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Associate Professor
Economics - Decision Science
Member of CNRS-GREGHEC Research Group
Tristan Tomala was a student at ENSAE before doing a Ph.D. on game theory (defended in 1996) at University Paris I. Prior to joining HEC Paris, he was assistant professor (maitre de conférences) at University Paris Dauphine. His research interests are about the various aspects of information and communication in dynamic games. He studies strategic information transmission in repeated games using information theory, graph theory and cryptography and has also a special interest for information and communcation networks.
His recent works are published in Games and Economic Behavior (2014), Mathematics of Operations Research (2013), Theoretical Economics (2012), Journal of Economic Theory (2011). At HEC, he teaches managerial economics in HEC 1st year and game theory in the Masters of Business Economics and in the Master of Economics of Paris Saclay.
Tristan Tomala is associate editor for Dynamic Games and Applications, International Journal of Game Theory, Operations Research Letters and Theory and Decision.
"Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments", Journal of Economic Theory, September 2015, vol. 159, Part A, pp. 401-442 (in coll. with L. RENOU).
"Secure message transmission on directed networks", Games and Economic Behavior, May 2014, vol. 85, n° 1, pp. 1-18 (in coll. with J. RENAULT, L. RENOU).
"Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games", Mathematics of Operations Research, November 2013, vol. 38, n° 4, pp. 617-637.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information", Games and Economic Behavior, January 2012, vol. 74, n° 1, pp. 222-234 (in coll. with Y. Heller, E. Solan).
"Mechanism design and communication networks", Theoretical Economics, September 2012, vol. 7, n° 3, pp. 489-533 (in coll. with L. Renou).
"Repeated Congestion Games with Bounded Rationality", International Journal of Game Theory, August 2012, vol. 41, n° 3, pp. 651-669 (in coll. with M. SCARSINI).
"Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence", Journal of Economic Theory, September 2011, vol. 146, n° 5, pp. 1770-1795 (in coll. with J. Hörner, S. LOVO).
"Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems", Operations Research, May-June 2011, vol. 59, n° 3, pp. 754-763.
"Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring", Journal of Mathematical Economics, January 2011, vol. 47, n° 1, pp. 14-21 (in coll. with P. Contou-Carrère).
"General properties of long-run supergames", Dynamic Games and Applications, 2011, vol. 1, n° 2, pp. 319-350 (in coll. with J. Renault).
"Informationally optimal correlation", Mathematical Programming, January 2009, vol. 116, n° 1/2, pp. 147-172 (in coll. with O. Gossner, R. Laraki).
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring", Games and Economic Behavior, November 2009, vol. 67, n° 2, pp. 682-694.
"Entropy bounds on Bayesian Learning", Journal of Mathematical Economics, January 2008, vol. 44, n° 1, pp. 24-32 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"Playing off-line games with bounded rationality", Mathematical Social Sciences, September 2008, vol. 56, n° 2, pp. 207-223 (in coll. with J. Renault, M. SCARSINI).
"Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks", Journal of Cryptology, April 2008, vol. 21, n° 2 (in coll. with J. Renault).
"A Minority Game with Bounded Recall", Mathematics of Operations Research, November 2007, vol. 32, n° 4, pp. 873-889 (in coll. with J. Renault, M. SCARSINI).
"Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring", Mathematics of Operations Research, May 2007, vol. 32, n° 2 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"The emergence of complex social networks, a discussion", Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, April-June 2007, n° 86, pp. 19-23.
"Empirical Distributions of beliefs under imperfect monitoring", Mathematics of Operations Research, February 2006, vol. 31, n° 1, pp. 13-31 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring", Games and Economic Behavior, November 2004, vol. 49, n° 2, pp. 313-344 (in coll. with J. Renault).
"Learning the state of nature in repeated game with incomplete information and signals", Games and Economic Behavior, April 2004, vol. 47, n° 1, pp. 124-156 (in coll. with J. Renault).
"Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors", Games and Economic Behavior, August 1999, vol. 28, n° 2, pp. 310-324.
"Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation", International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, n° 1, pp. 93-109.
