust allocator, while at the same time punish a just one. But if they chose the (1) alternative, they earned less money (5 $ instead of 6) than if they chose the (2) solution. The vast majority of the observers (74%) chose to earn less money in order to punish the unfair behavior and to reward the fair one. This experiment was replicated and led to similar results: 73% of the observers chose to sacrifice money to punish an unfair behavior and to reward a fair one (Turillo et al., 2002). A “study 2” allowing people to punish an unfair allocator, without rewarding a fair one, led to similar results which “are the first in the KTT tradition to reveal self-sacrificial punishment of intended injustice unconfounded with a chance to reward justice” (Turillo et al., 2002).

Therefore, people, when they are in a third-party observer’s position, may show a fairness preference effect. Still, until now, the question of the scope of this effect remains unanswered.
In the case of an allocator, research also shows a preference for justice to favorable outcomes, even if results are less consistent. If we look at the behaviors of the allocators in an Ultimate Bargaining Game and in a Dictator Game, we can see how strongly they care for justice. In a UBG, they mostly offer a just division of money of 50% for themselves and 50% for the recipients (Van Dijk and Vermunt, 2000). In the KTT experiments, the average amount offered varied between 42% and 48% (Kahneman et al., 1986, p 291). In a DG, allocators offered generally less to recipients but in the KTT experiment, when they only had a choice between sharing a sum of 20 $ equally with the recipient or giving him 2$ and taking 18$ for themselves, 76% chose to divide the 20$ justly.

However, another experiment leads to less optimistic conclusions (Weg and Zweig, 1994 cited by Vermunt, 2001). Allocators were given coupons and were told that the value of these coupons depended on the position handled: they were worth 10 $ for the allocators and 5$ for the recipients. The allocators were then put in one of the two following conditions: either a symmetric information or an asymmetric information condition. In the first one, the recipients knew that the coupons had a different value for themselves and for the allocators. In the second condition, they thought that the value was consistent whatever the position. In the symmetric information condition, most allocators acted fairly and offered a division of coupons of 33% for themselves and 67% for the recipients. This enabled the recipients to receive the same amount of money as them, i.e. 3.3 $. But in the asymmetric condition, they generally divided the coupons equally, 50% for themselves and 50% for the recipients. This appeared to be fair for the recipients but it was not, as the allocators gave 2.5 $ to the recipients and kept 5 $ for themselves. This allows one to conclude that “allocators act in order to seem fair rather than to be fair” (Vermunt, 2001, p 171). Still, in this case, the allocator appears to take a great care of fairness, but only of the fairness felt by the recipient, and he is not prone to sacrifice money in order to implement a situation in which real fairness would be realized.

In spite of this last experiment which, again, shows that self-interest can be important, we can conclude that, concerning material benefits, people may give more importance to fairness than to favorability, whether they are in a recipient’s, observer’s or allocator’s position. Indeed, they sometimes show either an interactive effect or a fairness preference effect. All these positive reactions concerning fair material distributions can be grouped under the denomination of a “material fairness effect” viewed in a large sense, which goes beyond the mere reactions of the recipients.

2.1.2. The relational fairness effect

A fair procedure (in a broad sense) has a second function, as we have seen in the first part of the article. It can guarantee the fair distribution of relational outcomes. This is the second explanation of the fair process effect. But no research has shown that people have a preference for fairness over favorability concerning relational outcomes, nor that fair relational outcomes can mitigate negative reactions due to negative relational allocations. As we do not have sufficient data to support our argument, we are not going to distinguish between the three cases of relational distributions we have identified previously (the allocation of relational benefits depending on the allocation of material benefits, the autonomous allocation of relational benefits by a formal procedure and the everyday distribution of relational benefits). Nevertheless, we will try to describe the phenomenon by distinguishing the three usual points of view: that of recipients, of observers and of allocators.
It would not be easy to prove the hypothesis that recipients sometimes prefer fair relational benefits to favorable ones. Indeed, as soon as one belongs to a group, one feels entitled to receive all the relational benefits this link implies. Thus it would be very difficult to differentiate favorable from fair relational outcomes. The only way to operationalize this concept would be to measure at the same time the level of identity one associates with a group and the level of relational benefits he expects from this group. Support for our hypothesis would be found if the two vary consistently, i.e. the more one links his identity to a group the more relational benefits one expects.

As we lack support for this hypothesis, let us use Folger’s methodology of the “thought-experiment” that consists of an “imaginary role-playing exercise” (Folger, 2001, p 20). Remember all the organizations and groups you belong to. The organizations that employ you, the professional associations you adhere to, the sporting, leisure clubs or societies you frequent, your different circles of friends, the societies of which you have the fidelity program cards... Imagine all these groups are allocating you the most favorable relational benefits they can. Wouldn’t it be quite exhausting for you to use regularly your right to express your voice, to try to influence decisions, to receive thorough explanations about the procedures that are implemented, to be invited to all the events organized by these groups and to be always warmly welcomed everywhere? Wouldn’t you sometimes prefer not to participate in the discussions about the new strategy of your sporting association, not to participate in all the galas of the university where you graduated or not to complain about the quality of the service at your usual dry cleaner but rather find another one? In the same way, we think people do not want to receive favorable relational outcomes from all the groups they interact with and prefer to be treated with fairness, i.e., receive only the relational outcomes they expect in line with the way they link to these groups.

Another example, inspired by a real case study, may be useful. An employee finds her manager very friendly. But she observes that in fact this manager is quite aggressive with the other members of the team. The employee feels unjustly privileged and she experiences guilt. Her colleagues make fun of it. As a consequence she becomes more distant with her manager and tries to be more friendly with her colleagues to compensate for the problem. She would have largely preferred to receive fair relational benefits, equally with the other members of her group, rather than more beneficial ones.

We can give a last instance that illustrates the interactive phenomenon regarding fair relational outcomes (the fact that recipients maintain their positive behaviors when they receive a negative but fair outcome): a man who is recruited as an assistant will surely consider it just not just to have a voice in the determination of his salary if none of the members of the firm who belong to the same group have this right. Even if he knows that the new executives in the same firm can influence the level of their salaries during their recruitment process, he will not feel unfairly treated and will maintain his positive attitudes and behaviors, even if he has received an objectively less favorable relational outcome than the employees belonging to the group of the executives.

Thus, on the basis of these illustrations, let us hypothesise that, concerning relational benefits, recipients may sometimes show either an interactive or a fairness preference effect. In these cases they give more importance to fair relational benefits rather than to favorable ones.

As regards the observer’s position, an experiment can shed some light on our subject (Turillo et al, 2002). Participants had the opportunity to punish a manager who had shown unjust behavior concerning the allocation of relational benefits. This manager was described as someone who “takes great pleasure in belittling and ridiculing” his employees “in public”. Participants acted as observers who have to share a sum of money. They had to choose...
between (1) earning money while rewarding a neutral person and simultaneously rewarding the ridiculing manager and (2) punishing the ridiculing manager while at the same time giving less money to the neutral person and earning less money for themselves. In this experiment, 50% of the participants chose to sacrifice 1 $ to punish the relationally unfair manager. This allows one to conclude that observers may have a preference for just distribution of relational benefits, even if it entails less favorable material outcomes for them.

Concerning the allocator, there are not as many experiments for relational allocations as for material allocations. However, we can refer to the two experiments we already quoted (Martin and Harder, 1994; Chen, 1995), which show that when they are in an allocator position, people prefer to distribute socioemotional benefits, such as friendliness, following an equality rule. These results enable us to think that allocators may give importance to just relational distributions.

Therefore, we can conclude that concerning relational benefits, people, at least sometimes, may give more importance to fairness than to favorability, irrespective of being in a recipient’s, observer’s or allocator’s position. All these reactions can be grouped under the denomination of a “relational fairness effect” viewed in a large sense that goes beyond the recipients’ reactions.

We have found some support for the superiority of fairness material and relational effects over favorable material and relational outcomes. As we saw, these may take two different shapes: the interactive effect that happens when fairness has more impact on people’s positive reactions if outcomes are negative (whenever fairness is distributive or procedural and whenever outcomes are relational or material) and the fairness preference effect, which means that people prefer fair allocations (whether they are material or relational) to favorable ones. The interactive effect concerns recipients and the preference effect may concern recipients, observers and allocators. They may be joined together, as it can be considered that they are different components of the more general fairness effect. Notice that the difference between the fair process or distributive effect and the fairness effect is that only the latter accounts for the superiority of fairness over favorability. Indeed, the fair process or distributive effect pertains to the positive reactions that follow fairness (even if these reactions may be due to the fact that fairness equates favorability), whereas the fairness effect encompasses the interactive effect (fairness has a positive impact on reactions when outcomes are unfavourable) and the fairness preference effect (fairness is preferred to favorability).

