To Thine Own Self Be True: Asymmetric Information in Procurement Auctions

Information Systems and Operations Management

_{^{SPEAKER: Joel Wooten Assistant Professor Darla Moore School of Business}}

HEC Campus - Jouy-En-Josas - Bâtiment T - Salle 15

Abstract

This talk explores how we developed useful insights for a common value auction problem without a clear, closed-form analytical solution. As procurement auctions increasingly move to digital platforms, more data and information is available (or can be made available) to bidders. Despite this trend, relatively little is known about the impact of information asymmetries in these settings. In a design that mirrors real construction auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of two asymmetries and finds that a better understanding of estimate precision decreases bidder profit, counter to our expectation. The implication from our realistic setting – that reduced uncertainty may not help – raises important questions about the degree of transparency that is optimal in procurement auctions.

Biography

Joel Wooten is an assistant professor of management science at the University of South Carolina's Darla Moore School of Business. His research focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship, and his classroom experience includes courses in innovation and design, web-based products and services, business analytics, and statistics. He holds doctoral and master's degrees from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and a bachelor's degree from Georgia Tech. 

His recent projects include work with innovation tournaments and recommendation systems as well as research partnerships with XPRIZE and Merck. With a history of entrepreneurial involvement, he has helped companies ranging from Fortune 500 firms to a local barbecue restaurant chain. Prior to returning to academia, he spent three years as a strategy consultant for Bain & Company.

https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/moore/directory/wooten_joel.php