"Repeated proximity games", International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, n° 4, pp. 539-559 (in coll. with J. Renault).
Théorie des jeux, Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés, Les Editions de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 2006 (in coll. with R. Laraki, J. Renault).
"Repeated Games with Complete Information", in Computational Complexity - Theory, Techniques and Applications, R. A. Meyers (Ed.), Springer, 2012, 2620-2634 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"Repeated Games", in Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, R. A. Meyers (Ed.), Springer, 2009 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"Value of information in repeated decision problems", Mimeo, (in coll. with O. Gossner).
"Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2015 (in coll. with F. GENSBITTEL, L. RENOU).
"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2015 (in coll. with S. LOVO).
"Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2013 (in coll. with L. RENOU).
"Dynamic Congestion Games: The Price of Seasonality", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2013 (in coll. with M. SCARSINI).
"Belief-free Market Making", Mimeo, 2012 (in coll. with S. LOVO, J. Hörner).
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information", Mimeo, 2010 (in coll. with Y. Heller, E. Solan).
"Mechanism design and communication networks", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2010 (in coll. with L. Renou).
"Repeated Congestion Games with Bounded Rationality", Mimeo, 2010 (in coll. with M. SCARSINI).
"Secret information transmission", Mimeo, 2010 (in coll. with J. Renault, L. Renou).
"Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2009 (in coll. with J. Hörner, S. LOVO).
"Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence", Working Papers, Yale School of Management's Economics Research Network, 2009 (in coll. with S. LOVO, J. Hörner).
"Protocols for Fault Identifcation in Partially Known Networks", Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC, 2008.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring", Mimeo, 2007.
"A minority game with bounded recall", Cahier de recherche du CEREMADE, 2006 (in coll. with M. Scarsini, J. Renault).
"Entropy bounds on Bayesian Learning", Cahier de recherche du CEREMADE, 2006 (in coll. with O. Gossner).
Employment Date: 2007
Microeconomics
Mathematics for Economists
Game Theory
Mathematics of Economics.
2005 Habilitation à diriger des recherches (Qualified Research Supervisor), Université Paris - Dauphine, France.
1996 Doctorat en Mathématiques Appliquées (Ph.D. in Mathematics), Université de Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, France.
1993 DEA de Modélisation et Méthodes Mathématiques en Economie, Université de Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, France.
English
Membre du Comité pédagogie d'HEC.
2011- Associate Professor, Economics - Decision Science.
2007- Member, GREGHEC (CNRS).
2006-2006 (juin) Chercheur invité , Northwestern University.
2003-2003 Chercheur invité, Università degli Studi di Torino.
1998-2007 Senior lecturer, Université de Paris IX-Dauphine.
1996-1998 ATER, Université de Paris IX-Dauphine.
Membre et co-responsable scientifique du GDR 2932 Theorie des jeux : Modélisation Mathématique et Applications (http://www.ecp6.jussieu.fr/colloques/gdr/presentation.html).
Membre du GDR MOA Mathematiques de l'optimisation et applications.
Membre de l'Econometric Society.
Membre du groupe MODE de la SMAI. Elu au bureau du Groupe MODE .
Membre élu du conseil d'UFR de l'UFR MD à Paris Dauphine .
Reviewer, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of EconomicTheory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematics of Operations Research, Mathematical Social Sciences, Theory and Decision.
Associate Editor, Dynamic Games and Applications.
Associate Editor, Theory and Decision.
Member, Editorial Board, International Journal of Game Theory.
Depuis 2004, Co-organisateur du séminaire parisien de théorie des jeux (IHP, GIS X-HEC, PSE, Dauphine).
Organisateur de l'Ecole d'été du GDR 2932 Theorie des jeux : Modélisation Mathématique et Applications, ''Transmission d'information, jeux répétés, apprentissagee'', CNRS, Aussois.
Co-organisateur de la Conférence Internationale : Théorie des jeux et applications, CIRM, Luminy.
Depuis 2008, Co-organisateur du séminaire XHEC d'Economie Théorique, joint avec Polytechnique (GIS X-HEC).
Game Theory
Repeated games
Stochastic Processes
Information theory
Cryptography
Graphs
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