However, the question of the scope of this fairness effect remains unanswered. It is not really our question in this article, in which we just need to know that this effect exists, to justify the interest of our why question. Nevertheless, we would like to say some words about it before going further. The fairness preference effect, as demonstrated in experiments, was just seen as a complementary effect to the more common self-interest motive. For economists, the “dominant trend” is to see “apparent indications of fairness (or of irrationality – emphasis added –) as isolated phenomena with little economic significance”. Just “several economists have invoked a preference for fairness in their interpretations”, “in opposition to the dominant trend” (Kahneman et al., 1986, p 286). It is according to this view that KTT made their experiments, which enabled them to conclude that there are some “anomalies in the standard model” and that “a number of economic phenomena can be predicted on the assumption that the rules of fairness have some influence on the behavior of firms” (Kahneman et al., 1986, p 298). Thus, they advocate “complicat[ing] the [economic] model of the agent”, and they propose that “this can be done by allowing market behavior to be affected by added motives”, like the justice motive. In the more traditional organizational justice field studies, there is
little proof of a fairness preference effect. We would only quote Adams’ results, which show that employees may prefer fair payment rather than overpayment.

Regarding the interactive effect, even if it is said to be a “robust finding”, which shows that people’s reactions are more driven by fairness than by favorability, it has some limits. First, it has not been proved to exist between unfavorable outcomes and distributive justice, in spite of distributive justice being as important as procedural justice. Second, it has never been proved between unfavorable relational outcomes and fairness. Third, researchers regularly find contrary interactions, for example, “on a particular type of dependent variable, self-evaluations” (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996). It has been confirmed that “high procedural fairness heightens the effect of outcome favorability on employees’ self-evaluations, relative to when procedural fairness is low” (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 2005). A contrary interaction was even found concerning managers in the relation to their subordinates, as “high procedural fairness heighten[s] the effect of outcome favorability among higher status parties, relative to when procedural fairness [is] low”. Plus, according to Lind and Vermunt, “There are […] studies […] that show no outcome-based moderation of the fairness effects and some that even show stronger procedural fairness effects in the presence of positive outcomes than in the presence of negative outcomes” (Lind and Vermunt, 2001).

This may be the reason why organizational justice scientists prefer studying the mere fair process effect that only refers to the positive reactions of recipients yielded by a fair procedure and that represents a much more robust finding. The problem is that this finding does not allow one to compare fairness to favorability. Moreover, it can be asked to what extent this effect does not encompass, in fact, a favorability effect. Indeed, fair procedures are generally operationalized as procedures that give systematic favorable benefits, such as voice or politeness. As Mikula stated it, “the provision of voice may have positive effects independent of being evaluated as just or fair. But in this case, the effects are out of the realm of justice theory and have to be explained in a different way” (Mikula, 2005, p 199). According to this author, this tends to question the validity of the “indirect justice measures” not based on people’s justice judgments but on their assessments of procedural justice antecedents; “calling them justice measures is conceptually misleading”. This tends to question even the relational model of justice, viewed in the traditional way, where justice is said to be important because of the relational outcomes it brings to people: “the relevant variables referred to […] neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition [(which are positive relational benefits)] but did not directly ask whether the authorities’ behaviors were perceived as fair [or not]. One may wonder whether the studies actually have anything to say about why procedural justice matters (emphasis in the original text)” (Mikula, 2005, p 203). “The perception of procedural justice is relevant only as far as it promotes relevant positive relational judgments about the authorities. But positive judgments about the authorities’ neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition would have the same effects if they resulted independently of any procedural justice information […] The group-value model of procedural justice would work as well without the notion of justice” (Mikula, 2005, p 205).

A way to resolve this dilemma would be either to study a fair distributive effect in a situation where people would receive fair but unfavorable material outcomes or to study a fair process effect in a situation where, on the basis of the relational entitlement program, people would be allocated fair but unfavorable relational benefits.

We would like to conclude, on the point of the force of the fairness effect compared to the force of the self-interest effect (whether material or relational), that consistent support is still lacking to prove the larger importance of fairness. The preference fairness effect only has the status of an anomaly that can at best complement the standard model based on self-interest. The interactive effect, even if it is quite a robust finding regarding recipients, shows
some contrary effects; and the fair process effect is not able to differentiate between a favorability effect and a real fairness effect. Nevertheless, we have proved that the global justice program that enables people to assure the fairness of the distribution of valued benefits is, at least sometimes, more important to them than the mere favorability of these benefits. This is enough to justify a return to our why-question, and we hope that future research will show that fairness is more important than favorability in numerous cases, which would give even much more importance to this why-question. By the way, knowing why might help identifying how to foster justice concerns.

2.2. Why do people care about organizational justice?

Why do people care about justice in work settings? It is not because they want in this way to obtain favorable material outcomes in the long run, as we demonstrated that justice only allows to make sure that these benefits are allocated according to the equity rule. Thus, if justice sometimes leads to favorable material outcomes, it sometimes brings negative ones also. It is not because people by this means want to obtain favorable relational outcomes, as we proved that justice only allows to make sure that these benefits are allocated according to the group equality rule. This means that if justice sometimes leads to favorable relational outcomes, it sometimes brings unfavorable ones also. Then, would people not prefer favorable outcomes rather than just ones? We have shown that, at least sometimes, they do not. On the contrary, they may give more importance to receiving material and relational benefits fairly rather than with favorability. We called the recipients’ motive for justice the control motive. But the question remains: why do they want to control, through justice, the distribution of material and relational benefits?

Another question will help us to find an answer to the first one: how to discover why people care about justice? We know that fair treatment has more powerful effects under certain conditions. Following two researchers, we can state that “if differential fairness effects do occur and if we can see a pattern that differentiates stronger from weaker fairness effects, we might have some clues concerning why fairness matters to people (emphasis in the original text).” The idea is that “fairness would have the greatest effects in conditions where it [is] most useful or most important” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 189). This means that we make a “‘functional assumption’ about fairness judgment processes”; more precisely, “we assume that fairness judgment processes serve a psychological function, and that the triggering of strong fairness effects is a sign that fairness judgments are being employed to resolve some social or psychological question” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 195).

When will fairness have the most powerful impact? Some studies show that procedural fairness has more important effects in the context of decisions handled by an in-group authority (Tyler, 1999; Tyler and Blader, 2000). This can be explained by the larger importance given to relational benefits rather than to distributive ones by people who are involved in a social exchange relation with their firm. We saw in the first part of the article that these employees are more prone to process their relational entitlement program and thus give more importance to procedural justice. Besides, it is not because these employees show a more important fair process effect that the global fairness effect characterizing them is also more important. Other people, more materially oriented, may compensate this phenomenon by a more important one, the fair distributive effect, and finally show the same global fairness effect in a situation where outcomes are unfavorable. Moreover, “there is also evidence […] of stronger fairness effects when the authority in question is a member of an out-group (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 206)”.

There are two other situations in which fairness has more impact: under conditions of uncertainty and when morality is more salient. As we think that moral issues may give a more
global answer to our question, let us first present the role uncertainty plays in triggering fairness concerns.

2.2.1. The uncertainty-reduction meta-motive

Lind and Van den Bos quoted numerous studies that show fairness (mostly fair procedures) to have more impact under conditions that make people feel uncertain (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002): The decision to claim in a court of law for wrongful termination depends more on the fair treatment received at the time of termination, when people experience a very uncertain situation, than during the course of employment (Lind et al., 2000). Fairness has more impact on satisfaction with the supervisor’s decision when employees are uncertain about whether the authority is trustworthy (Van den Bos et al., 1998). In other experiments, when participants are asked to think about something uncertain, when they are in a out-of-control condition, or when they have to think of their own death, fairness has a more important effect on measures of affect than in more certain conditions. Moreover, uncertainty about one’s self was proved to be a mediator of people’s reactions. This fairness-uncertainty connection seems to be “so fundamental […] that it occurs whether there is a logical link between the fair treatment and the source of the anxiety or not” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 193).

