Research seminars

Fleeting Orders

Finance

Speaker: Shmuel Baruch
The University of Utah

30 April 2015


We study a dynamic limit order market with a finite number of strategic liquidity suppliers who post limit orders. Their limit orders are hit by either news (i.e. informed) traders or noise traders. We show that repeatedly playing a mixed strategy equilibrium of a certain static game is a subgame perfect equilibrium with fleeting orders and flickering quotes. Furthermore, regardless of the distributions of the liquidation value and noise trade quantity, we always find a sequence of equilibria in mixed strategies such that the resulting random supply schedule converges in mean square, as the number of liquidity suppliers increases to infinity, to the deterministic competitive supply function.

Finance

Speaker: Matthieu Bouvard
Desautels Faculty of Management

14 June 2018 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Mikhail Simutin
Rotman School of Management

7 June 2018 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Liyan Yang
Rotman School of Management

31 May 2018 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Anton Lines
Columbia Business School

24 May 2018 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm


Finance

Speaker: Ian Martin
LSE

17 May 2018 - From 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm



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