This entails the authors to assert that “a key function, perhaps the key function, of fairness is that it provides people with a way to cope with uncertainties (emphasis in the original text)” (p 184). Its role would consist either in giving employees “confidence that they will ultimately receive good outcomes” or in making “the possibility of loss less anxiety-provoking” (p 195). So, as they conclude, “fairness seems to illuminate the darkness of uncertainty” (p 217). In the end, this “uncertainty management theory” (or UMT), as the authors call it, helps us to answer our why-question: people like to have control through fairness over material and relational distributions because they feel anxious about uncertainty. Thus the main role of fairness would be that it reassures recipients.

As for observers, the UMT does not take their attitudes and behaviors into consideration. But we can try to do so by calling upon another theory, which has strong links with uncertainty: the Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980). According to this theory, witnessing an injustice is likely to lead to questioning whether the world is a place where each person gets what he deserves. When this general rule (that we accounted for, in the first part of this article, as the global justice program) is not respected, it triggers uncertainty. As a consequence, the third-party observer may experience distress. To reduce this distress, one can react by doing something in the real world in order to repair the injustice or to punish the perpetrator. And as we have seen, observers often undertake such a behavior (at least in experiments).

But trying to reestablish the more soothing image of a fair world is another, sometimes a more convenient, alternative. One of the ways to achieve this consists in denying the unfairness itself. Three means are commonly used to reach this goal (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2002): holding the victims responsible for their lot, devaluing them or revaluing what they have (by minimizing the negative character of the distribution or by imagining that the victims will quickly discover how to make up for it). This denial of injustice is more marked for people who strongly believe in a just world, which appears very similar to saying that they are more scared of the uncertainty and the anxiety an injustice can bring. For example, Ellard and Skarlicki refer to a study (Pancer, 1988) in which people with a strong belief in a fair world, when they are facing an exhibition showing unfair treatments suffered by children (the aim of the exhibition being to raise funds), keep a larger physical distance when the exhibition
includes pictures. Moreover, they remember less the unpleasant details of these treatments in comparison with people who have a lower level of just world belief. Even if people do not have strong beliefs in a just world, this victim’s derogation is more likely when “the victims are innocent and their suffering is vivid and emotionally impactful”. More rational judgments occur when “relevant information is available and the observer is accountable and experiencing moderate rather than very low or high levels of negative affect” (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2002, p 150-151).

Thus, under conditions where people experience more uncertainty and anxiety because they are intrinsically very sensitive to just world threats, or because external conditions make these threats more salient, they are more likely to deny injustice and derogate victims. That is, they are more prone to give more importance to their own interests, in this case protecting themselves, than to fairness. According to this view, the uncertainty reduction motive may explain why observers do not care about justice, but not why observers care about it. Thus, the question why observers may give even more importance to fairness than to favorability to themselves, which, as we saw, often happens, cannot be answered using this theoretical framework.

As regards allocators, fairness could be seen as a way to reduce uncertainty. In the view of Vermunt (Vermunt, 2001, p 171): “According to fairness heuristic theory, supervisor’s fair behavior is seen as a passport to stable and reliable social relationships”. Notice the closeness of FHT and UMT: “Fairness heuristic theory deals with how people use fairness judgments to resolve uncertainty about whether they might be exploited or excluded from organizational and social relationships. Uncertainty management theory extends the use of fairness to include not only such social uncertainties, but the more general situation of any source of uncertainty” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 202). At first sight, we seem to have found here an explanation of the importance given by allocators to fairness. Unfortunately, it does not enable us to discriminate between situations in which an allocator tries to be really fair and situations in which he only wants to appear to be fair (Weg and Zweig, 1994; Vermunt, 2001). The willingness to reduce uncertainty can account for both. Therefore, we cannot maintain that we have an explanation for the real fair behavior that allocators may show.

We tend to conclude that the uncertainty-reduction meta-motive does not give a complete explanation to our why question.

First, as we have just seen, the UMT does not explicitly try to explain why people in other social roles than recipients may care about justice. We have tried to account for the uncertainty reduction meta-motives of observers and allocators, but this remains a personal attempt. Moreover, we found that avoiding uncertainty would drive allocators to give importance to fairness, but also to the appearance of fairness, and observers to even prefer injustice. Thus we need a more integrative theory, which includes all the three positions and gives an account of the real importance they give to justice (even if in the case of allocators, this importance lacks support).

Second, the UMT takes into consideration the retributive behavior of recipients who were unfairly treated: “sometimes […] the sting of unfairness becomes so strong […] that negative affect drives people to frankly competitive actions in which harming the organization is as much a goal as protecting the self” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 196). But it does not explain why people are willing to harm the organization in addition to trying to protect themselves. Here again, we have to find another theory, which may explain this phenomenon.

Third, the UMT cannot help us to explain why people use different rules to process their material deservingness and relational entitlement programs: the group equality rule for their material judgments and the equity rule for their relational ones. This is because the UMT
does not give any explanation of the fact that there are different types of justice. On the contrary, the emphasis is on the fact that the different types of justice are more or less “fungible”.

Fourth, the criticism that has already been made above concerning the general way of measuring the fair process effect can apply to the UMT. As far as recipients are concerned, when they feel anxious because of uncertainty, there are other factors that can alleviate their suffering: favorable relational or material benefits, for example. As Lind and Van den Bos observe, “in most of the experiments by Van den Bos and his colleagues [which are used to support uncertainty management theory], there is no chance of any real negative outcome; the only question is how much of a positive payment one might receive” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 206). In these conditions, we do not know, in fact, if participants in these experiments react to favorable outcomes or to fair ones. This makes a scholar remark that UMT, just as the main other well-known justice theories, “have to be classified as instrumental explanations” (Mikula, 2005). The fair process effect that was proved to be more important under uncertain conditions may reveal to be a favorable outcome effect. The experiments by Van den Bos and colleagues cannot, so far, discriminate between these two effects. In order to be sure that it is fairness that makes people feel less anxious while experiencing uncertainty, it would be useful to design some experiments in which people receive negative but fair relational or material outcomes in an uncertainty context. This lack happens to be a problem, as we precisely need a theory that explains why people often care about justice more than about favorability.

Last, and more seriously, if people, especially recipients, only fear uncertainty, they would be reassured, whether they are treated fairly or unfairly, providing the treatment they are subjected to remains unchanging. Indeed, an unfair but stable treatment does not cause any anxiety due to uncertain feelings. This seems to be what authors think when they say “people move to make their fairness judgments more certain, even when this involves cognitive shortcuts, because they need certainty in their fairness judgments to manage external uncertainty” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 199). On the contrary, research proves that people have a preference for justice over injustice. For example, a manager who never gives to his subordinates the right to have any voice in the work organization, whereas the other managers in the same firm grant this right, which is considered to be just by employees, does not produce any uncertainty. However, people could feel procedurally unjustly treated or, to say it differently, they could judge to have received an unjust relational allocation. Therefore we can say that managing uncertainty is not the sole function of fairness. So we need another theory, which would answer why people prefer fairness and not only certainty in their fairness judgments.

But does such a theory that would complement the UMT, in order to deal with these unanswered questions, exist?

2.2.2. The moral meta-motive

One model may have the potential to help the UMT to better account for the reason why people care about justice: the deontic model (from the Greek deon, which means obligation or duty) (Folger, 1998, 2001), even if, as we will see later, it is not the only one that is able to do that. Generally, this model, which accounts for a moral motive of fairness, has been presented as being an alternative to the material and the relational traditional models of organizational justice and not to the UMT. We think two cases can be identified, but in neither case does this comparison seem to be suitable. First, the material and relational models of justice may be viewed as explaining why people care about justice, by arguing that they are motivated by the favorable benefits they get from it. In this case, we think that these
models do, in fact, explain why people are interested in working for an organization but not why they are interested in justice. The explanation they give accounts for the self-interest of people (either material or relational) but not for their justice motive, since, as we saw, justice and favorability are different concepts. The two concepts may be seen as equivalent as long as, for example, for a recipient favorable outcomes equal fair ones. But as soon as fair outcomes become unfavorable ones, the positive effects on attitudes and behaviors may disappear if the recipient is only interested in favorable benefits. However, we can compare just material and relational benefits to favorable ones, as we did in part 2.1., but, in this way, we just compare the force of the first-order justice motive to the force of the self-interest motive. This is interesting, but it refers to another question than the question of why justice matters to people. At best, it shows how this why-question is important. Second, the material and relational models of justice may be viewed as explaining why people care about justice, by arguing that they are motivated by the fairness by which benefits are allocated to them (by the material deservingness program and the relational entitlement program). This is the view we have developed in this article, not only regarding material allocations, but also relational ones. In this case, these models do not exactly explain why people ultimately find fairness by itself as important. They only account for a first-order motive of justice, the control motive. Consequently, the deontic motive, which explains why people care about justice, is able to encompass them. Thus, in neither case, even if it is for different reasons, can the material and relational models of justice be compared to the deontic model of justice regarding the reason why people find an interest in justice.

An example borrowed from Folger (Folger, 1998) might help to illustrate this point. When someone makes “a ruling between two players that favors one’s own side (the in-group) rather than the opponent’s side (the out-group)” or when one favors “family members over mere acquaintances”, the author judges that the fairness these people are looking for is a sort of “limited fairness at best”, based on identification with collective interests and values and that it “does not aim at fairness for all”. In our view, these cases are not relevant to fairness at all but they relate, on the contrary, to cases in which people are not interested in fairness. Indeed, fairness would imply that people do not confuse their material and their relational justice programs. A fair judgment from players concerning the material side of their fairness feelings, for example in a game of cards where people play for money, would cause them to find correct an allocation of money according to the contribution rule. In this specific case, the player who wins the game, owing to his luck, but more probably to his competence (if the same players play several times together) has to get the stake (and earn more money in the long run). Parallel to this, players make another set of fair judgments concerning their relational interests. They know that they have links of a different nature with the other players. Some of them may belong to the same family, others may be friends, and still others mere acquaintances. In each case, they identify with these persons in a different way and expect different levels of relational benefits from them, more tenderness, for example, from a husband than from a friend. But in no case do they expect to get more material benefits on the ground of a closer relationship, if they follow their justice judgments. Still, a player may favor another player who is a member of her family, but then she knows that it is not “fair play”. Moreover, she knows that the other players, if they discover it, would judge that it is not fair and would strongly react to what they would qualify as cheating. So, in practice, people who want to act fairly have to allocate benefits following the rule adapted to their material or relational nature. It is in this sense that we can say that morality is not in conflict with a material or a relational models of justice if they are properly characterized. Or the contrary, it is able to account for them. This makes us to think the deontic model can encompass and at the same time overtake the material deservingness and the relational entitlement models of justice.
We are now able to argue why we think that the deontic model of justice may help us to find a meta-motive of organizational justice. Our demonstration will use the same method as for the uncertainty reduction meta-motive. If, when moral issues are made more salient, fairness has more impact on people’s subsequent reactions, then we can conclude that morality may give an answer to why justice matters to people.

We have seen that, in a situation in which, after having processed the material deservingness program, people feel that they receive a too high level of outputs (which means that they are overpaid), they tend to decrease the quantity and at the same time increase the quality of their inputs in order to restore equity. But what has been shown also is that this effect is much more pronounced when people have a higher level of morality, measured through the Moral Judgment Scale (Vecchio, 1981). This proves that moral recipients have a stronger preference for fair material allocations than for favorable outcomes. This tends to mean that this preference for control by fairness is due to morality. So the deontic model accounts for the fairness preference effect, at least concerning material benefits.

In the same line of thinking, we hypothesize that recipients with a higher development of morality would be more likely to show the same fairness preference effect concerning relational benefits. We also hypothesize that they will be characterized by a more important interactive effect. That is, they would have more positive subsequent reactions after having experienced an unfavorable material outcome if they assess the procedure as being fair. We suppose further that they will be more prone to show the interactive effect regarding an unfavorable relational outcome and a fair procedure. Indeed, in these two cases, more moral people should accept more easily an unfavorable experience if the way the procedure was implemented tells them that they are fairly treated. Here we can give the theoretical moral explanation of the interactive effect between unfavorable outcomes and fair procedures. As we saw when we described the two justice programs in part 1, a fair procedure can guarantee that material outcomes are fair, i.e. deserved. If moral people give importance to fairness when receiving a negative outcome, it is precisely because fairness enables them to make such attributions. Fairness tells them that the outcomes are in line with their inputs. Thus, when an outcome is negative but fair, it means that the input was negative. This configuration may have a deleterious effect on the recipient’s self-esteem (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996, 2005; Van den Bos et al., 1999) but will maintain cooperation. If the procedure is seen as unfair, then it is the allocator who will be attributed responsibility for the negative outcome and if, as a consequence, self-esteem will not be damaged, this will not be the same for cooperation. We will see below how the deontic model takes this moral need to attribute responsibility into account.

Concerning the interactive effect between a fair procedure and an unfair outcome that we explained (Part 1) by the fact that people may compensate unfair material benefits by fair relational ones, we do not think that more moral people would show a more interactive effect than less moral ones.

Moreover, there is a situation in which we think they will show no interaction at all, whereas less moral people will. In the case of an unjust relational outcome, which belongs to the “core of human dignity” that everybody shares, we think they will not at all accept to judge the allocation as being fair, even if the procedure is. As this phenomenon has been discovered in the case of observers, we shall describe it in the next paragraph.

A last proof of the morality as a reason to care for justice was given in a study where managers had to quote the principles that made them say that their own manager’s behavior was fair or unfair. The moral “golden rule”, consisting in not harming the others while doing something good for oneself, appeared to be one of the important meta-principles for these managers (Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987).
Globally, we would say that the **moral meta-motive**, which is accounted for by the deontic model, is able to explain why recipients care about justice more than about self-interest.

Regarding **third-party observers**, we have shown that they sometimes give more importance to fairness than to their own self-interest. An experiment was made to check if observers with a higher level of moral development, measured by the Socio-Moral Reflections Measure, would show stronger preference for fairness over favorability for material benefits (Rupp, 2003, quoted by Cropanzano et al, 2003). The results showed that people high in moral maturity acted in a self-sacrificial way in order to punish an unfair allocator. If the allocator had been fair, they divided the money fairly with him. On the contrary, people who were found to be low in moral maturity made self-serving allocations in either case. That is, they did not care if an injustice had occurred. We hypothesize that an equivalent effect would happen with regard to relational benefits, and that the same is true for the interactive effect between outcome favorability and fairness.

There is further proof of the importance observers may give to justice. We have just alluded to this point in the case of recipients. “People sometimes care profoundly about the fairness of outcomes regardless of the fairness of procedures (Cropanzano et al., 2001)”.

When observers think that a relational benefit should (or should not) be given to someone, whatever the situation, they are said to have a strong “**moral mandate**” (Skitka, 2002). That is, they consider this benefit to belong (or not to belong) to the minimal set of benefits that every man/woman is entitled to, just because he/she belongs to the group of human beings. The inclusion in (or exclusion from) relational benefits to this set may depend on the moral orientation of the person. Some people have a “**strong moral position about a specific outcome**” (which is the definition of a moral mandate) (Skitka, 2002). For example, in non-organizational settings, it has been proved that concerning homosexual civil rights, abortion, and allowing children of illegal immigrants to attend public school, some people hold moral mandates. Among these, some consider that a specific benefit ought to belong to the “core of human dignity”, whereas others strongly think that it ought not, and this whatever the fairness of the procedure. For people having such moral mandates, the interactive relationship between an unjust relational outcome and a fair procedure will not happen. For people who do not have a particular moral position concerning a specific relational outcome, they will show the usual interactive relationship between distributive relational fairness and procedural fairness. This gives support for morality being an answer to the why question regarding third-party observers.

As regards **allocators**, as we saw above (part 2.1.), they may act in a way that shows their preference for fairness over favorability. We hypothesize that an experiment that would measure the moral development level of allocators would also show that the more moral they are, the stronger their preference for fairness over favorability will be, for material as for relational benefits. But as we lack this information and as we concluded that the only other meta-motive, the uncertainty reduction one, was not able to discriminate between real fairness and apparent fairness for allocators, we will have to suppose that the moral motive can also explain the importance given to justice by allocators.

Thus, as fairness has the greatest effects in conditions where morality is high, we can say that it is most useful or most important for people when they have to cope with moral problems, and, indeed, it has been said that “fairness as deonance allows for a broad, universal, and generalizable explanation of fairness” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p 87). It is now time to characterise the deontic model in a more precise way.
First, the deontic model of justice states that people have a basic *respect for human dignity and worth*. This refers to no other aim than “good for goodness’s sake” (Turillo et al., 2002, p. 844) or “a tendency for people to act ‘on principle… to conform to or enforce social norms’” (Turillo et al., 2002, p. 844, quoting other commentators). This basic respect appears “in itself [to constitute] a protected social resource” which makes it possible to “preserve social welfare in mutually advantageous ways” (Folger, 1998, p. 21). Moreover, this respect seems to have a “transcendent, suprapersonal quality” as if it were ‘established by objective requirements’” (Folger, 2001, p. 8, quoting Heider, 1958). It was argued that people experiencing that they “ought to take a certain type of action, or that someone else ought to do so, […] feel as if they have recognized a feature of the world” (Folger, 2001, p. 22). This does not mean, however, that the deontic model of justice does not take the other selfish material or relational motives into account. “The deontological model acknowledges multi-source motives. It stipulates that fairness only becomes an issue of morality when others’ welfare is considered in addition to self-interest” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p. 87)

Second, the deontic model “emphasizes commitment to ethical standards” that say what is right and what is wrong (Turillo et al., 2002 p. 841). These may be viewed as “procedures that allow individuals freedom to the extent that they do not impinge on the rights of others (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p. 87)”’. They refer to the golden rule, which constitutes a “significant source of limits to personal freedom” (Folger, 2001, p. 11)’. These ethical standards serve to “differentiate fair play from foul play” (Folger et al., 2005, p. 221), that is, they enable to classify social events as conform or not conform. Concretely, adhering to them leads one to treat “others as they should or deserve to be treated” (Cropanzano et al., 2003, p. 1019). As we saw, justice can be viewed as meaning that people get what they are entitled to or deserve on the basis of who they are and what they have done. And we saw that “who they are” refers to the group-equality rule and “what they have done” refers to the contribution one.

This can help us define these ethical standards more precisely. We have seen that people, when they receive outcomes, make justice judgments in order to insure that the exchange with their company is fair. In doing so they process the justice program that is adapted to the situation, namely, the material deservingness program or the relational entitlement one. In fact, these cognitive and affective activities may be accounted for by the deontic model. People judge if their material allocations are fair following the contribution rule, which is an ethical rule. It is the same for people who judge, on the basis of the group-equality rule, if their supervisor or their firm allocates them relational benefits justly. If they have not been treated respectfully with regard to the ethical rule they believe in, then they have a feeling of moral transgression, even if, as we will see below, this feeling that a morally prohibited social conduct took place is more adapted to relational benefits than to material ones.

Of course, there will be some moderators to the choice of the two rules of contribution and equality as ethical standards. Indeed, these standards “are derived from some value-based systems of belief” (Cropanzano et al, 2003, p. 1020). For example, Chinese managers in modern companies seem to think that not only material but also relational benefits should be allocated following the contribution rule (Chen, 1995). But even in the same culture, the choice will depend on moral orientation. For example, managers who are task-oriented appear to be more flexible in the use of these two rules, depending on the characteristics of the situation, than more relationally-oriented managers (Meindl, 1989). In the same way, allocators with a high level of protestant ethic are more prone to use the equity rule for material rewards (Greenberg, 1978). Finally, two studies have shown that “ethical
formalists were more sensitive to procedural justice issues and ethical utilitarians were more sensitive to distributive justice issues” (Schminke et al., 1997, p 1190). We suppose that ethical formalists would be more interested in processing their material deservingness program and ethical utilitarians in using their relational entitlement program.

Generally speaking, the two justice programs will be effective in establishing the bases for the ethical standards that will allow to define people’s entitlement and deservingness. These concepts are “central to many social psychological theories of justice” (Mikula, 2003). However, it is now well known that people’s justice judgments are not only mere judgments of entitlement or deservingness by virtue of who people are and what they have done. Indeed, attributions of responsibility are a necessary additional antecedent of a justice judgment (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001; Feather, 1999; Ellard and Skarlicki, 2001; Mikula, 2003). This leads us to the third characteristic of the deontic model: its emphasis on blame. We can say that when they receive a material or relational benefit that is not considered deserved on the ground of the contribution or the group-equality rule, people try to hold someone accountable for what happened. This process is especially likely regarding negative outcomes. When they feel that the outcome is their own responsibility, people experience a sense of fairness even if their material or relational well-being has been hurt. But if they can find someone to whom to assign blame for their negative state, then they feel unfairly treated. This process is not specific to recipients and can also account for allocators’ or observers’ behaviors. For instance, “observers will be reluctant to see outcomes sharing the same valence as the antecedent actions as deserved if there is reason to believe that the target was not responsible for their actions” (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2001, p 146). The deontic model accounts for such “a desire to see that people are held accountable for actions potentially jeopardizing the well being of others” (Folger, 2001, p 6).

The fourth characteristic of the deontic model accounts for retributive justice. People have such “an aversion to other people’s unfair conduct” (Folger, 1998) that when they have identified the perpetrator of an injustice, they want him to be punished. Field studies show that employees are willing to punish their employer when he acts unjustly by “organizational retaliatory behaviors” (Skarlicki and Folger, 1997). The experiments we reviewed (part 2.1.) also give support for this kind of behavior from recipients as well as from observers, even if it is at some cost for themselves. The deontic model “explains [such] reactions people have toward injustice, even when they are a mere third party to the situation, have nothing at stake, and will be having no continuing relationship with the actors involved” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p 87). Studies show that this intention to punish a perpetrator who has transgressed an ethical rule and was consequently responsible for an unjust allocation happens even if it would have no deterrent effect (Turillo et al, 2003). So it is not a motive of justice restoration by allocating outcomes fairly to the victim that is concerned. For example, in the experiments of Turillo et al., people reacted to an inequity. Indeed, an allocator shared material goods unequally despite an equal input from him and the recipient (they did not present any different entitlement). This is why we do not agree with Turillo et al., who argued that “the punished person never actually created an inequity” (Turillo et al., 2002, p 861). Nevertheless, punishing the allocator clearly was not a means to restore equity. This recipient’s or observer’s justice judgment and his desire to punish a perpetrator are considered as a “deontic reaction” (Folger, 2001). When it turns into a concrete action “that is intended to satisfy the victim’s [or observer’s] desire for punishment of the perpetrator”, it is called a “moral remedy” (Folger et al., 2005). These reactions can be explained by the fact that “people hold some degree of allegiance to shared moral standards that they expect others to hold as well [and that] when transgressions dishonour such standards, people feel an antipathy toward the
transgressor and a concomitant punitive urge” (Turillo et al, 2002, p 842). Thus, retributive justice has its origin in the need to “preserve the moral order” (Folger, 1998).

We saw that the deontic motive can explain recipients’, observers’ and allocators’ concern for fair allocations. We have just seen that, besides, they want the transgressor to be punished. Are these two needs connected? In our view, they are. We think that people are interested in allocating fair outcomes, whether they are positive or negative. And retributive justice refers precisely to allocating negative outcomes. Hence, the same principle of deservingness works in both cases. However, notice that entitlement cannot refer to negative outcomes. Indeed, “whereas people can be judged to deserve either positive or negative outcomes, entitlement typically refers to positive actions and positive outcomes” (Feather, 2003). The experiments reviewed (in part 2.1.) showed that when allocators make unfair material allocations, recipients and observers tend to punish them by not allowing them to receive as many favorable material benefits as they would have liked. But in the field, punishment seems not to be an alternative for only material motives. ORB appeared only when significant material and also relational injustices were experienced (that is when distributive, procedural and interactional justice were all three at a very low level). It appears that relational benefits unjustly allocated in an interpersonal way are more likely to evoke a desire for punishment. It was suggested that “attributions of the other’s accountability for unfairness tend to grow stronger […] in an ascending order from distributive to procedural to interactional justice (Folger, 2001, p 24)”. Indeed, interactional justice is a field in which moral principles seem to be prevalent (Folger et al., 2005). One explanation is that an interpersonal unfair treatment entails victims to very easily make personalistic attributions of blame (Folger, 2001). Another explanation could be that these benefits touch identity exchange and, consequently, are likely to foster stronger reactions than when only material subjects are concerned, even if it is from a third-party observer. A last reason is that the core set of benefits that everybody is entitled to and that are the subjects of moral mandates are relational ones. Thus they have a strong link with interactional justice. We can conclude that the more relational the transgression, the more the perpetrator will be seen as deserving punishment.

What is the ethical standard by which people decide on the punishment the perpetrator deserves? The “primitive deontic principle” is that “you should reap what you sow”. That is, “the punishment should fit the crime” (Folger, 2001). In this regard, Ellard and Skarlicki remind us that “another person’s distress can be a source of pleasure, if we think they deserve it” (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2001, p 147). Besides, when they try to be virtuous by implementing retributive justice, people also try to be just in the way they act. This can be viewed as a “second virtuous motive” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p 89). In one of the experiments of Turillo et al., observers had the choice between (1) punishing the earlier unfair behavior of an allocator while keeping all the money or (2) sharing money with him equally. The problem that observers faced was that by keeping all the money for themselves, they themselves would have become unfair allocators. Thus, 85% decided not to punish him and to share the money equally (Turillo et al., 2001, p 848). This makes Turillo et al. conclude that for observers, “two wrongs do not make a right”.

Of course, recipients who feel unjustly treated do not only want the transgressors to be punished so that they get a negative allocation consistent with their unjust behavior. They also want to receive material and relational outcomes they feel entitled to with fairness. Thus, they may act in order to restore a fair situation, respectively by correcting the value of their material inputs or by removing their identity link from the firm (which can lead them to leave the field). They can also protest, in order to try to increase the level of benefits they get, or only show resignation (Mikula, 1986). As for the observers, available research shows that they are more attached to the allocation consisting in punishing the transgressor than to the
one consisting in correcting the fairness of the reward received by the recipient (Ellard and Skarlicki, 2001). The point is that the same principle of deservingness is concerned in both cases of positive and negative allocations, whatever the position of the actor.

Last, the fifth characteristic of the deontic model refers to its emphasis on quick, automatic and emotionally based judgements. According to this model, the unfairness experienced because of the transgression of a “normative standard of appropriate conduct” is by itself the determinant of the occurrence of judgments in an “unconscious and heuristic-like fashion” and of “strongly felt emotions”. This tends to “prompt action tendencies before reasons for acting one way or another get thoroughly considered” These rapid and “harsh emotional responses” are likely to produce a hostile reaction that is called “deontic anger” which is said to be a “robust phenomenon” (Folger et al., 2005) that is not specific to recipients but may also occur among observers.

In this situation, the wish to punish an unfair allocator is unlikely to be completely under control and the will to remain just on the basis that “two wrongs do not make a right” will not always take effect. Thus, the “moral remedies” that people use “are not necessarily moral [at all] or even legal from the perspective of an outsider” (Folger et al., 2005). For example, people who retaliate against their employer may do so by voluntarily damaging material equipments or by giving silent treatment to colleagues, which can be viewed as unjust actions (Skarlicki and Folger, 1997). Hence, the deontic model accounts for behaviors that may give more importance to the self-interest of people who strongly want to punish a perpetrator, even if the punishment is unjust, than to justice for all.

In our view, this emphasis on implicit and emotionally based judgments is not the only way morally driven judgments and reactions function. The Turillo et al. experiment showing that “two wrongs do not make a right” presents evidence for a more controlled judgment process (Turillo et al., 2001, p 848). By contrast to the deontic model, other attribution-of-blame models of judgments of justice may share all the characteristics of the deontic model, even if they may be less exhaustive about morality, and at the same time account for this more explicit and rational style of processing. For instance, Feather’s model of deservingness describes a complex social-cognitive process of how people react to injustice and retributive justice. It highlights people’s capabilities to evaluate the valence of an action and of the outcome associated, and to assess cognitively the different actors’ (even their own) responsibility and blame. It also gives some importance to morality, as it describes how the standards of judgments of the observer are in close relation to his own values. Indeed, in the model, “the general values that people hold are central influences on the more specific evaluations that they make” about the outcomes and the actions of the person (Feather, 1999). It also includes the assessment of the morality of the recipient, which mitigates the judgment that he deserves a negative or unjust outcome. For instance, studies show that “a politician who displays integrity (positive behavior) would be viewed positively and would then be seen not to deserve a negative outcome (failure to be reelected); whereas a politician who behaves arrogantly (negative behavior) would be viewed negatively and would then be seen to have received his or her just deserts when failing to be reelected” (Feather, 1999). Unfortunately Feather’s model of deservingness has not yet been tested in an organizational field.

There has been a long tradition in the organizational justice literature to see justice judgments and reactions and retributive justice as being either automatic and emotionally based or controlled and cognitively based: “on the automatic, implicit side, information processing is characterized by motivated inferences, reliance on heuristics, speed, associative rather than logical connections, and little or no cognitive elaboration. Alternatively, the explicit rational mode of information processing is associated with relatively greater cognitive elaboration, logical or ‘psycho-logical’ connections, and slower and intentional processing”
(Ellard and Skarlicki, 2001). It has been said that the different justice theories can be classified on such a continuum (Cropanzano et al., 2001b). For example, the equity theory is on the controlled side of the continuum whereas the FHT is on the opposite side. As we have just seen, even morally based theories of justice can be categorized in the same way: the deontic model would fall on the automatic side whereas Feather’s model of deservingness would be placed on the other side.

Notice that the deontic model, which is “not currently any one theory” (Folger et al., 2005), is encompassed by the Fairness Theory (FT). FT “presumes that the central topic of social justice is the assignment of blame” and that if “no one is to blame, there is no social injustice.” This is why this theory is based on the “process of accountability” (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001). Considering someone accountable for an injustice involves making three interrelated judgments: first, that a more pleasant state would be experienced if the outcome received would have been more favorable, second, that the person whose behavior is in direct link with the outcome could have acted otherwise and third, that this perpetrator should have acted otherwise. All the three would, could and should judgments are necessary to assign blame. The second judgment refers to the controllability of the behavior whereas the third one is linked to moral principles. Because of the salience of this “should” component of the FT, the deontic model of justice fits well with this theory. However, FT, as an integrative model, allows one to account for more situations. Indeed, the accountability process can happen either automatically or in a more controlled way, even if it has sometimes been described as corresponding to a “deliberate type of information processing” (Goldman and Thatcher, 2001, p 121). This is why FT has been categorized in the middle of the continuum distinguishing between automatic and controlled processes (Cropanzano et al., 2001b).

Hence, morality can explain why people care about justice and by and large, the deontic model can account for that meta-motive, even if it has to be completed by other more controlled oriented models. We hope the way we have presented the deontic model, particularly in its connections with the material deservingness and relational entitlement programs, both explains with enough clarity the need “of punishing moral transgressions” and “the desire to be treated fairly”, two phenomena that were sometimes seen as incompatible (Gillespie and Greenberg, 2005, p 195). We also hope it has become clear that, in our view, morality and the respect of rules of contribution and group-equality and not antagonistic aims. On the contrary, morality, the contribution rule and the group-equality rule appear to be in line. It is in respecting these two ethical rules of contribution and group-equality (the second, relational, appearing morally more important) that people foster human dignity.

At the end of the second part of this article, we can say that people care about fairness either because they use it to “illuminate the darkness of uncertainty” (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002, p 217), or because “they want to be virtuous actors in a just world” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p 174). Even if the moral hypothesis seems more global, the alternative remains. How to cope with it? Are people more interested in justice because it helps them to manage uncertainty or because it helps them to cope with moral issues? Two types of answers can be given to this question. One motive may always be more powerful than the other. Or one of the two motives may be more salient in certain conditions and the second in others. We propose an answer that is grounded on this second view.

As we have already seen, people are characterized by a certain level of moral development. Our hypothesis, grounded on Folger’s work (Folger, 1998, p 22-24), is that they use their justice judgment differently depending on the moral level they have attained. The notion of moral development reflects the cognitive processes used to resolve ethical dilemmas concerning what is right and what is wrong. On the basis of the Kohlberg’s moral development scale (Kohlberg, 1981), we can identify three levels of moral development. The
first is the preconventional level and refers to reasoning based on self-interest. It accounts for the way children think about moral issues. A third of people seem to never go beyond this level (Greenberg, 2002). The second one, called the conventional level, is attained by most adults and represents the capability of taking into account the social rules. A study found that 86.4% of managers operate at this level of moral development (Weber, 1990, quoted by Ambrose and Schminke, 2001). The highest level is called postconventional and is attained only rarely. People having reached this level reason in a personal way, on the basis of universal principles. Research shows that individuals really behave in ways consistent with their level of moral development (Greenberg, 2002) even if there is some debate on this subject (Schulman and Mekler, 1994, p 16-17).

More specifically, we propose that people **on the preconventional level** are generally not interested in using justice judgements, even if they are able to make them. They accept justice rules under strong social constraint or insofar as they find a personal interest in them. Thus, they may show a fair process or distributive effect when being treated with fairness, which implies that they will receive favorable benefits. For example, a trader may judge it fairer to receive a bonus according to a strict proportionality rule, without any ceiling effect, the year she is making much more money than her colleagues and would judge fairer a more equal distribution rule the year her results are on the average (example inspired by Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). But people on this level are not likely to show an interactive effect between negative **material outcomes** and fair procedures or fair distributions. When a material outcome is negative, their subsequent attitudes and reactions will not be significantly mitigated by fairness. Nor may they be prone to show any fairness preference effect. When choosing between punishing an unfair allocator and earning less money for themselves or not punishing him and earning more money, they would choose the second alternative. We think that the **traditional material model of justice** accounts for people’s behavior when they are on this first level of moral development. That is, it does not differentiate between fairness and favorability and explains importance given to justice insofar it equates favorability. We think it is the same case as far as **relational benefits** are concerned. People on the preconventional level are interested in always receiving the most favorable relational outcomes. For example, they will think it is just that larger offices are allocated via a group-equality rule to higher status employees if they are in a position to benefit from that rule. But they will appeal to a stricter equality rule that would benefit everyone if they belong to a group which is not entitled to receive relational benefits at the level they desire. They will show no interactive effect between relational negative benefits and fairness. When the group to which they belong does not allocate them the relational benefits they would like to get, they show dissatisfaction, even if the allocation and the process are generally considered as being just. Thus, we would say that the **traditional relational model of justice** accounts for the behavior of people who are on the preconventional level and who like fairness as far as it allows them to receive favorable relational benefits. However, as we saw, people on this first level may show an interactive effect between distributive justice (which gives them material outcomes) and procedural justice (which gives them relational ones), depending on the preference they have for the one or the other.

As for people who have attained the **conventional level**, we propose that they care about justice, and may show the interactive effect and the fairness preference effect for one of the two fundamental motives of self-interest or morality. We hypothesize that they will be more driven by the one or the other depending on their proximity to the first or the third level of moral development. People near the preconventional level will be likely to think primarily about their own interest and to protect themselves. People close to the post conventional level will be able to care about themselves but also about the others. Finally, we think the shape their reaction will show depends on the characteristics of the situation and their personality.
This will enable us to explain when the deontic and the uncertainty-reduction motives will be more likely to happen.

We think that people closer to the preconventional level, when facing uncertainty in emotionally charged situations or in conditions where they are unable or unwilling to consider relevant information explicitly and rationally, will process their judgments in a very quick, automatic and emotionally-based fashion. In this case, justice will help them to manage uncertainty, as the UMT predicts it. But as we saw, even injustice may sometimes play the same role, providing it gives a sense of certainty. This could explain why people of a nation, in a period of great uncertainties, sometimes let authoritarian and unjust leaders seize power. Thus, fairness will be cherished only as far as it is the best mean to be reassured. This is the reason why, for the same reason recipients may prefer fairness when they feel uncertain, observers, in contrast, would prefer to stick with their just world beliefs and finally act with unfairness. It is for them, indeed, the most convenient way to get reassured. As for allocators, they will prefer showing apparent fairness over really being fair, as it is a means to have the advantages of security both for the recipients and for oneself. When the situation and the person’s ability bring him/her to process a slower, more controlled and cognitively-driven judgment process, then his/her reactions will be explained by the material and relational models of justice.

In contrast, we think that the reactions of people who are closer to the postconventional level will be more influenced by morality. As a consequence, if they show any uncertainty-reduction need, this will happen in a particular way. They should be more responsive to moral uncertainty. Fairness will help them to “reduce uncertainty and lead in the direction of confident attributions about another person’s moral responsibility for the pain endured” (Folger, 2001, p 14). Even if they face more general uncertainty, they will not try to reduce it at all costs. For example, as observers, they should be less likely to show the just world effect. On the contrary, their morality will give a consistent direction to their possible uncertainty-reduction needs.

If the situation they face or their abilities foster a quicker, more automatic and emotionally driven judgment, then their reactions will be accounted for by the deontic model. When they are in less threatening and emotional situations or if some characteristics of the context – for example if they are made accountable for what they will do (Lerner et al., 1998) – or certain personal characteristics mitigate the impact of the situation, then their reactions will be different. They will process a slower, more controlled, and cognitively-based judgment. In this case, people will act following a moral model of justice presenting equivalent characteristics such as Feather’s. Whatever the case, FT will make it possible to account for both types of moral behaviors. This hypothesis finds some support in two studies that have shown that emotions and personality characteristics linked to emotions are predictors of the desire to punish a perpetrator by retaliatory (and generally unjust) actions. In the first study, “outward-focused negative emotions (e.g., anger) were found to partially mediate the relationship between the interaction of outcome favorability-interactional justice and retaliation” (Barclay et al., 2005, p 639). In the second one, two personality factors, negative affectivity and agreeableness, which are linked to the capability of regulating emotions, were found to explain organizational retaliatory behaviors (ORB). “ORB was highest when negative affectivity was high and both distributive and interactional justice were low” and “the interaction of distributive and interactional justice predicted ORB only among respondents who were low on agreeableness” (Skarlicki et al., 1999). Thus, at the conventional level, more moral people will be able to act justly, even in implementing retributive justice, only if their abilities or the situation they face enable them to process a more controlled justice judgment.
Finally, we suppose that people who have reached the **post-conventional level** will give more importance to fairness than to favorability, whatever the uncertainty they face, because of their strong moral motives. They will show strong interactive effects and fairness preference effects. Moreover, we think that they will always be more prone to behave in a way compatible with Feather’s model than with the deontic one. Indeed, the deontic model accounts for reactions such as deontic anger, which can, in the end, lead to being unjust while implementing retributive justice. And we hypothesize that people at the highest level of moral development will be very unlikely to show such unjust effects, whatever the characteristics of the situation.

We can present this way of linking the justice motives, at least for most people (those who have reached a conventional level of moral development), in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgements and reactions</th>
<th>Primarily morally driven</th>
<th>Primarily self-interest driven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on automatic processes</td>
<td>The deontic model</td>
<td>The uncertainty management theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on rational Processes</td>
<td>Feather’ model of deservingness</td>
<td>The material and relational models</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: A typology of justice models and theories of justice explaining why people care about justice.*

But this way of presenting things does not make justice to the different levels on which the justice motives we identified stand. It is, however, important to clarify this point, as “fairness goals may be understood best when viewed in the context of a hierarchy that conveys the process by which they are pursued and their relationship to other goals” (Gillespie and Greenberg, 2005). The material and relational motives pertain to justice insofar as justice and favorable outcomes are in line. This made us call them quasi-motives of organizational justice. The relational entitlement and the material deservingness models were said to be preferred to more self-interested motives because of the control they allowed. The uncertainty meta-motive was capable of explaining this control motive. But it could not discriminate between fairness and unfairness. Finally, only the moral meta-motive could give a sense to the need for reducing uncertainty and thus give a complete and consistent explanation of the importance given to fairness. Hence, we would like to propose the following hierarchy:
This way of presenting the issues helps us to differentiate justice motives that explain why justice is important. They also allow us to identify which motive accounts for justice being more important than favorability.

**Conclusion: why justice is sometimes more important than favorability?**

To **sum up** our argument, we began this paper by giving instances of behaviors that show an interest in fairness and others that reveal a preference for favorability. This second type of behavior was clearly related to self-interest. This led us to propose two models of justice that can really distinguish between favorability and fairness: the deservingness material program and the entitlement relational program. We saw that when people process these justice programs, they are more interested in the control that is given to them in that way. This is the reason why they accept to be submitted to their rules, even if this sometimes means receiving unfavorable material or relational benefits.

Then, we asked if people really do, at least sometimes, worry more about fairness than about favorability. This was a way to compare the justice motive of control to the material and relational self-interest of people. We did so by studying mainly two justice effects: the interactive effect between negative outcomes and fairness and the fairness preference effect shown when someone chooses a fair alternative, even if it costs him materially or relationally. We found support for this global fairness effect concerning material as well as relational benefits and for all the three possible positions held by an actor: recipient, observer and allocator.

Asking the question when people are more prone to show such fairness effects enabled us to find why people sometimes give more importance to justice than to favorability. First, we saw that justice allows them to cope with uncertainty and to alleviate consequent anxiety. But this necessary explanation given by the Uncertainty Management Theory appeared to be insufficient for understanding why they care more about justice and the control it offers than about material or relational favorable benefits. Indeed, certainty can be attained otherwise, for example by only favorable outcomes. Intriguingly, people may even prefer unfairness if it helps them to reduce uncertainty. Precisely, observers, for instance, may prefer unjust outcomes for recipients providing their own belief in a just world is not threatened.

Since we needed to complete the uncertainty-reduction explanation, we were interested in the fact that moral people show larger fairness effects. This enabled us to find support for a moral motive of organizational justice, which gave a clear direction to the motive to reduce uncertainty. The model that best accounts for this moral motive is the deontic model of justice. However, in certain cases where people’s justice judgments are less emotionally driven, this model has to be completed by another one. We found that Feather’s model of deservingness could advantageously play this role and noticed that the Fairness Theory was able to encompass these two close models. Consequently, the entitlement relational program and the deservingness material program, which account for people’s attitudes and behaviors when they give more importance to justice than to favorability, can be explained by the uncertainty management theory and the Fairness Theory.

Finally, on the ground of the work done, we found two factors that make it possible to distinguish between the different motives people may have when reacting justly: if their judgment is more automatic and emotional or controlled and cognitive, and if they are more self-interested or morally driven. As soon as they have some control, by virtue of their material deservingness and relational entitlement programs, we can say that this accounts for what we called the first-order justice motive. But even if they do not worry about control, they
may have an interest in justice. This is the case when they are self-interested and process their judgment in a controlled and cognitive style. Then, they care for justice for reasons of material and relational favorability and not for the control it can convey. This means that their taste for justice will be inconsistent. That is the reason why we named these motives quasi-motives of organizational justice. Now, if people are self-interested and more emotionally driven, they will care about justice in case it gives them a sense a security by removing uncertainty. This motive is a real meta-motive of justice but still incomplete, since, as we have just seen, it can also explain why people sometimes prefer unfairness. Hence, it is only when people have attained a higher level of moral development that they worry about justice, because it is an intrinsically proper way of removing uncertainty. If their judgment is more automatic and emotionally driven, they may act justly, but may also be unjust while implementing retributive justice. Finally, only people who have the adequate high moral development and have the possibility to process a strong cognitive style judgment are likely to act justly in numerous situations.

Thus, justice may be important for people for several reasons, but there is only one case where justice will consistently be considered as more important than favorability, whether people are concerned as recipients, as observers, as allocators or as punishers: when they really want to act morally because they are intrinsically moral, and when the situation and their abilities allow them to act accordingly. That is when “good apples” (moral people) are put into “good barrels” (situations that do not trigger too harsh emotions) (Greenberg, 2002, quoting Treviño and Nelson, 1995). This “person-by-situation interactionist approach” (Greenberg, 2002) now needs to be validated in the field. We have here the answer to our why-question: the people who will consistently give more importance to justice than to favorability do so because they are moral and are able to implement moral solutions. We could say that when we see people preferring implementing justice rather than favorable outcomes, it is because they “want to be virtuous actors in a just world” (Cropanzano et al., 2001b, p 174, emphasis added) and also because they can “be virtuous actors in a just world”.

Regarding managerial implications, this article shows how to improve concern for justice in work settings. This is especially important as organizational justice research has consistently proved that justice allows to maintain “good” attitudes and behaviors at work, mainly task performance and compliance, while injustice entails “bad” reactions, that is, withdrawal ones (turnover intentions, absenteeism and employee silence), or even “ugly” attitudes and behaviors (from minor organizational retaliatory behaviors to theft or sabotage) (Conlon et al., 2005). This importance may not have been fully recognized yet as, if subordinates do prefer managers high in moral integrity, superiors seem to have a preference for managers high in technical competence and social skill (Cook and Emler, 1999). Nevertheless, this article shows two ways to foster consideration of justice in organizations with consistency. The first alternative consists in relying upon people (and particularly managers) who have reached a high moral development stage and who process their justice judgments in a more controlled fashion. This could be achieved either by selection or by training. The second alternative emphasizes the role of the organizational structure and procedures in shaping work situations in such a way that moral issues are made more salient and reactions that are too emotional are recognized and given their just place. This could be achieved, for example, by specific decision making procedures, such as that of “constructive controversy” one (Johnson et al., 2000) or by designing particular structures. In this respect, less centralized structures appear to be more just than more centralized ones (Schminke et al., 2000). It can be hypothesized that this type of structure is more able to give room for moral
issues and, without denying the existence of emotions at work, takes them into account without letting them play too important a role.

The theoretical implications of this article concern first of all the new way of considering justice as a dual concept made up of two subprograms related to the fair allocation of material and relational outcomes. The existence of the material deservingness and the relational entitlement programs, the two rules upon which they are said to be based and the role of the four justice judgments in each of these two programs have to be tested in the field. This conceptualisation shows by contrast how the two traditional models of justice cannot account for a consistent concern with fairness, because they are often viewed as pertaining to the favorability of the outcomes received.

Second, the paper proposes a productive distinction between the usual relational benefits, which are said to be assessed by the group-equality rule, and the relational benefits belonging to the “core of human dignity” (Folger, 1998). This second category can be seen as a consensus of opinion about people’s different “moral mandates” (Skitka, 2002) or as the core relational benefits that all human beings belonging to the same "moral community" are entitled to receive (Opotow, 1990; Deutsch, 2000). The “non-comparative” rule pertains to this set (Bies, 2001).

Third, we think that a meaningful distinction is made in this work concerning the different types of allocations of relational benefits. These can be distributed via a procedure and an interaction when a material outcome is allocated. But they can also be distributed independently, either by a specific procedure not linked to material outcomes, or by allocators in the everyday life of the firm, which refers to the “encounter perspective”. This categorization gives ideas for further research, for example: Which processes follow justice judgments when new employees are submitted to a formal integration policy, which allocates only relational benefits? Or, to what extent do justice judgments made about relational benefits in everyday organizational life, independently of formal material allocations, explain employees’ attitudes and behaviors at work?

Fourth, a new explanation is given to the interactive effect between a just procedure and a just distribution. A compensative effect is hypothesized to happen between the relational and material benefits that are allocated by these means.

Fifth, a fairness effect is conceptualised as being more able than the fair process effect to differentiate between favorability and fairness. By the way, it has been pointed out that a fair distributive effect exists and might be more adapted to account for justice effects, as it allows one to consider a just but unfavorable outcome. By contrast, the fair process effect is always equated with favorable relational outcomes, since procedural justice is generally not operationalized with the group-equality rule. We defined a fairness effect as being composed of an interactive effect between outcome favorability and fairness and of a preference fairness effect accounting for the cases when people prefer fairness even if it is at some cost for themselves. Notice that we found that the fairness effect happens for material (material fairness effect) as well as for relational (relational fairness effect) benefits and for the three points of view of a recipient, an observer and an allocator. Some of the examples given in the article concerning relational fairness effects show directions for studies in the field.

Sixth, four motives of organizational justice are identified and categorized. Two quasi-motives are found: the material and relational self-interest motives, which show inconsistency. One motive of justice is identified as directly accounting for the interest people have in the two material deservingness and relational entitlement programs. It consists in the need of control. And two meta-motives are distinguished: an uncertainty-reduction meta-motive, which cannot account completely for the interest in justice, and the moral motive, which gives its direction to the first one.
Seventh, new links are made between different justice models and theories, the material and relational models, our new material deservingness and relational entitlement models, the uncertainty management theory, the deontic model, Feather’s model of deservingness and the fairness theory. These links show that the fairness theory can encompass the deontic and Feather’s models and that the fairness theory and the uncertainty management theory can explain the material deservingness and the relational entitlement programs. In a sense, this is a way to respond to the remark “it is not entirely clear how much the instrumental and interpersonal models pertain to morality” (Cropanzano et al., 2003, p 1019). In our view fair distributions of material and relational benefits directly pertain to morality.

Eighth, a typology is proposed, on the ground of two factors, which allows one to understand the conditions for considering justice as being consistently more important than favorability: when people have reached a sufficient level of moral development and when they are not submitted to situations or personal characteristics that evoke harsh emotions and automatic judgments processes. This typology and the answer it allows to find to the question why people give more importance to justice than to favorability would be interesting to test in future field studies.

The author thanks Eve Chiapello and Gerold Mikula for their helpful comments, Lydie Tournaire for assistance with library research and the HEC foundation for its grant, essential to the preparation of this article.

References


